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Thesis Abstract
Introduction: The notion of mental health has been used to designate a range 
of concepts and a great deal of controversy surrounds discussions about the 
meaning of the construct. Despite its elusive nature, there is a growing body of 
research indicating that the ways in which healthcare professionals 
conceptualise mental health may have important clinical implications. It is 
argued that the quantitative methodologies employed by previous studies have 
not been able to capture the complexity of healthcare professionals accounts. 
Objective: This study aimed to explore clinical psychologists accounts of 
mental health and its effects by using a qualitative methodology sensitive to the 
performative, variable and contextual aspects of discourse.
Design: A discursive psychological approach was taken in the analysis of data 
from semi-structured interviews. 
Method: Data was collected from eleven interviews conducted with clinical 
psychologists in the East Midlands region of the UK. 
Results: The findings demonstrated a wide range of constructions of mental 
health available to clinical psychologists, implying that their accounts are 
considerably more complex and flexible than previous quantitative studies have 
outlined. The study demonstrated how clinical psychologists use various 
discursive strategies to construct their accounts as credible and to manage 
issues of accountability. Clinical psychologists who constructed mental health in 
realist terms tended to draw on a biopsychosocial framework and employ 
discursive strategies such as case examples and stake inoculation to present 
their accounts as factual. Those who viewed mental health as a social 
construction focussed on the language associated with mental health and the 
implications of using this. This functioned to warrant a political analysis and to 
create a rationale for introducing alternative views of mental health. Participants 
drew on a discourse of moral concern for clients in considering the effects of 
their ideas about mental health on their clinical work thus allowing clinical 
psychologists talk to be viewed from a moral framework where accountability 
could be managed within interactions.
Discussion: The study offers a novel approach to the exploration of mental 
health, highlighting the various difficulties that clinical psychologists face in 
negotiating this concept and its effects. The constructs and discursive strategies 
drawn on by clinical psychologists in this research were consistent with past 
discursively informed studies, showing a cross-topic relevance by 
demonstrating how clinicians rely on particular rhetorical devices to get things 
done in verbal interactions. The results of this study suggests that there is a 
need for clinicians to be honest about the contingent and situated nature of their 
language and knowledge and to be mindful of the effects of their use of 
language on different stakeholders in talking about mental health. Clearly, if 
clinicians are not open about such issues there is a risk of service-users 
passively complying with a process that they do not understand or feel they 
benefit from, thereby ethically compromising clinical psychologists practice.
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9Healthcare Professionals’ Conceptualisations of Mental Health/Illness:
A Systematic Review1
Axel Lofgren, Roshan das Nair and Vanessa Hewitt
Trent Doctorate in Clinical Psychology, University of Nottingham
Abstract
Whilst the impact of healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental 
health/illness on clinical practice is empirically well-based, the dimensions underlying 
such conceptualisations and the factors that influence them are less clear. Hence, 
the present systematic review sought to examine how healthcare professionals 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness have been defined, measured and 
analysed in past research. A comprehensive literature search of databases, 
including Medline, Psycarticles, Psycinfo and Web of Knowledge from 1977 to 2011 
was conducted. This was supplemented by a review of reference lists of all identified 
studies, reviews and commentary articles as well as citation tracking. Articles were 
included in the review if they explored conceptualisations of mental health and used 
healthcare professionals as participants. All identified studies were assessed for 
quality and data relating to study design, definitions of mental health/illness and 
measures of conceptualisations of mental health/illness were extracted. Of 267 
identified studies, 7 met the inclusion criteria. Studies were conducted in France, 
USA and the UK. The included studies were generally of poor methodological quality 
with limited discussion of the dimensions and the factors implicated in
conceptualisations of mental health/illness. The assessment instruments used to 
examine healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental health/illness were 
also fraught with methodological flaws. The present review has highlighted gaps in 
existing research and identified various points for future studies to take into 
consideration.
                                               
1 The systematic review will be submitted to the Journal of Community Psychology. 
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1. Introduction
1.1 Background
There has been a long-standing debate about the ontological status of mental 
health/illness and the distinct positions taken by healthcare professionals has been 
argued to guide and inform their reasoning about mental health/illness and their 
approaches to assessment, formulation and intervention (Harland et al., 2009). It has 
therefore been suggested that healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental 
health/illness have important clinical implications for the work with service-users 
(Hugo, 2001). Since Engels introduced the biopsychosocial (BPS) model of mental 
health in 1977, which holds that mental health/illness is influenced by interactions of 
biological, psychological and environmental factors, a number of studies have been 
conducted investigating the clinical implications of conceptualising mental 
health/illness in terms of these factors. The most consistent findings of such studies 
have been that clinicians subscribing to a more biological perspective are less 
optimistic about treatment outcomes (Holmqvist, 2000), make more biased 
diagnostic decisions (Morey & Ochoa, 1989) and provide decreased quality of 
treatment (Wallach, 2004) compared to professionals who conceptualise mental 
health/illness in psychosocial terms. Conversely, healthcare professionals endorsing 
psychosocial explanations for mental health/illness have been shown to be more 
willing to involve service-users in the management of mental health services (Kent & 
Read, 1998), make more use of non-medical treatments (Cape, Antebi, Standen & 
Glazebrook, 1994) but also to be more likely to blame service-users for their 
behaviour (Miresco & Kirmayer, 2006) than clinicians endorsing a biological 
perspective of mental health/illness.
However, the findings from these studies need to be treated with caution because 
they have differed in the rigour with which they have attempted to define or measure 
healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental health/illness and in the 
extent to which they have controlled for variables that may affect such 
conceptualisations (Jorm, Korten, Jacomb, Christensen & Henderson, 1999). As a 
result, findings have often been inconclusive, inconsistent and in some cases 
contradictory. This has led researchers to criticise existing studies and the 
associated arguments may be broadly divided into the following points.
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First, previous studies have relied upon the a priori assumption that mental 
health/illness is a consensual object of thought about which only attributions may 
vary. However, there is no clear definition of mental health or illness used in these 
studies and the two concepts are often used inter-changeably (Malek, 2004), thus 
limiting the validity of the research. Second, existing experimental studies have 
tended to offer participants a choice between biological and psychosocial 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness, thus leaving little or no room for more 
multifaceted and integrative conceptions of mental health/illness and potentially 
limiting respondents viewpoints (Wyatt & Livson, 1994).  Third, the methodologies 
(e.g. questionnaires, experimental designs) used to assess healthcare professionals 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness have generally addressed the issue from 
a naturalist point of view, assuming that the boundaries between mental health and 
illness can be examined and determined through the use of rigorous scientific 
methods (Link, Yang, Phelan & Collins, 2004). 
The aforementioned criticisms have led researchers to suggest that healthcare 
professionals conceptualisations of mental health/illness warrant further study 
(Petrie, Broadbent & Kydd, 2008; Wahl, 2010). For the purpose of the present 
review, "conceptualisation" is operationally defined as a semantic structure that 
encodes knowledge constraining the structure of a piece of a domain such as mental 
health/illness2. As noted, there is extensive evidence suggesting healthcare 
professionals conceptualisations of mental health/illness to have important clinical 
implications but only little is known about its components (Morant, 2006). The mental 
health field is characterised by its lack of consensus about what mental health/illness 
is. It has been noted that this has allowed multiple competing and sometimes 
contradictory paradigms of mental health/illness to coexist. In this way, explanations 
of the nature, causes and treatment3 of mental health problems may draw on 
cognitive, behavioural, social, biological, humanistic, psychodynamic and systemic 
frameworks of mental health/illness while offering little or no guidance on how to 
                                               
2 The terms conceptualisation, model and representation will be used inter-changeably in the 
present review to mean the same thing unless otherwise stated.
3 Even the words used to describe a paradigm indicate its perspective (or bias;) depending on the 
ontological framework of the researcher or the therapist. Therefore, the ability to be neutral, even in 
this review, is problematic.
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compare or choose between them (Morant, 2006). This heterogeneity of models of 
mental health/illness raises the question of how past research has attempted to 
define and measure healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental 
health/illness which, in themselves, seem fragmented. It was hoped that employing a 
systematic review methodology would lead to an increased understanding of how 
healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental health/illness have been 
defined, measured and analysed by past studies. It has been proposed that recent 
decades are an especially significant timeframe to explore healthcare professionals 
representations of mental health/illness since historically taken-for-granted models 
have been challenged (Morant, 2006). Researchers have suggested that this shift in 
paradigms may help to access conceptualisations of mental health/illness that would 
previously have remained implicit or unverbalized (Gervais, Morant & Penn, 1999).
1.2 Definitions of Mental Health/Illness
Definitions of mental health/illness vary as a result of changes in historical 
conceptualisations and differences in the ontological framework subscribed to by 
individuals (Horwitz & Scheid, 1999). For instance, medical naturalism holds that an 
objective world of natural categories exists, and therefore defines mental health by 
distinguishing it from mental illness (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2009). More modern 
definitions tend to emphasise not only the absence of disease or infirmity but also 
physical, mental and social well-being (WHO, 2011). Social constructionists, on the 
other hand, suggest that the concept of mental health and illness is a socially 
constructed representation of the unknowable human condition and the result of a 
wider worldview reflecting the interest of society at large (Foucault, 1972). Schinnar, 
Rothbard, Kanter and Jung (1990) reviewed US literature and identified 17 different 
definitions of severe and persistent mental illness. The authors found the 
prevalence rate of severe mental illness to vary from 4% to 88% in the general 
population depending on the definition used. This finding was used to emphasise the 
fact that healthcare professionals understanding of concepts such as mental 
health/illness have important real-life implications but it also highlights how 
definitions of mental health are used differently depending on when it is used, where 
it is used and who is using it. However, given that definitions are culturally and 
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ontologically dependent (Horwitz & Scheid, 1999; Weare, 2000), the authors own 
cultural and ontological frameworks are likely to have impacted on the inclusion 
criteria used and hence also their results. For the purpose of the current study, the 
generic terms mental health/illness will be used as if they were relatively 
consensual terms4. However, given the objectives of the present review, an a priori
definition of mental health or mental illness will not be provided. 
1.3 Objectives 
The aim of the present systematic literature review was to examine how healthcare 
professionals conceptualisations of mental health/illness have been defined, 
measured and analysed in past research. The present review will identify the current 
status of the methods used to systematically describe the conceptualisations of 
mental health/illness in order to identify gaps in the current literature and establish a 
research agenda for furthering our understanding of healthcare professionals 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness.
                                               
4 The use of these terms does not imply the adoption of any particular theoretical approach.
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2. Method
A systematic review of social and medical science databases was carried out (see 
information sources) and two specific factors were adhered to in the design. Firstly, 
because of the broad nature of the research question, the methodology was 
designed to achieve a high degree of specificity to identify only studies examining 
healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental health/illness. For the 
purpose of the present review, the generic term healthcare professionals refers to 
individuals qualified as psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, psychiatric nurses and 
social workers5. Given the large number of studies investigating conceptualisations 
of mental health/illness amongst the general public (e.g. Link, Phelan, Bresnahan, 
Stueve & Pescosolido, 1999), populations with mental health problems (e.g. Lam & 
Salkovskis, 2006) and carers of individuals with mental health problems (e.g. 
Barrowclough, Lobban, Hatton & Quinn, 2001), care was taken to maximise the 
sensitivity of search results towards studies using healthcare professionals as 
participants of research studies.
The current review adopted a critical realist variation of social constructionism, 
assuming that an objective world exists but that power, culture and our senses limit 
the extent to which we can know this world (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999). This 
framework was considered appropriate for the present review as it implies that truth 
claims may be evaluated against evidence while, at the same time, it holds that 
knowledge, and by virtue, language, is socially constructed. It was hoped that this 
would allow for a systematic review of the identified studies without compromising 
the complexity of the research question. Such epistemological disclosure is essential 
so as to provide the reader with the perspective from which the review is conducted, 
thus increasing the transparency of the study (Horwitz & Scheid, 1999). 
2.1 Eligibility Criteria 
The process of selecting appropriate studies included reading the titles and abstracts 
of all articles retrieved from the searches. In cases where the suitability of the study 
could not be determined from the title or the abstract alone, full-text copies of the 
                                               
5 The current review will refer to this population as mental health professionals or name specific 
professions in instances where studies have described them as such.
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papers were obtained. The following inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied to 
all studies. Two main criteria were employed in considering articles to include in the 
review. Firstly, participants were healthcare professionals who had contact with 
service users as part of their work roles. Secondly, the aim of the studies was to 
explore conceptualisations of mental health or mental illness. This was done to 
maximise the sensitivity of results relevant to the research question, and because 
the terminology used to discuss mental health/illness has changed over time and 
across contexts (Weare, 2000), but also to exclude studies not investigating 
conceptualisations of mental health or illness. 
Studies that had not been previously published in peer-reviewed journals, grey-
literature and articles not available in English were excluded due to the limited 
resources available. To limit searches to more contemporary studies and to keep the 
search results manageable, articles published before 1977 were excluded. This 
period also relates to the introduction of the biopsychosocial model in 1977 (Engels, 
1977) which has had a considerable impact on contemporary conceptualisations of 
mental health/illness (Fava & Sonino, 2008) as reflected in the fact that it is often 
described as the ideal model of clinical psychology in undergraduate textbooks (e.g. 
Davison & Neale, 2001). In addition, studies focussing on attitudes about particular 
aspects of mental health/illness such as stigma, and articles examining beliefs about 
specific mental health conditions such as schizophrenia were excluded since the 
review was concerned with healthcare professionals more general 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness. Given that conceptualisations of mental 
health/illness are culturally determined (Weare, 2000), studies conducted outside of 
Europe and North America were excluded. While this geographical marker of 
culture is acknowledged to be problematic, it was chosen because of the parallels in 
both continents in terms of the use of comparable diagnostic systems such as the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (APA, 1994) and intervention 
strategies. No studies were excluded on the basis of research design as this might 
have unnecessarily limited the potential number of articles.
2.2 Information Sources
Suitable studies were identified through searching the following databases using a 
predefined search string. 
16
MEDLINE, 1977  2011, July Week 2
PsycARTICLES, 1977  2011, July Week 2
PsychINFO (Ovid), 1977  2011, July Week 1
Web of Knowledge, 1977  2011, August Week 2 
All primary study articles were searched for references and this provided an 
additional search strategy. Conference reports, commentaries, book chapters and 
editorials were also scanned for references of other published studies, but they 
themselves were not included in the review. 
2.3 Search Strategy
A systematic review of social and medical science databases was carried out. 
Search terms included mental health professional, healthcare professional, 
clinician, psychologist, psychiatrist, psychiatric nurse AND conceptualisation, 
representation, model, belief, attitude6 AND mental health, mental illness, 
psychopathology, mental disease, mental disorder, mental health condition, 
mental health state. Variations of these terms were also searched for by using 
truncation functions. The complete search strategy is available in Appendix A.
2.4 Assessment of Methodological Quality
The majority of quality rating scales have been designed to reduce the risk of bias in 
randomised controlled trials and as such appear inappropriate for the present review. 
Moreover, whether or how to make judgements of the quality of research is a widely 
contested issue and the use of formal appraisal tools has not been well supported by 
empirical research (Silverman, 2000). Nevertheless, there are a number of rating 
scales available that were not designed specifically for RCTs such as the Critical 
Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP, 2004), Long and Godfreys (2004) tool designed 
to explore descriptive and evaluative elements of studies and the Newcastle-Ottawa 
                                               
6 Some terms like attitude were included in the search to make it inclusive and to prevent missing 
studies that may have included some notion of conceptualisation.
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Scale (NOS) (Wells et al., 2006) employed to assess the quality of non-randomised 
studies. Critics have pointed out that these quality assessment scales have not been 
fully validated nor have they been found to include criteria that are associated with 
outcome or effect size in studies (Juni, Witschi, Bloch & Egger, 1999). In terms of the 
present review, the NOS was considered the most appropriate scale for evaluating 
quantitative studies since it is recommended by the Cochrane Non-Randomized 
Studies Methods Working Group for appraising observational studies and it has also 
been partly validated (Wells et al., 2006). However, research suggests the scoring 
system that the NOS is based on to be unreliable, arbitrary and hard to interpret 
(Juni, Witschi, Bloch & Egger, 1999). Nevertheless, an adapted version of the NOS 
was employed to systematically assess the included quantitative studies quality in 
terms of their selection of participants, design biases, definitions of mental 
health/illness and assessment of conceptualisations of mental health/illness. In line 
with the suggestion that assessing the quality of qualitative studies requires a 
separate set of procedures (Silverman, 2000), the Critical Appraisal Skills Program 
(CASP) was used as it is the most widely used quality assessment tool in the 
National Health Service (NHS) and it provides a methodological checklist with ten 
questions relating to rigour, credibility and relevance. 
2.5 Data Extraction
Data about the author, date of publication, participants, demographics of the study 
population, definition of mental health/illness provided, the measure of 
conceptualisations of mental health employed and the main findings were extracted 
from all of the included studies. Because the broad nature of the research question 
could result in large heterogeneity across studies in terms of definitions and 
measures of conceptualisations of mental health/illness, a meta-analysis was not 
considered.
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3. Results
By using the aforementioned search strategy, a total of 263 records were identified. 
Citation tracking and scanning of reference lists resulted in four additional studies 
being obtained that were not identified in the original search strategy.  
3.1 Study Selection
Out of the 267 studies, only 7 fulfilled the inclusion criteria. The process of obtaining 
and identifying studies for inclusion in the present review is summarised in Figure 1 
on the following page.
3.2 Study Characteristics 
Six of the identified studies employed quantitative methodologies whereas one 
approached the research question using a qualitative design. The characteristics of 
the seven studies included in the present review are summarised in Table 1.
3.3 Study Location
Of the seven identified studies, four were conducted in the United States, two were 
carried out in the United Kingdom and one was conducted both in the UK and in 
France.
3.4 Participant Characteristics
Out of the seven included articles, two studies used qualified psychiatrists, clinical 
psychologists and social workers as participants (Ahn, Flanagan, Marsh & Sanislow, 
2006; Ahn, Proctor & Flanagan, 2009). Two studies examined psychiatrists, clinical 
psychologists, psychiatric nurses and social workers conceptualisations of mental 
health/illness (Morant, 1995; Morrison & Hanson, 1978). The remaining studies used 
psychiatrists (Toone, Murray, Clare, Creed & Smith, 1979), trainee psychiatrists 
(Harland et al., 2009) and psychiatrists and clinical psychologists (Wyatt & Livson, 
1994) as participants. The total number of participants of all the studies combined 
amounted to 539 healthcare professionals.
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Figure 1. Flow chart of the stages of identifying studies to be included in the 
literature review. 
263 records obtained through 
searching previously 
mentioned databases
4 additional studies identified 
through scanning reference 
lists
A total of 267 records 
identified as being potentially 
relevant to the research 
question  
The 267 studies were 
screened and evaluated 
against the predefined 
inclusion and exclusion 
criteria
8 full text studies were 
assessed for eligibility
7 studies were found to meet 
the criteria for inclusion in the 
systematic review
Participants werent healthcare 
professionals = 119 records
Examined attitudes towards people 
diagnosed with mental health issues = 
57 records
Measured conceptualisations of 
mental health in relation to stigma= 32 
records
Examined conceptualisations of 
specific mental health conditions= 24 
records
Review or commentary papers = 16 
records
Reasons for Exclusion
Conducted in and concerned with 
conceptualisations of mental health in 
Thailand specifically = 1 study
Reasons for Exclusion
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Author, Year & 
Country
Sample Size Population Studied Mental Health/Illness
Conceptualisation Measure(s)
Main Findings
Ahn, Flanagan, 
Marsh & Sanislow 
(2006), USA
30 10 psychiatrists, 10 
clinical psychologists and 
10 social workers 
Bespoke measure of orientation 
(cognitive, behavioural, eclectic, 
psychoanalytic) and measure of 
participants beliefs about whether 
mental and medical disorders naturally 
exist in the real world 
Participants did not subscribe to categorical 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness 
that assume mental disorders to exist 
naturally in the world. Participants 
conceptualised mental disorders as being 
invented and decided upon by experts.
Ahn, Proctor & 
Flanagan (2009), 
USA
59 
(This was a new 
sample of healthcare 
professionals, none of 
whom participated in 
the above study).  
20 psychiatrists, 20 
clinical psychologists and 
19 social workers
Measure of believed causal basis of 
mental health issues using three 
dimensions (biological, psychological, 
social)
Participants tended to conceptualise 
different mental health states on a
continuum, ranging from disorders of body to 
disorders of mind. Disorders that were 
thought to be strongly biological were 
considered to be only weakly psychological 
and environmental, and vice versa. 
Harland, Antonova, 
Owen, Broome, 
Landau, Deeley & 
Murray (2009), U.K.
76 Psychiatrists MAQ containing items formulated to 
probe psychiatrists beliefs about mental 
illness. It divides each paradigm  
(biological, behavioural, cognitive, 
psychodynamic, social realist, social 
constructivist, nihilist and spiritualist) into 
four dimensions (aetiology, 
classification, research and treatment)
Most participants subscribed to the biological 
model of mental illness although this varied 
depending on the aspect of mental illness 
that was examined.
Wyatt & Livson 
(1994), USA
151 82 psychiatrists and 69 
clinical psychologists
MHQ was used to evaluate participants 
positions within the domains of 
psychosocial and medical models of 
mental illness, diagnosis, drug treatment 
and sociocultural values. Questionnaire 
items were derived from a survey of the 
literature on models of mental illness 
and included 105 items
Psychiatrists indicated a greater degree of 
acceptance for medical-model positions and 
less acceptance of psychosocial-model 
positions than did psychologists. More 
experienced psychiatrists and psychologists 
were more psychosocial-oriented and less 
medical-model oriented than their less 
experienced counterparts.
Table 1. Characteristics and Main Findings of Identified Studies.
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Abbreviations used in Table 1: (CAQ-A) Client Attitude Questionnaire, (MAQ) Maudsley Attitude Questionnaire, and (MHQ) Mental Health Questionnaire
Author, Year & 
Country
Sample Size Population Studied Mental Health/illness 
Conceptualisation Measure(s)
Main Findings
Morrison & Hanson 
(1978), USA 
84 26 psychiatrists, 16 
clinical psychologists, 23 
psychiatric nurses and 25 
social workers.
Adapted version of the CAQ-A, designed 
to assess the extent to which 
participants endorse or reject 
psychosocial and medical explanations 
of mental illness
Clinical psychologists were found to endorse 
the psychosocial model of mental 
health/illness whereas psychiatrists 
subscribed to the medical model 
Toone, Murray, 
Clare, Creed & 
Smith (1979), U.K.
79 Psychiatrists Amalgamation  of two questionnaires 
used to create a bespoke tool consisting 
of 68 items purporting to measure 
models of mental illness
No support for any particular model of 
mental illness but higher age, senior status 
and more published papers were all 
associated with the endorsement of a 
biological model.
Morant (1995), 
France and U.K. 
60 Psychiatrists, clinical 
psychologists, psychiatric 
nurses and social 
workers (the study did 
not specify the amount of 
participants belonging to 
each professional group)
Semi-structured interviews to explore 
mental health professionals 
representations of mental illness, these 
were analysed using thematic content 
analysis 
No one fixed understanding of mental illness 
dominates professionals understandings of 
mental health/illness. Instead participants 
conceptualisations were multiple and 
sometimes contradictory. 
Table 1 (cont). Characteristics and Main Findings of Identified Studies.
3.5 Methodological Quality of Studies
The methodological quality of the quantitative studies was assessed using an 
adapted version of the Newcastle-Ottawa Scale (NOS), and was found to be varied 
across the included studies as presented in Table 2. 
Quantitative Studies
Selection Methods 
Although the studies selected participants from a wide range of sources, the 
reporting of selection and recruitment methods was generally found to be poor. Two 
of the six studies using a quantitative design provided no or very limited details about 
the selection and recruitment methods (Morrison & Hanson, 1978; Ahn, Flanagan, 
Marsh & Sanislow, 2006). Ahn, Proctor and Flanagan (2009), Toone, Murray, Clare, 
Creed and Smith (1978) and Harland et al., (2009) contacted all licensed healthcare 
professionals working in specific hospitals and healthcare trusts by post but provided 
little information about how these individuals were identified. Morrison and Hanson 
(1978) contacted mental health professionals that were personally known by the 
authors for participation in the study, and Wyatt and Livson (1994) randomly selected 
psychologists and psychiatrists working in the San Francisco bay area with no 
indication of how this process took place. The lack of detail about the selection and 
recruitment methods limits the extent to which these studies can be reproduced and 
generalised to different populations.
Design Biases
All of the included studies recorded participants age and gender and so unless 
stated, it may be assumed that these was controlled for. The reviewed studies 
identified a number of confounding factors, with clinical experience being the most 
prevalent. Extensive research indicates that the amount of clinical experience, or 
contact with individuals with mental health problems, has an impact on peoples 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness (Couture & Penn, 2003) and this was 
identified and controlled for in all but one of the studies. In Morrison and Hansons 
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(1978) study the participants were personally known by the authors and so no 
demographic data other than age and gender was recorded in order to preserve the 
anonymity of participants. 
Two studies (Ahn, Proctor & Flanagan, 2009; Wyatt & Livson, 1994) not only 
controlled for years of clinical experience, but also attempted to control for amount of 
client contact by including a measure of this. Three studies (Harland et al., 2009; 
Ahn, Proctor & Flanagan, 2009; Toone, Murray, Clare, Creed & Smith, 1978) also 
incorporated a measure of clinical research as this was hypothesised to influence 
healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental health/illness. However, the 
studies differed in their ways of measuring participants clinical research experience 
with Harland et al., (2009) recording the number of peer-reviewed papers, Ahn, 
Proctor and Flanagan (2009) measuring years of clinical research and Toone, 
Murray, Clare, Creed and Smith (1978) controlling for the number of published 
journal papers. Only three of the six quantitative studies controlled for the setting of 
the participants workplace (Harland et al., 2009; Wyatt & Livson, 1994; Ahn, Proctor 
& Flanagan, 2009) which is noteworthy since the context in which people has contact 
with individuals with mental health issues has been found to influence their 
perceptions of mental health/illness (Zani, 2005). Of particular note is the lack of 
studies including participants ethnicity into their design, with Ahn, Proctor and 
Flanagans (2009) study being the only one to record this. Given that 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness are culturally determined (Weare, 2000), 
this may represent a potentially large confounding factor that has not been controlled 
for in the majority of the studies. 
Definitions of Mental Health/Illness
None of the quantitative studies provided an explicit definition of mental health/illness 
but a range of different terminology was employed to describe the concept and 
various factors were referred to as being pertinent to the subject. Two of the studies 
(Toone et al., 1978; Morrison & Hanson, 1978) referred to mental illness as a 
unidimensional construct occurring on a linear continuum. In such definitions, 
medical and psychosocial explanations represent opposite poles on a single scale. 
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Unidimensional definitions have been widely criticised for being simplistic, and this 
has led to more multi-dimensional frameworks being developed such as the 
biopsychosocial model (Engels, 1977). In line with this, four of the studies suggested 
that mental disorders (Ahn et al., 2006; Ahn, Proctor & Flanagan, 2009) and mental 
illnesses (Wyatt & Livson, 1994; Harland et al., 2009) cannot be readily classified as 
either biological or psychological phenomena but instead should be thought of as 
complex multi-level phenomena. Ahn et al. (2006), Ahn, Proctor and Flanagan 
(2009) and Toone et al. (1978) discuss the impact of cultural context on 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness. Three of the studies (Harland et al., 
2009; Wyatt & Livson, 1994; Ahn et al., 2006) also describe mental illness as a 
social construct based on a mistaken analogy between physical illness and 
psychological distress. 
Measures of Mental Health/Illness Conceptualisations
The six quantitative studies all used questionnaires to measure participants 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness, four of which had been tested for validity 
and internal consistency (Wyatt & Livson, 1994; Ahn et al., 2006; Toone et al., 1978; 
Harland et al., 2009). Most of the studies employed unidimensional measures of 
mental health/illness conceptualisations, such as the Maudsley Attitude 
Questionnaire (MAQ) (Harland et al., 2009) asking participants to rate the extent to 
which they agree with statements about mental illness, pertaining to the major 
conceptual paradigms in mental health/illness. Unidimensional measures have been 
criticised on the grounds that they neglect valuable information by not discerning 
underlying dimensions of constructs (Hattie, 1985), a limitation that may be 
particularly relevant to the field of mental health/illness given its broad nature. 
To address these shortcomings, Wyatt and Livson (1994) employed a 
multidimensional instrument to evaluate healthcare professionals positions within 
the domains of psychosocial and medical models of mental illness, diagnosis, drug 
treatment and sociocultural values. The authors suggested that this approach would 
allow for more multifaceted conceptualisations of mental illness to be recorded. 
However, such questionnaires may be criticised for their implicit demand to select a 
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single conceptualisation of mental health/illness, thus limiting the extent to which 
participants are allowed to express truly multi-faceted conceptions. Moreover, it is 
well-established that questionnaires may capture idealized rather than participants 
actual conceptualisations of mental health/illness due to social desirability effects 
(Link et al., 2004). Moreover, there was no discussion of the potential influence and 
bias of the researcher on data collection or interpretation.
Qualitative Study
The only included qualitative article was Morants (1995) study exploring 
representations of mental illness among British and French mental health 
professionals. The quality of the study was assessed using the Critical Appraisal 
Skills Program (CASP). The aims to explore mental health professionals 
representations of mental illness in Britain and France and its relevance were 
explicitly stated and since the aim of the study was to explore mental health 
professionals subjective representations of mental illness, the choice of 
methodology was deemed to be appropriate. There was little justification of the 
research design and no reference to the possibility of triangulation of methods. 
However, given the complexity the research issue, the use of semi-structured 
interviews seem appropriate as it allows participants to express a wide range of 
potential conceptualisations of mental health/illness. 
The study employed purposeful sampling to obtain a sample representative of the 
full range of mental health professionals working in the two countries but without 
mention of how they were selected. There was no discussion of participants' clinical 
experience despite this being known to impact on individuals conceptualisations of 
mental health/illness (Couture & Penn, 2003). The authors provided some 
information about the procedure of the interviews and the themes explored. 
However, there was no justification of the form of data collection, no mention of the 
form of the data, no discussion of saturation of data and there was no reference to 
how/if methods were modified in the data collection process. Moreover, there was no 
indication of whether ethical standards were maintained, whether informed consent 
and ethics approval were sought and there was no discussion of how the researcher 
26
handled the effects of the study on the participants. The study included a detailed 
description of the analysis process, how the themes were derived from the data and 
how quotes were selected to be included in the study. The article also integrated 
contradictory data and discussed the possible reasons for this along with its 
implications. However, there was a lack of reflexivity and no critical examination of 
the potential influence and bias of the researcher on data collection or interpretation. 
The findings of the study were explicitly stated and evidence for and against the 
findings were included and discussed in relation to the original research question. 
However, the study did not mention any tools used to verify findings such as 
triangulation or respondent validation. The contribution of the study to existing 
knowledge was considered in terms of its findings in relation to clinical practice and 
organisational policy. The findings were also discussed in relation to representations 
of mental health/illness held by lay people along with suggestions of how the findings 
may be transferred to other populations. In summary, Morants (1995) use of semi-
structured interviews is valuable as it allows participants to express multifaceted and 
contradictory conceptualisations of mental health/illness. However, the study lacked 
a statement on reflexivity and a critical examination of the role of the researcher in 
selecting and analysing the data.
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Primary 
Author & 
Year
Adequate Selection 
Methods
Design Biases Present Definition and Discussion of Mental 
Health/illness
Assessment of Conceptualisations of 
Mental Health/illness
Ahn 
(2006)
Yes. Comprehensive 
details available in 
reference.
Yes. Controlled for years of 
clinical experience but no control 
for amount of client contact, 
setting of work or ethnicity.
Discussion of the impact of cultural 
factors on definitions of mental illness and
mentions the social constructionist notion 
of mental illness as a myth.
Questionnaire measuring the extent to which 
participants believe mental illnesses to be 
categorical or dimensional. A pilot study was 
carried out to ensure face validity of the 
instrument and it was also tested for its 
internal consistency.
Ahn 
(2009)
Unknown, insufficient 
information provided to 
ascertain sample.
Only study to control for 
participants ethnicity. Also 
controlled for years of clinical 
experience, amount of client 
contact, setting of work and years 
of clinical research. 
Describes mental disorders as complex, 
multi-level phenomena. Also discusses 
the impact of culture and ontological 
beliefs on definitions.
Measure of believed causal basis of mental 
health issues (biological, psychological, 
social). No details provided regarding the 
validity and reliability of the instrument.
Harland
(2009)
Yes. Population and 
selection methods were 
well described. 
Yes. Controlled for years of 
clinical experience, amount of 
research experience and setting
of work. However, no control for 
amount of client contact or 
ethnicity.
Reference to how different ontological 
frameworks impact on definitions. Mention 
of the social constructionist notion of 
mental illness as a myth based on 
mistaken analogy between physical 
illness and psychological distress.
Questionnaire with different statements about 
mental illness pertaining to the major 
conceptual paradigms. Included a pilot study 
to ensure that the format was clear and a 
validation study but was not tested for internal 
consistency.
Wyatt 
(1994)
No. Population well 
described but details 
about the selection 
process and the 
contexts in which this 
took place were limited. 
Yes. Controlled for years of 
clinical experience, amount of 
client contact and setting of work. 
No control for research 
experience or ethnicity. 
Refers to mental illness as a 
multidimensional construct consisting of 
various poles. Also mentions the social 
constructionist notion of mental illness as 
a myth.
Multidimensional questionnaire used to 
evaluate healthcare professionals positions 
within various domains of mental illness. 
Pretesting of questionnaire to ensure face 
validity. Highly reliable instrument as 
measured by the internal consistency of the 
items on the questionnaire (Cronbachs alpha 
= .93)
Table 2. Assessment of Methodological Quality of Identified Studies.
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Primary 
Author & 
Year
Adequate Selection 
Methods
Design Biases Present Adequate Definition and Discussion of 
Mental Health/illness
Adequate Assessment of 
Conceptualisations of Mental 
Health/illness
Morrison
(1978) 
No. Mental health 
professionals that were 
personally known by the 
authors were randomly 
contacted for 
participation in the 
study.
Yes. Did not control for any of the 
following potentially confounding 
variables: years of clinical 
experience, amount of client 
contact, setting of work or 
ethnicity of participants.
Describes mental illness as a 
unidimensional construct consisting of two 
poles; medical and psychosocial. Mention 
of mental illness as being an ineptly 
phrased concept as it gives proponents of 
a medical approach unwarranted moral 
and political power.
Adapted version of a unidimensional 
questionnaire designed to evaluate beliefs 
about mental illness. The instrument had 
previously been tested for reliability but not for 
validity.
Toone
(1979)
Yes. Selection and 
recruitment methods 
were well described.  
Yes. Controlled for years of 
clinical experience and amount of 
research experience but no 
control for amount of client 
contact, setting of work or 
ethnicity.
Describes mental illness as a 
unidimensional construct occurring on a 
linear continuum. Discussion of the 
impact of cultural factors on definitions of 
mental illness.
Unidimensional questionnaire consisting of 
items devised to measure models of mental 
illness. Half of the items consisted of 
propositions designed by the authors and 
were not tested for validity or reliability. 
Morant 
(1995)
Very limited details 
about the sample, and 
the selection and 
recruitment methods.
Study employed a qualitative 
design but only provided limited 
demographical data about the 
participants and the factors 
believed to influence their 
representations of mental illness.
Refers to mental illness as a 
multidimensional construct consisting of 
multiple dimensions. Discusses the 
impact of culture and the ontological 
framework subscribed to on definitions of 
mental illness.  
Semi-structured interviews analysed using 
thematic content analysis. There was little 
justification of the research design, no 
reference to the possibility of triangulation of 
methods and a lack of reflexivity.
Table 2 (cont). Assessment of Methodological Quality of Identified Studies.
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3.6 Conceptualisations of Mental Health
Overall, there was a great amount of variation in the ways that the included studies 
presented their findings and in what they found to be the conceptualisations of 
mental health/illness held by healthcare professionals. However, all studies included 
references to psychosocial and biological/medical explanations of mental 
health/illness. Amongst the first of studies conducted in this area was Morrison and 
Hansons (1978) study assessing the extent to which psychologists and psychiatrists 
endorse and reject psychosocial and medical explanations of mental illness using the 
CAQ-A (Morrison & Hanson, 1978). This unidimensional measure places 
respondents on a continuum, with psychosocial positions at one end and medical-
model positions at the other. The study found that psychiatrists endorse the medical 
model of mental illness whereas clinical psychologists endorse the psychosocial 
model. Similarly, other studies employing unidimensional measures of 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness found  participants to endorse biological 
explanations of mental health/illness (Toone, Murray, Clare, Creed & Smith, 1978; 
Harland et al., 2009) or psychosocial models (Ahn, Proctor & Flanagan, 2009). 
However, as previously noted, since unidimensional measures are not capable of 
making multifaceted assessments of healthcare professionals conceptualisations of 
mental health/illness they tend to homogenise groups and the results springing from 
such studies thus appear simplistic at best.
The only study using a multidimensional measure (MHQ, Wyatt & Livson, 1994) 
found that more experienced psychiatrists and psychologists are more psychosocial-
oriented and less medical-model oriented than their less experienced counterparts. 
Moreover, although not statistically significant, psychologists subscribing to systemic 
models of mental illness tended to give more weight to psychosocial explanations 
compared to psychologists endorsing psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioural 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness. However, it is possible that this was an 
effect of the participants amount of clinical training which the study did not control 
for. In the only included study to employ a qualitative methodology, Morant (1995),
found that healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental illness are multiple 
and sometimes contradictory. The studys methodology allowed it to analyse the 
themes brought up by its participants as well as the language used to express these. 
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It was found that the participants made frequent use of terms derived from medical 
understandings of mental illness such as psychosis and neurosis. However, there 
were also regular references to mental illness as being an individuals inability to 
cope with aspects of personal or social life, which were interpreted by the authors as 
signifying psychosocial conceptualisations of mental illness in the participants. It was 
also found that themes of otherness and sameness coexist in healthcare 
professionals conceptualisations of mental illness. Mental illness can thus be viewed 
as experiences that are different and not understandable (otherness) or as similar to 
other experiences (sameness). However, the study only provided limited 
demographical data about the participants which may have influenced these results. 
Moreover, the study failed to consider factors that may influence participants 
representations of mental illness, such as years of experience, and the potential bias 
of the researcher on data collection or interpretation.
4. Discussion
4.1 Summary of Evidence
The present review identified seven studies that investigated healthcare 
professionals conceptualisations of mental health/illness. The studies used a variety 
of measures such as questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, and assessed a 
range of aspects of healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental 
health/illness, including ontological frameworks and beliefs about aetiology, 
classification, research and treatment of mental health/illness. Because of the large 
heterogeneity across studies in terms of definitions and measures of 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness employed, no clear, discernable pattern 
between the studies findings could be identified. The studies that used 
unidimensional measures of conceptualisations of mental health/illness found that 
healthcare professionals either endorsed or rejected psychosocial and biomedical 
explanations of mental health/illness. This is not a particularity surprising finding 
given that such unidimensional measures are not capable of making multifaceted 
assessments of conceptualisations of mental health/illness. To assume from these 
studies that, as in Morrison and Hansons (1978) study, psychiatrists are more likely 
to conceptualise mental health/illness in biomedical terms than clinical psychologists 
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seems both imprecise and misleading. Indeed, a given healthcare professional may 
endorse a medical model in certain areas of practice, such as diagnosis, but adhere 
to psychosocial models in other areas, such as when planning and carrying out 
interventions. As such, the poor quality of these studies limits their applicability and 
the conclusions that can be drawn from them. 
Whilst there were evident differences across the included studies, there were three 
points of particular pertinence. Firstly, Wyatt and Livsons (1994) use of a 
multidimensional measure capable of accounting for a greater complexity of 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness compared to unidimensional measures. 
Secondly, Morants (1995) use of a qualitative methodology which allowed the author 
to record participants multiple and contradictory conceptualisations of mental illness 
whilst paying attention to themes and the language employed to express these. 
Lastly, Ahn, Proctor and Flanagan (2009) being the only study to control for 
participants ethnicity, despite evidence suggesting conceptualisations of mental 
health/illness to be culturally determined (Weare, 2000). This has two broad 
implications for the remaining studies. Firstly, conceptualisations of mental 
health/illness may be most appropriately assessed using multidimensional or 
qualitative measures. Secondly, ethnicity or culture may be a confounding variable 
that needs to be controlled for. However, in the 24 years of research reviewed in the 
present study, few studies have taken such factors into consideration.
4.2 Limitations
There are a number of limitations to this review. Firstly, the search strategy was 
designed with the aim of maximising the sensitivity of results relevant to 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness whilst maintaining high specificity to 
studies examining healthcare professionals conceptualisations. Although the term 
conceptualisation has been extensively used in previous studies exploring 
representations of mental health/illness, it is possible that studies using different 
terminology were excluded on this basis. However, given the extensive search 
through reference lists and commentary papers in which such studies may have 
been identified, it is thought that this potential bias was limited. Secondly, the search 
strategy was intentionally kept broad in order to maximise the sensitivity of results 
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and this yielded a range of studies that considered various aspects of healthcare 
professionals conceptualisations of mental health/illness. It is possible that by 
employing a search strategy focussing on more specific aspects of healthcare 
professionals conceptualisations of mental health/illness would have resulted in 
additional studies relevant to the research question. Thirdly, the search strategy was 
also limited to published studies conducted in Europe and North America and 
presented in the English language. Given acknowledged cultural differences in 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness (Weare, 2000), the external validity of the 
findings is limited outside of this geographical area. The specificity of the search 
strategy may also represent a source of selection bias as well as potential publication 
bias. Moreover, given the large heterogeneity within groups of professionals, the fact 
that few of the studies controlled for demographics such as sexuality, ethnicity and 
area of work may further confounded the results signifies another limitation of 
previously conducted research.
4.3 Conclusion 
This study has provided an overview of the manifold ways in which healthcare 
professionals conceptualisations of mental health/illness have been measured and 
analysed in past empirical studies and a number of conclusions can be drawn from 
these. In terms of the various dimensions of healthcare professionals 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness, there appears to be a fairly stable broad 
consensus as to the main concepts to be measured such the extent to which 
participants endorse biological and psychosocial explanations of mental 
health/illness. However, studies of healthcare professionals conceptualisations of 
mental health/illness have remained descriptive with little rigorous research 
examining the underlying components of such conceptualisations.  Moreover, there is 
no consensus about the set of measures to be used to assess conceptualisations of 
mental health/illness. Although the variety of measures is valuable as it approaches 
the complex question of conceptualisations of mental health/illness from a range of 
perspectives, it limits direct comparison of results and probably also contributes to 
the variation in the studies findings and how these are presented.
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4.4 Implications 
There are a number of implications for future research in this area. Whilst existing 
studies have provided useful preliminary examinations of healthcare professionals 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness, future studies need to build on the 
methodological flaws inherent in previous designs. Whilst the quantitative research is 
limited to questionnaire designs, this warrants greater control of confounding 
variables such as the impact of participants ethnicity and amount of contact with 
individuals with mental health issues on conceptualisations. Further qualitative 
research will need to critically examine the role of the researcher in selecting and 
analysing data as well as make use of triangulation of methods where appropriate.
From this review it is also apparent that the widely used unidimensional measures 
are not able to discern the underlying dimensions of conceptualisations of mental 
health/illness and future studies will therefore need to employ instruments capable of 
making multifaceted assessments and qualitative methodologies may be particularly 
useful for this purpose. It is a matter for further studies to explore whether 
assessments of healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental health/illness 
can be made more specific or whether the generality of the construct is what makes it 
so pertinent to clinical practice.  However, as noted, there is no one measure of 
healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental health/illness that 
comprehensively addresses all the mentioned issues at present
The importance of the included studies for clinical practice is questionable. Although 
there is extensive evidence to suggest that healthcare professionals 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness impact on their clinical practice, the 
studies in the present review shed limited light onto the complexities of assessing 
conceptualisations of mental health/illness. This is particularly true for unidimensional 
measures, which simplify the complex conceptualisations that practitioners draw on 
in clinical practice to such an extreme degree that they are misleading at best. 
However, the purpose of the present review has been to take a critical look at current 
concepts and assessments of healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental 
health/illness and as such has provided a valuable first step in identifying how the 
investigation of the research question should proceed in future research.
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Appendix A
The following search strategy was entered into Medline, Psycarticles, Psycinfo and 
Web of Knowledge independently. 
1. exp mental health professional/
2. exp healthcare professional/
3. exp clinician/
4. exp psychologist/
5. exp psychiatrist/
6. exp psychiatric nurse/
7. or/1-6
8. exp conceptualisation
9. exp conceptualization
10. exp representation
11. exp causal belief/
12. exp model/
13. exp etiology/
14. exp explanatory model/
15. or/ 8-15
16. exp mental health/
17. exp mental illness/
18. exp psychopathology/
19. exp mental disorder/
20. exp mental disease/
21. or/ 16-20
22. (healthcare pro* or mental health pro* or conceptualisation or conceptualization 
or representation or belief* or attitude* or mental health or mental illness or mental 
disorder* or psychopathology).tw.
23. (healthcare pro* or mental health pro* or conceptualisation or conceptualization 
or representation or belief* or attitude* or mental health or mental illness or mental 
disorder* or psychopathology).mp.
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‘Doing Fence-sitting’: A Discursive Analysis of Clinical Psychologists’ 
Constructions of Mental Health and its Impact on their 
Work with Service-users1
Axel Lofgren, Roshan das Nair and Vanessa Hewitt
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Abstract
The concept of mental health has been used to designate a range of concepts and a 
great deal of controversy surrounds the meaning of this construct. Despite its 
contested nature, there is a growing body of research indicating that the way 
healthcare professionals conceptualise mental health may have important clinical 
implications. This study adopted a discursive psychology approach, a method well 
suited to examine contested and variable concepts, to explore clinical psychologists 
accounts of mental health and its effects. Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with eleven clinical psychologists in the East Midlands region of the UK. The 
participants constructed mental health through building up biological factors and 
psychosocial aspects as opposite ends of the same spectrum and then positioning 
themselves as distant from these extremes. This construction was used to manage 
issues of stake and accountability and to present their accounts as factual. The 
clinical psychologists drew on a discourse of moral concern for service-users to 
negotiate the implications of having different views of mental health to their service-
users. This enabled participants to manage issues of accountability and to 
demonstrate their ability to be helpful to service-users. The results suggest that there 
is a need for clinicians to make the contingent and situated nature of their knowledge 
explicit and to be mindful of the effects of their use of language on different 
stakeholders in talking about mental health.
                                               
1
The journal paper will be submitted to Social Science & Medicine.
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Research highlights
x The first discursive psychological study of psychologists accounts of mental 
health 
x Clinicians avoided extremes of biological and social aspects of mental health
x Language was used to manage issues of stake and accountability and to 
present accounts as factual 
x Clinicians should be honest about the contingent and situated nature of 
language and knowledge
x Clinicians should be mindful of the effects of language use regarding mental 
health
Keywords
Clinical psychologists, healthcare professionals, constructions, conceptualisations, 
mental health, fence-sitting, discursive psychology, discourse analysis.
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Introduction
This paper adopts a discursive psychological approach to explore clinical 
psychologists constructions of mental health and its perceived influence on their 
work with service-users. This approach is concerned with how language is used 
within social interactions to manage and create reality and as such represents a 
move away from the traditional cognitive psychology view of language as a tool to 
discover mental states (Elliott, Fischer & Rennie, 1999).
Since its inception over half a century ago, the notion of mental health has been used 
to designate a range of concepts including a psychological state, a dimension of 
health, and wider disciplines such as psychology and psychiatry. Given the variety of 
purposes for which the term has been adopted, it is not surprising that a great deal of 
controversy surrounds the meaning of mental health, with views reflecting the 
interests and values of the groups attempting to define the term. Indeed, a widely 
accepted definition of mental health remains absent from the literature and the 
concept is frequently dismissed as too nebulous to warrant serious exploration 
(Newton, 1988; Secker, 1998). Notably, the APA Dictionary of Psychology (2005) 
does not have an entry on mental health, whereas Campbells Psychiatric Dictionary 
(2010) defines it as a synonym of mental hygiene and as a state of psychological 
well-being. The failure to provide a clear definition of mental health could be seen to 
imply that the concept has a self-evident validity. Moreover, it suggests a peculiar 
state of affairs since psychological literature rarely includes discussions about the 
general nature of mental health whilst, at the same time, asserts knowledge about 
the concept. 
One consequence of the ambiguity about what constitutes mental health is a number 
of controversies regarding its ontological and epistemological status. A central point 
of contention is whether the concept of mental health is ever value-free and whether 
mental health and mental illness should be conceptualised as representing 
extreme ends of the same continuum (Kendell, 1995). Other researchers have 
suggested mental health to be qualitatively different from mental illness, implying that 
a person can be both mentally healthy and mentally ill at the same time (Secker, 
1998). Indeed, these concepts are often used interchangeably in psychological 
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literature (Malek, 2004; Pickering, 2006), the boundaries between health and illness 
are drawn differently in different cultural contexts (Fernando, 2003), and the term 
mental health is frequently employed to denote the management of mental illness 
(Vassilev & Pilgrim, 2007). Despite its elusive nature, there is a growing body of 
research indicating that the ways in which clinicians conceptualise mental health 
guide and inform their attitudes, reasoning and approaches to assessment, 
formulation, intervention and evaluation (Harland et al., 2009). Researchers therefore 
suggest that clinical psychologists conceptualisations of mental health have 
significant clinical implications for their work with service-users (Hugo, 2001; Stevens 
& Harper, 2007).
Clinicians’ conceptualisations of mental health and its effects
Research examining clinicians conceptualisations of mental health and its 
implications comprise two main parts. The first is concerned with how 
conceptualisations influence attitudes and behaviours in relation to service-users. 
Such empirical studies have focussed on the consequences of endorsing biological 
and psychosocial conceptualisations which have been found to influence clinicians 
attitudes (Bennett, Thirlaway & Murray, 2008), treatment decisions (Cape, Antebi, 
Standen & Glazebrook, 1994), engagement with service-users (Kent & Read, 1998),
and the quality of treatment provided (Wallach, 2004). The second part includes 
studies concerned with the status of clinicians ontological beliefs about mental health 
and the effects of these on their work with service-users. Such studies have found 
that psychiatrists and clinical psychologists are unwilling to accept mental disorders 
as real and natural categories (Ahn, Flanagan, Marsh & Sanislow, 2006), that 
ontological views about mental health influence clinicians beliefs about the 
effectiveness of interventions and choice of treatment options, and that service-users 
views about the aetiology of their condition are shaped by their clinicians (Ahn, 
Proctor & Flanagan, 2009). All these studies provide support for the notion that 
clinicians conceptualisations of mental health have important clinical implications.
The problematisation of mental health
Whilst previous studies have been usefully applied, they appear conceptually and 
methodologically limited as they rest on the a priori assumption that mental health is 
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a consensual object of thought and that conceptualisations, beliefs and attitudes 
reside internally within individuals, that these remain relatively stable across contexts, 
and that they can be elicited through appropriate research methods. The notion that 
peoples language reflects their underlying thoughts and feelings has been disputed 
by discursive psychologists such as Potter and Wetherell (1987), who argue that 
people construct accounts to serve different functions. In support of this, there is 
extensive research on health (Crossley, 2002) and beyond (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984) 
suggesting that people are often inconsistent in their discussions of ideological 
dilemmas and that attitudes change even during the same interactions (Billig, 1999). 
This poses difficulties for quantitative methodologies, argued to be insensitive to the 
performative, variable and contextual aspects of peoples accounts (Wetherell, Taylor 
& Yates, 2001). Instead, this research proposes that clinical psychologists accounts 
of mental health and their effects can be productively explored by focussing on the 
ways in which these are discursively constructed through employing a social 
constructionist epistemology. Social constructionism holds a relativist position with 
regard to truth and thus views scientific inquiry not as an objective pursuit of truth but 
as a social institution which actively and systematically produces specific versions of 
reality and truth (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999). Taking this perspective, an 
examination of the various ways in which mental health is constructed, negotiated 
and authenticated and the implications of such accounts is made possible. 
Methodology: discursive psychology
This study adopts the theory and methods of Potter and Wetherell's (1987) discursive 
psychology, which assumes that language is constitutive and that peoples accounts 
are constructed to perform specific functions. The variability and inconsistency of 
peoples accounts are considered to be the result of language being orientated 
towards different functions. For instance, researchers have described how accounts 
are constructed as factual in journal articles by minimising the agency of the scientist, 
thereby implicitly locating agency in the objects of research (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). 
It has been noted that speakers tend to draw on a range of rhetorical strategies when 
they have a stake in the outcome and in discussing contested issues, such as mental 
health (Harper, 1995). Through analysing the various discursive strategies that 
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speakers use to construct their accounts, the functions or interests served by these 
can thus be made more visible.
It is proposed that the application of a discursive psychological approach to the 
examination of clinical psychologists constructions of mental health and its influence 
on their work with service-users enables an analysis of the processes through which 
mental health is talked into being. Through paying attention to the organisation and 
functions of such talk, the different issues attended to and how this talk is situated by 
the social and historical context in which it takes place, the adoption of this approach 
accommodates the variability and fluidity of clinical psychologists accounts neglected 
by previous research. Discursive psychology has been used in previous studies to 
explore how professional accounts of psychiatric medication may be employed to 
serve rhetorical and persuasive functions in managing questions about its efficacy 
(Harper, 1999), to examine the ways in which psychiatric diagnoses are produced in 
professional discourse (Wooffitt & Allistone, 2005), and to study how the professional 
use of psychological terms can be the site of discursive struggle (McHoul & Rapley, 
2005). As such, discursive psychology was considered to provide a framework well 
suited to the aim of this study: to explore clinical psychologists constructions of 
mental health and its perceived impact on their work with service-users.
Method
The data for this study comprised audio recordings from eleven interviews with 
clinical psychologists in the East Midlands region of the United Kingdom.
Participants 
This study received ethical approval from the Institute of Work, Health and 
Organisations at the University of Nottingham. A purposive maximum-variation 
sampling strategy was used as it was hoped that recruiting participants from various 
services would allow the range of positions and discourses available to speakers to 
be identified. Clinical psychologists known to the researchers were sent information 
packs containing information about the research through email. Eleven clinical 
psychologists volunteered to take part in the study, a sample size consistent with 
other published discursive studies designed to explore issues related to 
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professionals accounts of mental health (e.g., Harper, 1995). Due to the small 
number of participants, demographic information is offered across the sample to 
protect confidentiality and minimise the risk of identification. The sample consisted of 
seven females and four males, six of whom had 0-10 years of clinical experience, 
two who had between 11-20 years, and three who had between 21-30 years of 
experience. The participants worked in a variety of services including: Primary and 
Secondary care, Forensic, Community, Neuropsychology, Residential and Child 
mental health services.
Interviews
The use of semi-structured interviews in discursive research is a contentious issue 
and naturally occurring talk is frequently preferred (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). 
However, interviews enable researchers to purposely question a sample on the same 
issues, and were therefore considered to provide an appropriate framework for 
gathering data. The interviews were conducted by the first author, a trainee clinical 
psychologist, after informed consent was obtained that included permission to audio-
record the interviews and to publish anonymised extracts. The interviews were aimed 
at eliciting a range of talk around mental health and were guided by an interview 
schedule covering participants views of mental health and its effects on their work 
with service-users. The development of the interview schedule was informed by a 
literature review and pilot study.
Transcription and analysis
The interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder and transcribed using a 
simplified form of Jeffersonian transcription notation (Rapley, 2007). Following Potter 
and Wetherells (1987) suggestions, the analysis consisted of an iterative process 
whereby the transcripts were read a number of times whilst paying attention to 
patterns of language use in the data. Anonymised transcripts were also discussed in 
detail with the two other authors in a series of data sessions. Extracts relating to the 
different categories were then transferred into data files that became the material for 
analysis. In particular, the different systematic ways in which mental health was 
talked about, the various discursive strategies used by speakers to construct their 
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accounts as factual and cohesive, and the range of positions made available through 
the talk was considered.
Quality issues
As noted, this study adopted a social constructionist epistemology, thus rejecting the 
notion of absolute truth that logical positivist research is measured against. This 
epistemological difference has considerable implications for evaluating the quality of 
the study since the reading of the data is viewed as only one out of a number of 
possible interpretations. In line with the suggestion that the quality of qualitative 
research should be evaluated by the logic of justification associated with the studys 
epistemology, this study aimed to meet the quality criteria set out by Madill, Jordan 
and Shirley (2000) for discursive psychological research. We urge the reader to keep 
these criteria in mind as they consider the study in terms of internal coherence, 
deviant case analysis, trustworthiness and openness to reader evaluation.
Analysis and discussion
The analysis focuses on two features of clinical psychologists talk about mental 
health and the interests served by these constructions. First, the ways in which 
speakers construct mental health as psychological versus biological; and second, 
negotiating difference between their views and that of their clients. Both these 
aspects were salient and permeated the participants talk and contained a wide range 
of the rhetorical strategies identified across the data corpus, suggesting that they 
were culturally available to the speakers. To aid reader evaluation, extracts from the 
interviews are used throughout the analysis to illustrate the presented arguments. 
The codes next to each extract refer to the interviewer (I) and the clinical 
psychologists who participated in the study (CP1, CP2 and so on). 
Mental health as psychosocial vs. biological
Edwards and Potter (1992) noted that people frequently view others accounts as 
invested to some extent and that there is therefore a risk that an account is 
discredited on this basis. In order to manage such dilemmas of stake or interest, 
people deploy discursive strategies to demonstrate that their accounts are justified or 
warranted by facts rather than biased or prejudiced. In the following two extracts, 
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accounts of mental health are constructed through building up biological factors and 
psychosocial aspects as opposite ends of the spectrum and speakers position 
themselves as distant from both these extremes. This is achieved through the use of 
a number of discursive strategies that help clinical psychologists to manage issues of 
stake, interest and accountability.
Extract 1 
1         I: yes:: yes erm (.) its a good opportunity to ask you what your                
2 understanding of mental health is?
3        CP2: erm (.) yes I mean its funny because in the process of doing this I
4 was kind of thinking what is my neat succinct answer to that
5  question and I dont (.) ha:::ha I cant think of one at all.
6        I: ha ha.
7        CP2: erm I would have said that=well not historically but maybe for me 
8 there is I would really li::ke it would really satisfy me to be able to 
9 dismiss the notion of any kind of illness kind of conceptualisation
10      I: mmmm mmmm.
11      CP2: of and I am thinking about Psychosis in this case erm (.) it would 
12 really please me to be able to conclusively dismiss the fact that its 
13 an illness and I think my approach is often informed by that drive
14      I: yes.
15      CP2: to kind of consider alternatives and think about (.) okay well lets 
16 think about this persons kind of psychological resources=how they 
17 have been nurtured=their developmental experiences=their 
18 attachment style=what life has dealt them because sometimes you 
19 know people just get dealt a crappy hand
20      I: sure
21      CP2: and erm so thinking about how they respond to kind of 
22 psychological burden erm but its the caveat to that is that its then 
23 tricky when someone sits in front of you and says but it is an illness 
24 (.) to me it is
25      I: mmmm
26      CP2: and I was well before (.) my medication has helped
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27      I: yes
28      CP2: and actually in a way I am internally cursing them damn it ha:ha:ha:
29 I really wish I really had you know, because I suppose theoretically
30 its satisfying to be able to conceptualise it purely in terms of 
31 psycho-social? stuff (.) but I am not sure that we can and I think 
32 maybe thats kind of a naïve erm its just (.) its that anti-psychiatry 
33 thing of just not wanting them to be right
34      I: yes
35      CP2: erm (.) I think 90% they are not but there are times (.) particularly 
36 post-qualification when I have had you kno:w when you think 
37 actually you do:: have to consider factors like that
Interestingly, when asked about mental health, the speaker responds by constructing 
the dismissal of illness conceptualisations as an ideal to aspire to. This ideal is then 
explored by listing the psychosocial stuff which is presented as comprising the 
alternative to an illness conceptualisation of mental health and is finally dismissed 
through the introduction of a case example on line 23, which is used as a contrast to 
the psychosocial aspects of mental health. The use of such contrasts and lists has 
been noted to be powerful in producing factuality as it combines ideas eclectically 
from a range of theoretical viewpoints (Edwards & Potter, 1992). Similarly, through 
constructing her stake as counter to the illness conceptualisation represented by the 
case example, a discursive strategy known as stake inoculation, the speaker 
communicates that she has no stake in what she is saying and thereby positions 
herself as objective and constructs her account as factual (Potter & Hepburn, 2008). 
The speaker explains that it would be theoretically satisfying to conceptualise 
mental health purely in psychosocial terms but that, through experience, she has 
come to think of this as naïve and just that anti-psychiatry thing of just not wanting 
them to be right. In this way, thinking of mental health in purely psychosocial terms 
is presented as a naive ideal which the speaker distances herself from using case 
examples, creating a space between theory and practice and referring to the 
authority given by her experience as a clinical psychologist. 
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Horton-Salway (2001) suggested that rhetorical strategies are used precisely when 
there is a sensitive or contentious issue. It is therefore interesting that the case 
example is deployed following an account of psychosocial aspects of mental health, 
an aspect that is presented as incongruous with the illness conceptualisation which 
it would really satisfy the speaker to conclusively dismiss. Edwards and Potter 
(1992) noted how such case-study format examples create the impression of a 
perceptual experience, i.e. as being factual and free from personal bias. The use of 
this example constructs the account as open to challenge and positions the speaker 
as reasonable. Indeed, if someone were to say that the speaker endorses an anti-
psychosocial understanding of mental health, one could point to the comment that 
she views it as the ideal conceptualisation, which, if it werent for her personal 
experiences of evidence to the contrary, she would embrace. In the last part of the 
extract the speaker makes use of various rhetorical strategies to account for the 
implication of biological factors in mental health and thus an illness conceptualisation. 
First, the use of the qualifier I think followed by the numerical approximation 90% 
works to position the speaker as thoughtful and open to challenge whilst objectifying 
the implication of biological and psychosocial factors in mental health, thus giving 
them agency in their own right. The use of numbers is a common rhetorical device in 
empiricist accounts (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). Second, through referring to post-
qualification the speakers talk is constructed as coming from a category (qualified 
clinical psychologist) of knowledge and is thus presented as factual upgrade of 
knowledge. It is likely that the interviewers position as a trainee clinical psychologist 
prompted the speaker to make use of this device, as it may not have carried the 
same epistemic weight in a conversation with another qualified or senior clinical 
psychologist. This rhetorical strategy has been named category entitlement by 
Edwards and Potter (1992) who demonstrated how some individuals (category 
members) are expected to possess or have access to certain knowledge or skills. 
Thus, through referring to such category membership, speakers are able to position 
themselves as possessing the truth. Third, on line 36, the speaker describes how, 
not just her, but everyone else also needs to take such biological factors into 
account. Through characterising these events as having a predictable and sequential 
pattern, the speaker makes use of a discursive strategy referred to as script 
formulation by Edwards (1995). This helps to manage the speakers accountability as 
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it scripts the implication of biological aspects in mental health as an aspect that is to 
be expected or assumed and therefore not the responsibility of the speaker. 
As in the previous excerpt, although asked about mental health, the speaker in 
extract 2 orientates towards a conceptualisation of mental ill-health and constructs 
mental health, mental illness and mental health problems as concepts that are taken 
to mean the same thing and can thus be used interchangeably, as indicated in the 
statement whatever terminology you use on line 44. Through utilising the impact of 
a scientific metaphor (continuum) along with the powerful nomenclature of a 
scientific and medicalised discourse (psychosis, mood regulation issues), mental 
health is then constructed as real and as existing regardless of the previously 
mentioned diagnostic categories.
Extract 2
38      I: thats er (.) thats a good point to lead into erm what your 
39 understanding of mental health is I suppose.
40      CP1: I am very much erm mmm:: my starting point I suppose is that I see 
41 most of the issues that people struggle with as being part of erm (.) 
42 er: a continuum of human experience and obviously people who 
43 have got a diagnosis of a mental illness or a mental health problem 
44 (.) however whatever terminology you use tend to be people who
45 are just at the extreme ends of=of some continuum or other which 
46 we are all on somewhere
47      I: yes
48      CP1: erm whether its erm obsessiveness or erm:: you know (.) sort of (.)
49 relationship erm (.) you know mood regulation type issues or 
50 whether its erm anxiety or even psychosis?but I am not a (.) I dont 
51 have a sort of radical position on erm the sort of the construction 
52 of=of mental illness in that I think it is legitimate for people for us to 
53 consider and for people to consider themselves to have what might 
54 be described as an illness with a kind of at least partially 
55 physiological basis. I think there is evidence or a genetic basis you 56
know there is evidence that=that those factors are relevant
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57      I: yes
58      CP1: however? I think that in general the medical approach to mental 
59 illness is probably (.) erm in a sense the least important part of it 
60 and of the psychological and social end of understanding of 
61 somebodys experience and how their difficulties have sort of 
62 manifested and understood, erm is kind of you know 75% of the (.) 
63 of whats worth working with
64      I: yes
65      CP1: So=yes medication might be helpful yes its important to bear in 
66 mind there might be things that arent going to change through 
67 social or psychological interventions but I suspect on the whole in 
68 mental health erm that thats the sort of the least important part of it 
69 very often for a lot of people anyway.
70      I: yes.
71      CP1: erm so I suppose erm and I dont want to put a label on it I am 
72 loathe to put a label on it but my position would be although I am 
73 not a radical anti-psychiatry anti-medical I do:: think that thats not 
74 where most of the important stuff goes on (.) I guess I would say 
75 that
76      I: yes.
77      CP1: or I would say that because I am a Psychologist
78      I: yes
79      CP1: but:but thats I suppose where I position myself
In the second turn, the speaker positions herself as distant from any radical position 
before answering the question and corrects herself from I am not a to I dont have
a sort of radical position. This re-phrasing is noteworthy as it changes the 
intentionality of the statement from being one that defines the speaker (the verb to 
be) into a position of choice (the verb to have) thus giving agency to the intentional 
and flexible nature of the stance. This statement serves to distance the speaker from 
radical social constructionist views and works as a rhetorical disclaimer for the 
following sentence in which biological aspects of mental health are emphasised. In 
line 59, the speaker also distances herself from the medical approach, instead 
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emphasising the importance of psychosocial aspects of mental health. The use of 
quantification to describe the extent to which psychosocial factors are implicated in 
mental health gives the account further epistemic weight. As in the previous extract, 
through constructing her stake as counter to the medical approach, stake inoculation 
is used to protect the speaker from accusations that her account is invested or 
biased. 
As outlined, clinical psychologists produce accounts of mental health through 
presenting psychosocial and biological as representing opposite extremes and then 
distancing themselves from these poles. A feature of this type of account is that 
speakers note the influence of personal ideological commitment in distancing 
themselves from that anti-psychiatry thing of just not wanting them not to be right 
and the medical approach which is the least important part of it. One effect of such 
constructions is to present a narrative that asserts the implication of biological 
aspects in mental health through distancing oneself from more radical 
understandings which, in turn, are constructed as naïve and narrow-minded.
Negotiating constructions: a moral discourse
The second aim of this study was concerned with how clinical psychologists 
construct the influence of their views of mental health on their work with service-
users. As reflected in the following extracts, one prevalent feature of these accounts 
was clinical psychologists negotiating the implications of having different views of 
mental health to their service-users through drawing on a discourse of moral 
concern.
Extract 3 
80      CP9: and just it doesnt matter? what I believe you know what matters is 
81 the persons own view and their experience and I might be able to 
82 share some helpful ideas
83      I: yes
84      CP9: about that and they may take them on board and you know they 
85 might kind of buy into some of my theories around mental health (.) 
86 erm or why they might be facing difficulties but they might reject 
87 that and I suppose part of the way that I integrate it into my work is 
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88 by always making it clear that I have a kind of bit of a theory or a 
89 hypothesis and I make it very tentative
90      I: mmmm::
91      CP9: and I make it very gentle and I also invite people to reject it
92      I: yes
93      CP9: as much as I invite people to buy into it (.) so you know quite often 
94 in sessions its not unusual for me to say you know I have got an 
95 idea or it might be wrong and tell me if I am completely off the mark 
96 or you know
97      I: yes
98      CP9: I think I am very=I am very keen for the client to know that they are 
99 the expert on them
Through the continuous use of the modal auxiliaries might and may, the 
tentativeness of the speakers subjective account is emphasised. These features give 
an impression of collaboration and function to position the speaker as a liberal and 
non-directive clinician whose primary concern is to empower service-users. In line 
with this, previous researchers have noted the need for clinicians to come across as
open-minded and to take on the attitude of independent objective discussants 
(Fowler, Garety & Kuipers, 1995).
Another feature of this discourse was to present oneself as a responsible 
professional through providing examples of authoritarian clinical psychologists and 
then distancing oneself from these. Potter and Wetherell (1987) noted that speakers 
do not only use discursive strategies to present particular versions of events in 
constructing their accounts, but also deploy rhetorical devices to undermine 
alternative versions that may pose a threat to how that person wants to be 
understood. Examples of such accounts can be seen in the following two excerpts in 
which speakers address the threat to themselves as non-collaborative clinicians 
through the deployment of case examples, thus enabling their talk to be viewed from 
a moral framework where accountability can be managed and allocated within 
interactions.
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Extract 4
100    CP9: I suppose I manage it by and I always manage it by taking a kind of 
101 not knowing position and taking a position of not having any 
102 certainty
103   I: mmmm::
104    CP9: SO I would never impose on somebody that their view=you know 
105 their view is wrong or just because its different to mine (.) I dont 
106 see myself as an expert who knows more about their experience 
107 than they do
108    I: right
109    CP9: erm and I think thats really dangerous and in fact I was having a 
110 conversation with a service-user not a client but someone who has 
111 used psychology services in the past recently and they were saying 
112 that they had a really awful. experience of going to a psychologist 
113 who was very insistent on what the formulation was
114    I: yes
115    CP9: of the problem and that things that she had seen in her life as good 
116 the psychologist turned that (.) so you know the formulation kind of 
117 made out that things had caused her problems that she actually
118 didnt believe had caused her problems
119    I: mmmm::
120    CP9: and had never thought about it in a kind of negative way
121    I: yes
122    CP9: and you know I never want to be that psychologist basically you 
123 know I dont want to be someone that kind of imposes a view so I 
124 think if you take a position where you say lets think about what 
125 may have led to your current difficulties erm then you know (.) then 
126 you can co-construct something thats meaningful to the client?
In this extract, the expertise of the service-user is given agency through the 
assumption of a not knowing position. This account is then corroborated through the 
use of a case example which is strengthened through vivid and detailed descriptions 
and by the authority of personal experience which positions the speaker as a credible 
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witness (Edwards & Potter, 1992). The deployment of the extreme case formulations 
really dangerous and really awful functions to further emphasise the seriousness 
of the example (Pomerantz, 1986). CP9 strongly distances herself from those clinical 
psychologists who impose their views on others and places evaluative moral force 
in the word impose, which constructs the behaviour of such clinicians as morally 
unjustifiable and unethical. This distancing is also achieved through the use of the 
personal pronoun you and you know which works to co-opt the interviewer. The 
deployment of the word co-construct suggests a social constructionist discourse in 
which views about mental health may change depending on their situatedness. 
Indeed, the reluctance to make use of the word truth and the use of words such as 
ideas and views which do not imply a singular, fixed or neutral way of looking at 
things were a prevalent feature of clinical psychologists talk about the effects of their 
views about mental health. Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) noted that although the activity 
performed by participants constructions cannot be known by analysts, theories about 
the functions of such accounts can nevertheless be developed through familiarity 
with the data. It seems that through presenting views about mental health within a 
social constructionist ontology, clinical psychologists are able to resolve the potential 
dilemma of having conflicting views and instead emphasise their primary concern; 
their ability to be helpful to service-users through co-constructing narratives.
Extract 5 
127    CP2: and also when someone tells you that thats how they view it (.) 
128 who are we? to tell them that they are wrong?
129    I: yes
130    CP2: otherwise I am just pushing my agenda on them arent I?
131    I: yes
132    CP2: by saying no=no its all about stress=its all about your 
133 psychological resources (.) actually they dont want to hear that and 
134 its not necessarily useful
135    I: yes
136    CP2: if they want to think of it as an illness then. and do you know what 
137 really annoys me about psychologists? actually who are=who do 
138 that and I am only thinking of a couple I am not saying this is a 
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139 widespread occurrence but I do know a couple of psychologists 
140 who=who will push the psycho-social agenda on someone who 
141 views their experience as an illness because thats their agenda
142    I: mmmm:::
143    CP2: because they think that there is some inherent value in someone 
144 understanding it that way rather than that way and I always think 
145 that actually boils down to arrogance really
146   I: mmmmm:::
147    CP2: of thinking well no (.) my idea is better than yours.
148    I: yes (.) yes
149    CP2: and its not for us to dictate is it (.) you know if someone think of 
150 themselves as ill and that=thats not fundamentally undermining 
151 their recovery (.) then why would we suggest that they are wrong?
As in the previous extract, the speaker uses a case example to position clinicians 
who push their own agendas as irresponsible and arrogant. This strong moral 
discourse is highlighted both in the first and the last sentence in which rhetorical 
questions are asked as if to invoke common sense; why fix something that isnt 
broken? The use of consensus is a common discursive strategy to enhance facticity 
and functions to position the speaker as balanced and reasonable (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). As we have seen, clinicians root their discourse and justify their 
decision not to challenge service-users views about mental health in a discourse of 
moral concern. This concern is perhaps unsurprising given its integral role in the 
therapeutic relationship and that it is widely considered to be closely linked to 
clinicians credibility (Gibson, 2006). Nevertheless, the explicit concern with not 
imposing views of mental health on service-users is interesting as most schools of 
therapy offer resources for challenging service-users life-worlds. As described by
Gergen (2009), if a client talks about issues of sexual perversion the psychoanalyst 
moves on to enquire about childhood experiences, and if a client speaks about how 
everyone is laughing at him the cognitive therapist asks if they could be laughing at 
something else. These therapeutic responses serve to challenge the reality of the 
service-user by communicating: you thought it was this, but it is (or could be) that. 
Indeed, George Kelly (1969), doubting the alleged truths and insights resulting from 
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psychotherapy, concluded that insights occur only when service-users adopt the 
perspective of therapists. As noted throughout this analysis, the moral concern for 
service-users was a recurrent feature of the arguments and explanations that 
participants constructed in responding to the interview questions. The clinical 
psychologists presented this moral imperative as continuously guiding them in their 
considerations of the effects of their ideas about mental health on their clinical work 
thus allowing their talk to be viewed from a moral framework where accountability 
could be managed within interactions. As well as being professional, such accounts 
may also function to reflect aspects of clinicians ethical self; their need to know that 
they are benefitting service-users rather than causing them harm.
General discussion
This study has presented a reading of clinical psychologists accounts of mental
health in which participants constructed biological factors and psychosocial aspects 
as opposite ends of the spectrum. By positioning themselves as distant from these 
extremes, participants were able to manage issues of stake and accountability and to 
present their accounts as credible. This construction legitimated the implication of 
biological factors whilst emphasising the primacy of psychosocial factors, which was 
helpful in managing cases where there was a lack of psychosocial evidence to 
explain a persons mental health. Consistent with Potter and Wetherells (1987) 
observations, participants used a range of different rhetorical strategies to construct 
their accounts of mental health. In particular, stake inoculation, category entitlement, 
and case examples were used to present their constructions as factual and to 
manage issues of accountability. The discursive strategies deployed by the clinical 
psychologists in this study are consistent with past discursively-informed studies, 
showing a cross-topic relevance by demonstrating how clinicians rely on particular 
rhetorical devices to get things done in verbal interactions. For example, research 
has outlined how clinicians use such discursive strategies to construct their accounts 
as credible (Harper, 1995; 1999), to meet challenges to their constructions (Harper, 
1994), and to manage issues of professional accountability in clinical interactions 
(Robertson, Paterson, Lauder, Fenton & Gavin, 2010). This study was also 
concerned with how clinical psychologists construct the influence of their views of 
mental health on their work with service-users. One prevalent feature of these 
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accounts was participants negotiating the implications of having different views of 
mental health to their service-users through drawing on a discourse of moral 
concern, which functioned to manage issues of accountability. Power and 
collaboration is common dilemma in psychotherapy (Frank, 1973) and, in line with 
this data corpus, previous discursive studies have demonstrated how clinicians 
manage the implications of challenging service-users beliefs through drawing on a 
discourse of collaboration (Messari & Hallam, 2003).
This study has shown various assumptions implicit in professionals accounts and 
analysed the consequences of these accounts, in particular for how clinicians and 
service-users are positioned. As outlined in the literature review, clinicians views and 
assumptions about mental health have been found to guide and inform their 
approaches to assessment, formulation and intervention (Harland et al., 2009) and 
shape service-users views about their conditions (Ahn, Proctor & Flanagan, 2009). 
This implies that there is a need for clinicians to be honest about the contingent and 
situated nature of their knowledge and language, to make their assumptions about 
mental health explicit, and to be mindful of the effects of their use of language on 
different stakeholders in talking about mental health. Clearly, if clinicians are not 
open about such issues there may be a risk of service-users passively complying 
with a process that they do not understand or feel they benefit from, thereby ethically 
compromising clinicians practice. Moreover, such open and honest conversations 
are likely to strengthen the therapeutic alliance, a factor associated with positive 
outcomes (Martin, Garske & Davis, 2000) and service-user satisfaction (Roberts & 
Holmes, 1998) across therapies. On a theoretical level, the findings demonstrate that 
there is a range of constructions of mental health available to clinical psychologists 
and the analysis highlighted the variability and ambiguity of the participants 
accounts. This highlights how the concept of mental health is highly contested and 
that, rather than relying on the a priori assumption that mental health is a consensual 
object of thought, future studies should be designed to capture this complexity. 
Lastly, on a methodological level, this research represents the first discursive 
psychological examination of clinical psychologists constructions of mental health 
and its effects on their work with service-users. As such, not only does it fill a gap in 
DA literature by examining the topic of mental health as an action-orientated 
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discursive practice but it also offers a discursive space to examine the interactive 
actions performed in other controversial and contested issues.
Limitations and suggestions for future research
The use of this novel approach is not without its limitations. In particular, the use of 
artificial data has been argued to decrease the ecological validity of findings (Potter 
& Hepburn, 2005). Although not epistemologically problematic, the method of data 
collection is likely to have impacted on the variability of the data. Given that mental 
health is an ambiguous and contested term, participants may have been conscious of 
how they would be perceived in constructing their accounts. The presence of the 
interviewer is likely to have influenced the ways in which the clinical psychologists did 
professional accountability and how they defended their constructions of mental 
health and the choices made in clinical practice. As such, the views and 
constructions of the participants could be argued to be intersubjective, taking into 
account what they perceived to be the interviewers views of mental health. Further 
studies might therefore consider how clinical psychologists present and negotiate 
constructions of mental health with service-users and other professionals in clinical 
settings, thus providing the opportunity to compare the data from this study with 
naturally occurring talk. This study focused specifically on clinical psychologists 
constructions of mental health and its perceived effects. One question which has 
been left unanswered is how service-users construct mental health and their
experiences of how views of mental health are negotiated in their interactions with 
clinicians, which would be an interesting extension to this study.
61
References
Ahn, W., Flanagan, E., Marsh, J., & Sanislow, C. (2006). Beliefs about essences and
the reality of mental disorders. Psychological Science, 17, 759-766.
Ahn, W., Proctor, C. C., & Flanagan, E. H. (2009). Mental health clinicians beliefs 
about the biological, psychological, and environmental bases of mental disorders. 
Cognitive Science, 33, 147-182.
APA Dictionary of Psychology. (2005). Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association. 
Bennett, L., Thirlaway, K., & Murray, A. J. (2008). The stigmatising implications of 
presenting schizophrenia as a genetic disease. Journal of Genetic Counseling, 17, 
550-559. 
Billig, M. (1999). Freudian Repression: conversation creating the unconscious.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Burr, V. (1995). An introduction to social constructionism. London: Routledge.
Campbell's Psychiatric Dictionary (2010). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cape, G., Antebi, D., Standen, P., & Glazebrook, C. (1994). Schizophrenia: The 
views of a sample of psychiatrists. Journal of Mental Health, 3, 105-113.
Crossley, M. L. (2002). 'Could you please pass one of those health leaflets along?' 
Exploring health, morality and resistance through focus groups. Social Science & 
Medicine, 55, 1471-1483. 
Edwards, D. (1995). Two to tango: Script formulations, dispositions, and rhetorical 
symmetry in relationship troubles talk. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 
28(4), 319-350.
Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1992). Discursive psychology. London: Sage.
Elliott, R., Fischer, C. T., & Rennie, D. L. (1999). Evolving guidelines for publication 
of qualitative research studies in psychology and related fields. British Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 38, 215-229.
Fernando, S. (2003). Cultural Diversity, Mental Health and Psychiatry. London: 
Routledge.
Fowler, D., Garety, P., & Kuipers, E. (1995). Cognitive Behaviour Therapy for 
Psychosis: Theory and Practice. Chichester: Wiley.
Frank, J. D. (1973). Persuasion & healing: A comparative study of psychotherapy.
London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
62
Gergen, K. J. (2009). Relational being: Beyond self and community. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press.
Gibson, S. (2006). Respect as esteem: The case of counselling. Res Publica, 12(1), 
77-95.
Gilbert, G. N., & Mulkay, M. (1984). Opening Pandora’s box: A sociological analysis 
of scientists’ discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Harland, R., Antonova, E., Owen, G. S., Broome, M., Landau, S., Deeley, Q., & 
Murray, R. (2009). A study of psychiatrists' concepts of mental illness. Psychological 
Medicine, 39, 967-76.
Harper, D. (1994). The professional construction of "paranoia" and the discursive use 
of diagnostic criteria. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 67, 131-43. 
Harper, D. (1995). Discourse analysis and mental health. Journal of Mental Health, 4, 
347357.
Harper, D. (1999). Tablet talk and depot discourse: Discourse analysis and 
psychiatric medication. In C. Willig (Ed.), Applied discourse analysis: Social and 
psychological interventions (pp. 125-144). Buckingham: Open University Press.
Horton-Salway, M. (2001). The construction of M.E.: The discursive action model. In 
M. Wetherell, S. Taylor & S. J. Yates (Eds.), Discourse as data (pp. 148-188). 
London: Sage Publications.
Hugo, M. (2001). Mental health professionals' attitudes toward people who have 
experienced a mental health disorder. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health 
Nursing, 8(5), 419-425.
Kelly, G. A. (1969). Psychotherapy and the nature of man. In B. Maher (Ed.) Clinical 
psychology and personality (pp. 207215). London: Wiley. 
Kendell, R. (1995). Mental health and mental illness. In D. Trent, & C. Reed (Eds.),
Promoting Mental Health (pp. 33-40). Avebury: Aldershot.
Kent, H., & Read, J. (1998). Measuring consumer participation in mental health 
services: Are attitudes related to professional orientation? International Journal of 
Social Psychiatry, 44, 295  310.  
Madill, A., Jordan, A., & Shirley, C. (2000). Objectivity and reliability in qualitative 
analysis: Realist, contextualist and radical constructionist epistemologies. British 
Journal of Psychology, 91, 1-20. 
Malek, M. (2004). Understanding Ethnicity and Children's Mental Health. In M. Malek, 
& C. Joughin (Eds.), Mental Health Services for Minority Ethnic Children and 
Adolescents. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
Martin, D., Garske, J., & Davis, K. (2000). Relation of the therapeutic alliance with 
63
outcome and other variables: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 68, 438-450. 
McHoul, A., & Rapley, M. (2005). A case of ADHD diagnosis: Sir Karl and Francis B 
slug it out on the consulting room floor. Discourse and Society, 16(3), 419449. 
Messari, S., & Hallam, R. (2003). CBT for psychosis: A qualitative analysis of clients 
experiences. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 42, 171-188.
Newton, J. (1988). Preventing Mental Illness. London: Routledge. 
Nightingale, D. J., & Cromby, J. (1999). Social constructionist psychology: A critical 
analysis of theory and practice. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Pickering, N. J. (2006). The Metaphor of Mental Illness. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Pomerantz, A. M. (1986). Extreme case formulations: a new way of legitimating 
claims. Human Studies, 9, 219-230.
Potter, J., & Hepburn, A. (2005). Qualitative interviews in psychology: problems and 
possibilities. Qualitative research in Psychology, 2, 281-307.
Potter, J., & Hepburn, A. (2008).  Discursive constructionism.  In J. A. Holstein, & J. 
F. Gubrium (Eds.), Handbook of constructionist research (pp. 275-293).  New York: 
Guildford.
Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond 
Attitudes and Behaviour. London: Sage.
Rapley, T. (2007). Doing conversation, discourse and document analysis. London: 
Sage Publications.
Roberts, G., & Holmes, J. (1998). Healing Stories: Narrative in Psychiatry and 
Psychotherapy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Robertson, M., Paterson, B., Lauder, B., Fenton, R., & Gavin, J. (2010). Accounting 
for accountability: A discourse analysis of psychiatric nurses experience of a patient 
suicide. The Open Nursing Journal, 4, 1-8.
Secker, J. (1998). Current conceptualizations of mental health and mental health 
Promotion. Health Education Research, 13(1), 5766.
Stevens, P., & Harper, D. J. (2007). Professional accounts of electroconvulsive 
therapy: a discourse analysis. Social Science and Medicine, 64(7), 14751486.
Vassilev, I., & Pilgrim, D. (2007). 'Risk', 'Trust' and the Myth of 'Mental Health 
Services'. Journal of Mental Health, 16(3), 347-357.
64
Wallach, H. S. (2004). Changes in attitudes towards mental illness following 
exposure. Community Mental Health Journal, 40(3), 235-248.  
Wetherell, M., Taylor, S., & Yates, S. (2001). Discourse as data: A guide for analysis. 
London: Sage. 
Wooffitt, R., & Allistone, S. (2005). Towards a discursive parapsychology: language 
and the laboratory study of anomalous communication. Theory and Psychology, 
15(3), 325-355.
65
EXTENDED PAPER
66
Part One: Extended Background
1.1. Section introduction
The central interest of this thesis is clinical psychologists2 constructions of mental 
health and its effects on their work with service-users. In order to offer a context to 
the study, it is important to begin by situating it within a wider picture and to review 
the literature that has influenced the understanding of the psychological construct of 
mental health3. For this reason, I start with introducing the history of the evolving 
concept of mental health and review the importance of the construct in psychology. 
To provide a background to the current study, the ways in which CPs accounts of 
mental health have been studied in the past will then be explored. In particular, 
studies examining the association between professionals conceptualisations of 
mental health with factors linked to interactions with service-users will be considered. 
Thirdly, the methodological limitations of previous research will be reviewed and used 
to provide a focus and rationale for the present study. Lastly, an alternative approach 
to the exploration of the construct of mental health and its implications than has been 
taken historically will be advocated and the epistemological implications of this 
approach will be reviewed along with empirical studies adopting a similar approach. 
1.2 History of the concept of mental health 
The history of the concept of mental health is complex, arguably in part due to the 
idea that any formulation of the construct is entangled within particular social and 
historical contexts (Bracken & Thomas, 2005). References to mental health and the 
corresponding concept of mental hygiene can be found in the English language long 
before the 20th century. Indeed in 1843, one of the founders of the American 
Psychiatric Association, Isaac Ray, referred to it as the art of preserving the mind 
against all incidents and influences calculated to deteriorate its qualities, impair its 
energies, or derange its movements (Rossi, 1962, p.78). It was not until 1946, 
however, when the World Health Organization (WHO) was established in New York 
that technical references to the concept of mental health were made (Bertolote, 
                                               
2 The abbreviation CP will be used throughout this thesis to denote the professional group of clinical 
psychologists.
3 Throughout this study I aim to problematise the concept of mental health. The use of inverted 
commas to signal this may be irritating or confusing for readers and so the term mental health will be 
employed pragmatically despite the risk that I may end up inadvertently reifying it.  
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2008). In 1951, WHOs Expert Committee on Mental Health defined the concept as a 
condition, subject to fluctuations due to biological and social factors, which enables 
the individual to achieve a satisfactory synthesis of his own potentially conflicting, 
instinctive drives; to form and maintain harmonious relations with others; and to 
participate in constructive changes in his social and physical environment. Since its 
inception over half a century ago with its clear psychodynamic references, notions of 
mental health have been used to designate a range of concepts including a 
psychological state, a dimension of health, and wider disciplines such as psychology 
and psychiatry. Given the variety of purposes for which the term has been adopted, it 
is not surprising that a great deal of controversy surrounds discussions about the 
meaning of mental health as outlined in the journal paper. In an attempt to overcome 
the dichotomies of physical/psychic and body/mind, the WHO stresses a more 
holistic and positive dimension of mental health in the widely referenced preamble to 
its constitution: (mental) health is a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity (WHO, 2001).
1.3 Mental health and psychology
Because of its polysemic nature, the delimitation of mental health in relation to 
psychology is not always clear and it is therefore useful to consider the social context 
in which the modern discipline of psychology has developed, as this may illuminate 
some of the social interests at work in creating and maintaining discourses around 
mental health. Psychology has its roots in the nineteenth century when principles of 
science were increasingly being applied to the study of human beings in the hope 
that this would enable predictions about human behaviour to be made (Milton, 
Craven & Coyle, 2010). Gergen (1991) suggested that the discipline of psychology 
grew out of four overarching epistemological suppositions that are now embedded in 
the discipline. Firstly, psychology adopted the belief in a knowable world and thus a 
basic subject matter to be examined. Secondly, this supposition implies a belief in the 
existence of underlying essences and universal properties. Thirdly, it subscribed to 
the idea that, through the use of the scientific method, obdurate truths can be 
discovered about such essences and thereby reveal laws or principles that apply to 
other instances across time, individuals and situations. This point is evident in 
taxonomic systems such as the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) (World 
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Health Organization, 2008) and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), which assume that the 
concepts of mental health and illness and their boundaries are matters of natural fact 
to be examined and determined using scientific methods, and best diagnosed by 
healthcare professionals and experts. Under this assumption, therefore, the specific 
personal theories that individual clinicians hold about mental health and illness would 
be irrelevant to the truth yet to be discovered. Indeed, as noted by Ahn and Kim 
(2008), to suggest that these are relevant might sound as bizarre as proposing that 
the periodic table should be revised to fit the way chemists reason about elements. 
Lastly, there is a belief in the progressive nature of the research enterprise resulting 
in the illumination of the fundamental character of its subject matter (Gergen, 1991).
These realist assumptions are challenged by the alternative social constructionist 
idea that understandings of mental health and illness do not represent truths but 
rather that they are ideologically shaped and culturally reinforced constructions 
(McNamee & Gergen, 1992). From this perspective, in order to make sense of 
mental health, an account of what constitutes mental ill-health is required and it is 
argued that such categories are embedded within broader social systems and reflect 
existing beliefs regarding what is socially acceptable and normative (Milton, 2010). 
As pointed out by the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1967), conceptualisations 
of madness at any given point in history are necessarily reflective of normality, as 
indicated by the additions and deletions of mental health conditions in the ICD and 
DSM which could be argued to reflect changes in the way that mental health is 
perceived over time. Mental health from this perspective is therefore viewed as a 
concept constructed through a range of socio-cultural factors including scientific 
concepts prevalent in society, ideas regarding an ideal and healthy lifestyle as well 
as dominant causal beliefs and explanations about illness conditions. This stance 
implies that the ways in which professionals reason about mental health is crucial in 
building an understanding of the concept. The reasons for why such an 
understanding is important will be considered in greater detail following an outline of 
one of the prevalent contemporary frameworks of mental health; the biopsychosocial 
model.
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1.4 The biopsychosocial model of mental health
In 1977, a psychiatrist named Engel highlighted the inadequacies of biological 
explanations of mental illness and instead proposed a biopsychosocial framework of 
mental health which holds that mental illness is caused by interactions of biological, 
psychological and environmental factors. The model was warmly welcomed by social 
scientists as it affirmed the importance of psychosocial factors and has since had 
considerable impact on the scientific community (Yardley, 1996). In particular, the 
introduction of the model led to a vast expansion of research concerned with the 
biopsychosocial determinants of mental health and illness. In line with Engels (1977) 
suggestions, such studies have tended to produce quantitative measures of 
psychosocial variables and correlated these with assumed signs of mental health and 
illness. The consequences of this wave of biopsychosocial studies have been 
multiple; psychological research has won acceptance from medical clinicians, the 
implication of psychosocial factors on mental health has become increasingly 
acknowledged in medical circles and CPs have been given a more substantial role to 
play in the provision of mental health services (Yardley, 1996). Indeed, the Health 
Professions Council (HPC), the statutory regulator for psychologists, has included a 
conceptualisation of mental health in biological, psychological and social terms in the 
core definition of CPs competencies (Health Professions Council, 2009). Similarly, 
the British Psychological Society (BPS) has argued this framework to be crucial to 
psychologists understanding of mental health (Kinderman & Tai, 2009). The 
biopsychosocial model has thus become established as a prevalent narrative within 
psychology and researchers have noted that the model is an important conceptual 
framework that guides clinicians in their everyday work with service-users (Fava & 
Sonino, 2008). As such, it is likely to inform the perspective that psychologists adopt 
when considering the concept of mental health. 
1.5 Relevance of constructions of mental health
There are two distinct branches of literature into the implications of CPs 
constructions of mental health. The first is concerned with how CPs ideas about 
mental health shape and maintain the discourses held by service-users and wider 
society in general. The second focuses on the influence of CPs constructions of 
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mental health on their attitudes and clinical decision-making and each of these will 
now be reviewed in turn.
1.5.1 Constructions of mental health and dominant discourse
As previously outlined, it could be argued that mental health is constructed in the 
context of social and cultural settings (Gergen, 2001). From this perspective, beliefs
about mental health are not necessarily acquired from direct experience but derived 
through the complexity of constructive processes of communication and interaction in 
a particular setting that is itself situated in a broader historical, social, political, and 
cultural context (Foucault, 2006). In line with this, it has been demonstrated that the 
meaning of mental health is formed in everyday conversations (Daniels & White, 
1994), is influenced by cultural and social norms (Dixit, 2005; Leventhal et al., 1997)
and that the concept may thus be understood as an intersubjective linguistic creation 
(Guterman, 1994). Because of their role in society as practical experts, mental 
health professionals such as CPs are charged with the job of assessing peoples 
mental health and deciding what care should be provided. As such, CPs play a major 
role in the provision of mental health services and in the social constructive 
processes through which contemporary representations of mental health evolve. This 
implies that CPs hold the power to construct and maintain discourses and to position 
themselves and others in ways that may have significant consequences. Indeed, the 
work of CPs guides and informs the mental health theory that influences government 
policy of care, which, in turn, is used to shape the tangible practices made available 
to service-users. In this way, CPs constructions of mental health are filtered into the 
existing stock of common sense knowledge about mental health. Consistent with this 
account, service-users views about the aetiology of their diagnosis have been found 
to be shaped by their clinicians (Ahn, Proctor & Flanagan, 2009) and CPs attitudes 
and behaviours have been argued to inform and influence future caregivers (Servais 
& Saunders, 2007). Given their powerful role in constructing the contemporary social 
reality of mental health, it is thus important to gain an understanding of CPs 
discourse of mental health and how this relates to their work with service-users.
1.5.2 Constructions of mental health as implicated in clinical decision-making
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The distinct positions taken by healthcare professionals in relation to mental health 
have also been argued to guide and inform their reasoning and their approaches to 
assessment, formulation and intervention (Harland et al., 2009). Although CPs 
professional bodies emphasise the importance of focussing and attending to the 
difficulties experienced by individual service-users in order for clinical care to be 
client-centred (HPC, 2009), clinicians also need to think more generally about what 
the science suggests, about any similar problems assessed before and what 
interventions may be helpful in making clinical decisions. It may be that CPs do not 
consider the larger concept of mental health in day-to-day practice, but focus instead 
on the sets of symptoms or concerns that service-users present with. However, such 
judgements are likely to be influenced by the ways in which CPs construct mental 
health as these constructions position their service-users in particular ways and may 
therefore markedly impact on the processes of referral, assessment, formulation and 
intervention (Harper, 1999b). Indeed, critics have long argued that clinicians rely on 
intuitive thinking in predicting outcomes and making diagnoses for service-users 
rather than drawing on scientifically established findings (e.g., Dawes, 1994; Garb, 
1998; Kahnemann, Slovix & Tvwersky, 1982; Meehl, 1954). 
As previously noted, the construct of mental health can be viewed as a value position 
regarding what is appropriate, desirable or normal in contemporary life and the ways 
in which different therapeutic schools of thought define the concept may reflect such 
value judgements. Drawing heavily on the medical model, the traditional view of the 
aim of therapeutic change has been to replace a state of illness with a state of health 
(Milton, 2010). Similarly, the aim for Freudians may be to replace repression by ego 
control, for Jungians to realise self-hood and for cognitive therapists to replace 
dysfunctional thoughts with reality-based thoughts. In this way, successful therapy 
replaces dysfunctional or unhelpful orientations with new realities, narratives or 
insights, a process that carries with it value judgements about what mental health 
entails. It is noteworthy that not only is there a lack of clear definitions of mental 
health but there is also no device or technique that can verify an individuals mental 
health. Instead such verification processes involve clinical judgements. Mental health 
may thus be viewed as an arena of discursive encounters as it involves the 
negotiation of assumptions and values (Yardley, 1996) and previous studies have 
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demonstrated various ways in which clinicians decision-making is discursively 
constructed (Barrett, 1988; Harper, 1994). It thus seems that there are a range of 
ways in which professionals constructions of mental health may be implicated in 
clinical decision-making, an observation that has led researchers to suggest that the 
topic warrant further investigation (Hugo, 2001; Petrie, Broadbent & Kydd, 2008; 
Stevens & Harper, 2007; Wahl & Aroesty-Cohen, 2010).
1.6 Review of the literature on healthcare professionals’ conceptualisations of 
mental health 
One of the most well established findings in cognitive psychology is that peoples 
expectations can influence their attention (e.g., Sarter, Givens & Bruno, 2001), 
perception (e.g., Rolls, 2008), categorisation (e.g., Delorme, Rousselet, Macé & 
Fabre-Thorpe, 2004) and memory (e.g., Rutman, Clapp, Chadick & Gazzaley, 2009). 
Such expectations can be elicited by anything ranging from the theories and beliefs 
that the person brings to the situation to cues in the environment. This notion of top-
down processing has provided the basis for a wealth of literature examining 
healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental health and its implications. 
This body of research comprises two main parts; the first concerned with how 
healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental health influence their attitudes 
and behaviours in relation to service-users. Such empirical studies have focussed on 
the consequences of endorsing biological and psychosocial conceptualisations of 
mental health (Wahl & Aroesty-Cohen, 2010). In addition to this branch of research, 
there is a more recent wave of studies concerned with the status of mental health 
professionals ontological beliefs about mental health/illness and the effects of these 
on their work with service-users. These two branches of research will now be 
considered and critiqued in turn. Previous studies have generally used samples 
consisting of different mental health professionals and thus the following sections 
reviewing this evidence will also treat this group as unitary. Moreover, the terms 
mental health, mental illness and mental disorder have been used 
interchangeably in past research and as such appear inextricably linked (Malek, 
2004; Pickering, 2006). Therefore, studies employing these terms were considered 
relevant and were consequently included in this review.
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1.6.1 Effects of healthcare professionals’ conceptualisations of mental health 
on attitudes and behaviours
The most consistent findings of studies examining the consequences of endorsing 
biological and psychosocial conceptualisations of mental health4 have been that 
clinicians subscribing to a more biological perspective perceive service-users as 
more pathological (Langer & Abelson, 1974), more dangerous (Bennett, Thirlaway & 
Murray, 2008) and are more likely to perceive mental health problems as untreatable 
(Herrman, 2001) than those conceptualising mental health in psychosocial terms. 
Such attitudes held by mental health professionals have been found to be associated 
with biased diagnostic decisions (Morey & Ochoa, 1989), less optimism about 
treatment outcomes (Holmqvist, 2000) and decreased quality of treatment (Wallach, 
2004). Conversely, healthcare professionals endorsing a psychosocial perspective of 
mental health have been shown to be more willing to involve service-users in the 
management of mental health services (Kent & Read, 1998), make more use of non-
medical treatments (Cape, Antebi, Standen & Glazebrook, 1994) but also to be more 
likely to blame service-users for their behaviour (Miresco & Kirmayer, 2006) than 
clinicians endorsing a biological perspective of mental health.
These findings support the notion that CPs conceptualisations of mental health have 
important clinical implications in terms of influencing their attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviours when working with service-users. However, as outlined, findings have 
often been inconclusive, inconsistent and in some cases contradictory. This has led 
researchers to criticise existing studies and the associated arguments may be 
broadly divided into the following four points. First, previous research has relied upon 
the a priori assumption that mental health is a consensual object of thought about 
which only attributions may vary. Second, existing experimental studies have tended 
to offer participants a choice between biological and psychosocial conceptualisations 
of mental health, thus leaving little or no room for more multifaceted and integrative 
conceptions of mental health and potentially limiting respondents viewpoints (Wyatt 
& Livson, 1994). Third, past studies have tended to employ questionnaires and 
vignettes, methodologies widely recognised to capture idealised rather than actual 
                                               
4 A comprehensive account of the literature examining the implications of clinicians subscription to 
biological and psychosocial conceptualisations of mental health is beyond the scope of this literature 
review but is available elsewhere (e.g., Schulze, 2007; Wahl & Aroesty-Cohen, 2010).
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attitudes due to social desirability effects (Link, Yang, Phelan & Collins, 2004).
Finally, the methodologies used to assess healthcare professionals 
conceptualisations of mental health have addressed the issue from a naturalist point 
of view, assuming that the boundaries between mental health and illness are matters 
of natural fact that can be examined and determined through the use of rigorous 
scientific methods. This assumption appears inconsistent with findings from more 
recent research suggesting that some CPs are unwilling to accept mental disorders 
as real and natural categories, which will now be reviewed.
1.6.2 The ontological status of healthcare professionals’ beliefs about mental 
health and its effects on their work with service-users
Ahn, Flanagan, Marsh and Sanislow (2006) set out to investigate whether and to 
what extent clinicians believe that mental disorders, compared to medical disorders, 
are real and possess an essence. The participants were asked to judge whether 
mental and medical disorders naturally exist in the world or whether they are 
invented by culture and whether disorders are categorical or dimensional. 
Participants were also asked to rate the extent to which they believed that each 
disorder has a defining feature, whether they believed that those features cause 
symptoms of disorders and whether one needs to target the defining features in order 
to treat the disorders. The study concluded that clinicians are unwilling to commit to 
essentialist beliefs and endorse mental disorders as naturally existing concepts, that 
is, categories to be discovered in the world. The authors speculated that clinicians 
unwillingness to subscribe to essentialist accounts might shield them from 
stigmatising people diagnosed with mental disorders since such categories were 
viewed as being socially constructed.
Employing a similar methodology, Ahn, Proctor and Flanagan (2009) examined 
mental health clinicians ontological beliefs about the mental disorders listed in DSM-
IV and the consequences for judging treatment effectiveness. In the first part of the 
study the authors asked clinicians to rate the extent to which they believed each 
individual disorder to be biologically based, psychologically based and 
environmentally based. In the latter part, participants rated the extent to which they 
felt that psychotherapy or medication would be able to improve, control, or manage 
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the various disorders. The study found that clinicians conceptualise mental disorders 
along a continuum spanning from non-biological disorders (e.g., adjustment 
disorders) to biological disorders (e.g., autistic disorders) and that clinicians believe 
psychotherapy to be more effective for psychosocially based mental disorders and 
medication more effective for biologically based mental disorders. It was thus 
concluded that clinicians ontological beliefs about mental health influence their 
beliefs about the effectiveness of medication and psychotherapy as well as their 
choice of treatment options. Kim and Ahn (2002) found that clinicians concepts of 
mental disorders are theory based rather than theory-neutral and that they are better 
at recalling symptoms associated with their individual theories of mental health than 
symptoms not related to their theories. The authors concluded that clinicians may be 
biased to falsely remember symptoms central to their theory and that their 
conceptualisations may thus influence informal initial diagnoses, which in turn may 
impact on the way in which clinicians perceive and interact with their service-users. 
For instance, the authors argued, clinicians may be inclined to focus their attention 
on detecting symptoms that are central to their theories about mental health, an issue 
of particular importance given that symptoms are often ambiguous. 
These studies contribute to knowledge by examining healthcare professionals 
conceptualisations of mental health and provide further support for the notion that 
CPs conceptualisations of mental health have a range of clinical implications. This is 
important since similarities between service-users and mental health professionals 
values are associated with therapeutic improvement (e.g., Beutler & Clarkin, 1990; 
Castonguay & Beutler, 2006) and service-users views of their difficulties have been 
found to be shaped by their clinicians (Ahn, Proctor & Flanagan, 2009). Moreover, 
shared conceptualisations of mental health may help to strengthen the therapeutic 
alliance, a factor associated with positive outcomes (Martin, Garske & Davis, 2000) 
and service-user satisfaction (Roberts & Holmes, 1998) across therapies.
1.6.3 Concerns with mental health as a consensual object of thought and the 
methods used to explore it.
The underlying assumptions of past studies have clearly informed the methods used 
to collect data, the type of data and results obtained, as well as their perceived 
76
implications and these assumptions will now be considered. One of the implicit 
assumptions of previous research is that attitudes and beliefs reside internally within 
individuals and that these can be elicited through appropriate research methods. The 
studies employed vignettes and questionnaires to explore clinicians beliefs about 
mental health and their role in interactions with service-users. This methodology is 
ideal for obtaining individualistic and categorical data that can be assigned an 
attitude. However, it may also be criticised for its implicit demand to either endorse or 
reject a limited list of prescribed responses, leaving little room for articulation of 
multifaceted beliefs. Through the use of these methodologies, data that does not 
answer the questions in the predefined format, such as talk or free text comments, is 
not regarded as suitable for inclusion in the primary analysis. It could thus be argued 
that through directing participants to express their beliefs about mental health using 
forced choice attitude scales, the occasioned and variable nature of professionals 
conceptualisations of mental health and its effects is obscured and restricted. Indeed, 
any variability would present difficulties for categorisation and so points to the 
limitations of conceptualising attitudes or beliefs as inner stable cognitive entities.
It seems that the reviewed studies assumption regarding the straightforward 
connection between participants responses and their beliefs have resulted in a lack 
of discussion about the context in which participants accounts are produced. It could 
be argued that past studies focus on attitudes as the core unit of analysis have 
worked to construct an epistemology that produces particular sets of categorical 
statements about clinicians beliefs about mental health and the ways that these 
influence their work with service-users. The methodologies employed could be seen 
to reinforce the unit of analysis and to dismiss any contextual challenges to its 
methods as mere contingencies. In this way, individual clinicians are constructed as 
the core source of meaning and as holding discrete sets of rational attitudes and 
beliefs that are relatively stable across settings. At the same time, the function of the 
talk and the impact of social, cultural and situational factors on clinicians 
conceptualisations of mental health are marginalised as random contextual and 
contingent factors external to their beliefs. These issues indicate that past research 
has failed to explore the performative and contextual aspects of the discourses used 
by CPs to conceptualise mental health and the perceived effects of these on their 
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work with service-users.
As previously noted, healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental health 
and their implications have been routinely measured, compared and theorised from a 
variety of perspectives whilst relying upon the a priori assumption that mental health 
is a consensual object of thought. In this way, even though people hold different 
attitudes and attributions in relation to mental health the concept itself is not disputed.
However, as outlined, the vagueness of the phrase mental health, its multiple uses 
and contested nature implies that it is very difficult to differentiate its meaning to one 
individual from another. This raises the potentially controversial question of how it is 
that people can work as mental health professionals or be diagnosed as having a 
mental health problem when mental health itself seems to be a conceptually fuzzy 
and highly ramified term? Moreover, the methodologies employed by past studies 
have not been sensitive to features of ambivalence, ambiguity and uncertainty in 
clinicians sense-making processes, thus potentially simplifying the complex beliefs 
about mental health that practitioners draw on. These issues raise important 
questions about the appropriateness and the solidity of the epistemological 
assumptions that past research has relied on in studying healthcare professionals 
ideas about mental health and its influence on their work with service-users. 
Furthermore, whilst clinicians beliefs about mental health and their effects are 
referred to as an association, the beliefs are also implicitly presented as a causal 
variable in influencing practitioners attitudes towards service-users (Wahl & Aroesty-
Cohen, 2010), their beliefs about intervention efficacy (Ahn, Proctor & Flanagan, 
2009), and the informal initial diagnoses they assign service-users (Kim & Ahn, 
2002). The use of standardised and validated questionnaires with demographic 
tables outlining participants representativeness of the broader population and 
complex statistical analyses serves to authenticate the objectivity of the research. 
Such rhetorical features are typical of an empiricist repertoire (Gilbert & Mulkay, 
1984) and, through their use, even though categorisations such as mental health and 
mental illness may be referred to as biopsychosocial entities or even hypothetical 
constructs, the data involving these categorisations is collected, analysed and 
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disseminated as if though it exists in the social and psychological world 
independently of any particular categorisations. 
Whilst existing studies have been usefully applied, they appear to have missed 
domains central to the research question which may help to explain some of their 
contradictory findings since healthcare professionals conceptualisations of mental 
health may not be consistent across social contexts, or indeed, over time. There is 
extensive research on health (Crossley, 2002; Gillies & Willig, 1997) and beyond 
(Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984) suggesting that attitudes change even during the same 
interactions. Such arguments have led researchers to suggest that the variation in 
the definitions and conceptualisations of mental health appear to represent the 
different contexts of its reification (Bracken & Thomas, 2005). The observation that 
people are often inconsistent in their discussions of ideological dilemmas (Billig, 
1999), poses difficulties for quantitative methodologies, argued to be insensitive to 
variability in participants accounts (Wetherell, Taylor & Yates, 2001). The present 
study is not suggesting that the naturalist assumptions that previous research has 
relied on are inherently wrong. Instead, it is proposing that it is necessary to examine 
the assumptions that underpin CPs conceptualisations of mental health in order to 
gain a better understanding of the function of these and the effect they may have on 
their work with service-users. For this purpose, it is argued that the examination of 
mental health requires a radically different methodological framework from the 
positivist approach that has been applied historically to explore healthcare 
professionals conceptualisations of mental health. In particular, it will be suggested 
that CPs accounts of mental health and their effects can be productively explored by 
focussing on the ways in which these are discursively constructed through employing 
a social constructionist epistemology, which will be considered next5.
1.7 Mental health from a social constructionist lens 
In recent years, there has been a general shift towards qualitative research; a shift 
                                               
5 It seems useful at this stage to draw a distinction between critique and deconstruction: critique 
challenges statements by working within the same world of assumptions; deconstruction, in contrast, 
explores those very assumptions (Spivak, 1990). This thesis is deconstructive in the sense that rather 
than assuming that the entity of mental health exists, it seeks to understand how the concept is 
produced.
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largely fuelled by the postmodernist critique of positivism and it is increasingly 
acknowledged that such a framework provides a useful alternative to quantitative 
research in the study of psychological processes (e.g., McLeod, 2001; Toukmainian 
& Rennie, 1992). In particular, there has been a move towards developing research 
approaches drawing on social constructionism, which suggests that all aspects of 
human functioning are produced and reproduced through social interactions in 
specific cultural and historical contexts (Burr, 1995). Social constructionism holds a 
relativist position with regard to truth, implying that knowledge is never value-neutral 
as it is considered to be located within and constrained by particular historical and 
sociocultural contexts. Social constructionism therefore considers scientific enquiry 
not as an objective pursuit of truth but rather as a social institution that actively and 
systematically constructs particular versions of truth and reality. The approach thus
assumes a critical stance towards taken-for-granted or common sense knowledge 
and is committed to analysing and problematising the naturalisation of such 
discourses through the process of active deconstruction (Frosh, Burck, Stricklan-
Clark & Morgan, 1996) (see section 2.1 for a more comprehensive account of social 
constructionism and the epistemological assumptions of this study). As such, it is 
concerned with the social and interpersonal categories that individuals bring into 
existence in talking about their minds to others (Edwards & Potter, 1992). 
There appears to be a number of advantages of employing a social constructionist 
framework in the study of CPs constructions of mental health and its effects. First, 
because language is not viewed as representing truth or the real experience of the 
speaker, adopting a social constructionist position implies that rather than attempting 
to establish correct or true accounts, it allows for the examination of what is 
achieved in talk and how versions of truth are constructed, argued and authenticated 
in discourse (Willig, 2008). This focus on the performative aspects of discourse 
suggests that rather than being seen as a consistent and accurate representation of 
individuals attitudes, talk may instead be viewed as produced to meet particular 
interactional demands. Second, because talk is viewed as oriented towards social 
action, it changes according to time, function and the social conditions in which it is 
situated. This means that instead of viewing CPs accounts of mental health as being 
located in the individual and as separate from their context, accounts can be viewed 
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from within the complexity of social interactions in which it takes place. The study of 
mental health itself is thus replaced by a study of the ways in which CPs represent 
or construct mental health through their use of language in particular contexts. Lastly, 
as implicitly implied by the first two assumptions, attitudinal variability is viewed as an 
inherent property of accounts since people perform different conversational actions 
with their talk depending on the contexts in which they are speaking (Austin, 1962). 
The approach thus aims to facilitate variability, disagreement and contradiction in 
peoples accounts as this is considered to provide important clues about the 
contextual, functional, and argumentative features of the discourse being analysed, 
not as a problem to be solved, controlled or avoided as assumed in traditional 
cognitive research (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
1.8 New wave of social constructionist studies 
In response to the call for a change in methodology, there is a new wave of studies 
underpinned by a shared recognition of the role of context and language in 
negotiating, confirming and challenging social realities. The majority of such studies 
have focussed on the therapist - service-user interaction and the ways in which 
therapy is performed including the rhetorical strategies used by therapists and the 
effects of interventions on service-users narratives (see Avdi & Georgaca, 2007 for a 
review). However, there is also an increasing body of social constructionist research 
concerned with the ways in which psychological discourses constitute and regulate 
mental health (Foucault, 1967; Guterman, 1994; Parker, Georgaca, Harper, 
McLaughlin & Stowell-Smith, 1995; Zeeman & Simons, 2011) and its specific 
diagnostic categories such as eating disorders (Malson, Finn, Treasure, Clarke & 
Anderson, 2004), schizophrenia (Boyle, 2002) and depression (Stoppard, 2000). In 
particular there is a wave of empirical studies informed by social constructionist ideas 
concerned with the accounts of health professionals (e.g., Griffiths & Hughes, 2000; 
Parker, Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin & Stowell-Smith, 1995; Soyland, 1995). Given 
their methodological focus on the inherent variability of accounts, such studies have 
focussed on the ways in which contested issues are constructed by professionals. 
Examples of these studies include an analysis of how professional scientific rhetoric 
is employed to construct recipients of electro-convulsive therapy as severely ill 
(Stevens & Harper, 2007), an examination of how professional accounts of 
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psychiatric medication may be employed to serve rhetorical and persuasive functions 
in managing questions about its efficacy (Harper, 1999a), a critique of how the 
definition of mental disorder is constructed in the DSM-IV and its implications for how 
normality is constructed (Crowe, 2000), a study of how psychiatric diagnoses are 
produced in professional discourse (Wooffitt & Allistone, 2005), and an exploration of 
the ways in which the professional use of psychological terms and production of a 
psychiatric diagnosis can be the site of discursive struggle (McHoul & Rapley, 2005). 
These studies comprise the background to the present thesis, which itself forms part 
of a broader discursive turn within mental health (Gergen, 1990; Harre & Gillet, 
1994; Radley & Billig, 1996).
1.9 Section summary
The literature reviewed in this introduction has outlined the ways in which 
professional discourse on mental health and its effects is characterised by conflicts 
and confusion, reflecting the inherent complexity of the topic. CPs conceptualisations 
of mental health and its effects on their work with service-users have been found to 
be diverse and reflective of the biasing filters of the methods used to make sense of 
the topic. In particular, it has been argued that the methodologies employed by past 
studies have not been sensitive to the function, variability and context of participants 
accounts and that an alternative methodology drawing on social constructionist ideas 
is therefore more suitable. It has been suggested that the adoption of such an 
approach enables the exploration of the research question whilst paying attention to 
the functions of CPs talk, the different issues attended to and the ways in which their 
talk is situated by the social and historical context in which it takes place. These 
issues will be further discussed in the extended methodology. The aim of this study 
was thus to explore CPs constructions of mental health and its impact on their work 
with service-users.
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Part Two:  Extended Methodology
2.1 Section introduction 
In the literature review, the ways in which conceptualisations of mental health have 
differed across time and contexts were identified and I outlined how I came to 
appreciate the great variability in the definition of mental health. This variability has 
been regarded as problematic by past research approaching the issue from a 
positivist framework6 seeking to construct a generalised version of participants' 
accounts where consistency is seen as evidence of generalisability. It has been 
argued that because psychological constructs such as mental health are represented 
through linguistic labels, which are bound by time and culture and reified through 
their use, they are thus intrinsically variable. An alternative approach sensitive to 
variability and peoples use of language was therefore proposed and this section will 
detail the epistemology and methodology that is being used. This will be followed by 
an outline of methods employed, the procedure of the study, ethical considerations 
and a discussion of quality issues in qualitative research. 
2.2 Epistemology: social constructionism
Throughout my training in psychology with its clear emphasis on empiricism I was 
taught that there are innate discoverable psychological essences or truths that we 
as researchers can come to know through the process of carrying out carefully 
designed experiments. However, my study of conceptualisations of mental health has 
opened my eyes to an alternative framework which views our understanding of the 
world as derived not from an objective reality but from other people (Burr, 1995). 
From such a social constructionist perspective, variability is not viewed as an 
obstacle but as the central feature of interest. Similarly, language is not thought of as 
a tool to discover mental states as proposed in cognitive psychology but rather as a 
social action used to manage and create reality (Elliott, Fischer & Rennie, 1999). This 
is in line with Burrs assertion that knowledge is, therefore, seen not as something 
that a person has (or does not have), but as something that people do together  
(1995, p.8). This study adopts a social constructionist epistemology assuming that 
people come to understand the world in terms of their views, and that these are 
                                               
6 Positivist frameworks are based on the assumption that there is an objective reality which 
researchers can come to know through the use of traditional empirical methods.
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interactionally and communicatively produced (Gergen, 1999). From this perspective, 
the various possible accounts of the nature of the world are viewed as constructions 
in themselves and are therefore best understood in terms of their functional nature in 
specific contexts. Since the aim study of this study was to explore CPs constructions 
of mental health and its effects, a methodology sensitive to variability through the 
medium of language was favoured to explore how such constructions are 
represented.
2.3 Methodology
A number of different approaches including Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
(IPA), Conversation Analysis (CA) and Discourse Analysis (DA) were considered in 
the process of designing this study. IPA is concerned with producing accounts of 
individuals subjective experiences of the world and this research was less interested 
in CPs subjective experiences and more with how they produced or constructed their 
accounts of mental health and its effects (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). CA is 
mainly focussed on the micro-features of conversation whereas this research aimed 
to situate the data within its wider context and so for these reasons DA was deemed 
the most appropriate framework (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Sacks, Schegloff & 
Jefferson, 1974). 
2.3.1 Discourse analysis 
Discourse analysis (DA) is a blanket term for various different frameworks7 that 
developed through a critique of the ideas of cognitivism and the notion that peoples 
language reflects their underlying thoughts and feelings (Willig, 2008). Instead, 
language is viewed as a device used to manage social interactions and construct 
social realities and DA enables questions to be asked about the actions performed by 
the use of language. In short, discourse analysts are concerned with how 
descriptions, accounts and arguments are organised and what is gained by these 
constructions (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). This has led Billig (1997, p.43) to suggest 
                                               
7 These include, amongst others, Foucauldian DA (FDA), Critical DA (CDA) and Discursive 
Psychology (DP). An in-depth review of DA approaches is beyond the scope of this study but can be 
found elsewhere (e.g., Cameron, 2001; Rapley, 2007; Wetherell, Taylor & Yates, 2001; Willig, 2008)
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that DA is not only a methodology as it involves a theoretical way of understanding 
the nature of discourse and the nature of psychological phenomena. 
2.3.2 Discursive psychology
This study adopted the theory and methods of discursive psychology (DP), which 
differs from other forms of discourse analytic approaches in its emphasis on how 
psychological themes are utilised and has been described as the application of 
discourse analytic principles to psychological topics (Edwards & Potter, 2001, p.12). 
The approach stresses the primacy of discourse as a medium for action and draws 
on the principles of ethnomethodology8 (Garfinkel, 1967), conversation analysis (CA) 
(Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974) and Wittgensteins (1967) philosophy of mind. 
Discursive psychology differs from more traditional psychological approaches that 
view discourse as representative of a form of communication that takes place 
between minds that exist a priori. Rather than conceptualising discourse as neutral 
mirrors of reality or as confounding variables that need to be controlled, discursive 
psychology views discourse as something worthy of study in itself without regard to 
any presumed underlying representation or structure. The discursive psychology 
approach taken in this study focusses on how meaning is created through the use of 
language within social interaction and assumes that discourse is action-orientated, 
situated and constructed and each of these features will now be considered in turn 
(Edwards & Potter, 2001). 
Action-oriented
The discursive psychological approach to language is informed by Wittgensteins 
notion of language-games (1967) in that it recognises the importance of considering 
the different actions performed by the infinite variety of statements that people can 
make in any given context (Potter, 1996). Language is viewed as active, constitutive 
and committed to a purpose rather than as a path to discover how users of language 
think or feel about something. Specifically, the approach is concerned with how 
individuals construct what they say in order to serve particular interests or perform 
certain functions (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).
                                               
8 Within the approach, discourse is generally conceptualised as all forms of spoken interaction and 
written text (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).
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Situated
Given the potentially infinite variability of discourse, the context to which it is bound, 
or situated within, has been argued to be central to its understanding (Hepburn & 
Potter, 2003). Discourse may be situated in a number of different ways. Firstly, rather 
than being neutral descriptions of the way things actually are, peoples accounts are 
often made in relation to other possible alternatives and so are constructed to 
consider the risks of being viewed as contentious or false (Edwards, 1997). 
Therefore, the discursive psychological approach emphasises the importance of 
paying attention to the rhetorical organisation of discourse (Billig, 1987). Secondly, 
the approach concurs with the conversation analytic notion that discourse can be a 
function of its social setting and sequential positioning and the interactional 
framework of the discourse thus needs to be taken into account (Sacks, Schegloff & 
Jefferson, 1974). Lastly, not only the discourse produced in any given context but 
also what might be omitted or what could have been said should be considered in
order to understand its meaning (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
Constructed
Discursive psychology assumes an epistemic rather than an ontological position with 
regard to social constructionism and therefore differs from other constructionist 
approaches (Potter & Edwards, 2003). In this way, the central feature of interest is 
the constructive nature of accounts as opposed to what might exist beyond them. 
Thus, in considering conceptualisations of mental health, the approach considers 
these to be constructed rather than representing an accurate description of 
individuals inner mental states. Discursive psychology enables an exploration of how 
people utilise language to perform social actions and may thus offer an increased 
understanding of the processes by which mental health is talked into being (Antaki & 
Widdicombe, 1998; Willig, 2008). However, as noted by Wittgenstein, interpretations 
by themselves do not determine meaning (1967, p.198) and the constructive nature 
of the current study and the ways in which the interpretation and analysis of the data 
are, in themselves, constructed to achieve particular aims must consequently be 
acknowledged. 
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2.3.4 Discursive psychology and constructions of mental health
A discursive psychology approach was adopted to explore variability in CPs 
constructions of mental health in order to gain an increased understanding of 
patterns of meaning and interpretation in their accounts. Discursive psychology is 
concerned with the different manners in which mental health may be talked about 
and the implications of such variations and therefore differs from previous research, 
which has tended to be of a quantitative nature. Since conceptualisations of mental 
health are produced almost entirely within language, it is argued that adopting a 
discursive psychology approach is particularly appropriate for the present purpose. 
The approach allows for the variability and fluidity of CPs discourse to be captured 
while paying attention to the contextual nature of mental health accounts (Seymour-
Smith, 2008). As noted by Edwards and Potter (1992), rather than being viewed as 
an explanatory resource, discursive psychology enables an examination of how 
language is used for specific purposes in talking about contested issues. Mental 
health is one such issue and a discursive examination was thus used to shed light on 
the communicative practices, verbal strategies and common assumptions drawn on 
by CPs in producing their accounts of mental health and its perceived impact on their 
work with service-users. In line with its epistemological position, the aim of this study 
was not to produce knowledge of what mental health is or isnt but rather to gain an 
increased understanding of the processes by which mental health is talked into 
being. Indeed, Harper (1994) suggested that discursive approaches are useful in 
deconstructing discourses as they allow for an examination of implicit oppositions in 
peoples accounts, such as between the normal and the pathological. Moreover, 
there is an increasing amount of discourse analytical studies concerned with 
contested issues within psychology to which this research aims to contribute.
Critics of discursive approaches have argued that its analyses arent sufficiently 
grounded and that DA studies thereby risk over-interpreting data. In response to such 
arguments, researchers have proposed that all semantic phenomena have multiple 
causes and that studies rooted in a logical positivist tradition may thus be over-
determining data (Burman & Parker, 1993). Indeed, the social constructionist 
epistemology associated with discursive approaches rejects the notion of any 
completely grounded final version of reality and discursive writers are careful not to 
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assert that their interpretations or findings represent universal and timeless truths.
However, rather than arguing that everything is relative and that anything goes, it 
has been suggested that it may be a case of nothing goes in that all alternatives 
have both inherent possibilities and dangers (Stenner & Eccleston, 1994). Thus, 
instead of subscribing to the extreme relativist argument that no comparative 
evaluations can be made, discursive analysts aim to elaborate and problematise the 
criteria against which the quality of analyses is measured (Harper, 1999b). This issue 
is given further consideration in section 2.7.
2.4 Methods 
2.4.1 Design 
To allow for the varied and contested accounts of mental health to be explored, a 
qualitative research design sensitive to participants language use was considered 
the most appropriate. The details of the methods employed in this study will be 
outlined in the following five sections: collection of data through semi-structured 
interviews, recruitment, sample size, sample and materials. 
2.4.2 Semi-structured interviews 
The appropriateness of using semi-structured interviews in discursive research has 
been debated and naturally occurring talk is frequently preferred, although the 
meaning of this term is a contentious issue9 (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). 
In particular, it has been argued that the use of interviews produce a certain kind of 
interaction as participants invariably orient towards the interview situation thus 
revealing more about the manners in which participants manage their stakes as 
interviewees than about the discursive strategies used in everyday life (Willig, 2008). 
However, it has also been suggested that semi-structured interviews are able to 
identify more informal use of discursive resources (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984) and 
enable researchers to purposely question a sample on the same issues rendering it a 
good way of generating rich data about the social world (Gubrium & Holstein, 2003).
The aim of the current study was to examine CPs conceptualisations of mental 
                                               
9 Critics have argued that research-prompted data is a contrived artefact and that the process of 
obtaining informed consent and using recording equipment by its very nature contaminate the purity of 
naturally occurring data, thus rendering the concept meaningless (Speer, 2002).
88
health and its perceived effect on their work with service-users, a topic that 
participants might not have felt comfortable discussing if a different methodology was 
employed (such as focus groups). As such, semi-structured interviews were thought 
to provide participants with a safe, confidential and flexible space sensitive to 
complexity and variability in participants accounts. One-to-one semi-structured 
interviews are also the most commonly employed method of capturing individuals 
discourse in DA research (Wetherell, Taylor & Yates, 2001). On this basis, semi-
structured interviews were considered to be most appropriate method for gathering 
data. Consistent with the epistemological framework, the interviews are not regarded 
as accurate descriptions or truth claims but rather as important in constructing the 
data in itself. In line with this, the interviewer and interviewee are viewed as co-
constructing the contingent sense-making and the interviews are thus considered as 
conversations rather than elicitations (Willig, 2008) (see Part 5 and Appendix I for 
statements on reflexivity). However, taking into account Camerons (2001) 
suggestion that participants respond to questions on the basis of what they perceive 
the researchers motive to be, my involvement in the interviews in terms of questions 
and prompts was intentionally kept to a minimum and a facilitative rather than a 
argumentative style was adopted. 
2.4.3 Recruitment
This project was interested in CPs constructions of mental health and its influence 
on their work with service-users and the study thus sought to recruit accredited CPs 
with direct contact with service-users as part of their work role. Participants who did 
not meet this standard were excluded based on their answers to the following 
questions: Are you registered as a Clinical Psychologist with the HPC? and Do you 
have direct contact with service-users as part of your current role?
A purposive maximum-variation sampling strategy (Pickard, 2007) was used in that 
CPs working in a variety of different settings were invited to take part in the study. In 
line with Merriams (1998) suggestion that purposive sampling enables researchers 
to ensure that participants add different perspectives, it was hoped that recruiting 
participants from various services would allow the different positions and discourses 
about mental health available to CPs to be identified. After gaining ethical approval 
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(see section 2.6), CPs in the East Midlands region known to the researchers were 
sent an email inviting them to take part in the study. The respondents expressing an 
interest were then sent information packs containing information about the research 
through email and the practical arrangements for the interviews were agreed on. 
Before the start of the interviews participants were reminded of the research aims, 
the interview process and the equipment being used to record the interviews. Prior to 
completing the consent forms, participants were also asked if they had any questions 
about the research and whether they had understood the aims of the study.
2.4.4 Sample size
It has been suggested that because extensive variations in linguistic patterning can 
emerge from a small amount of people, a large sample size may not add to the 
analytic outcomes but instead render the process of analysis unmanageable (Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987). Indeed, a number of researchers have noted that discursive 
psychology methods require smaller sample sizes compared to quantitative 
approaches since the success of such studies are dependent not on the amount of 
data but on the research question asked and depth of the analysis carried out (Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987; Seymour-Smith, 2008). Previous published studies employing 
discursive approaches have tended to use sample sizes of between five and fifteen 
participants and so a sample size of ten CPs was deemed appropriate (Madill, 
Gough, Lawton & Stratton, 2005). This sample size is also consistent with previous 
discursive research specifically designed to explore issues related to professionals 
accounts of mental health (e.g., Harper, 1995). 
2.4.5 Sample
Eleven semi-structured interviews were conducted with CPs who volunteered to take 
part in the study and who self-identified as working directly with service-users. 
Overall, the sample represented diversity with regard to service-user groups, clinical 
settings and length of clinical experience as detailed in the journal paper.
2.4.6 Materials: interview schedule
The development of the interview schedule was informed by the literature review, the 
pilot study and discussions with the research supervisors and current government 
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policy on mental health such as No Health Without Mental Health (Department of 
Health, 2011). The interview schedule was designed to broadly cover five areas 
related to the research question in order to elicit a range of talk around mental health
whilst still allowing the participants to elaborate and introduce new aspects to the 
study (see Appendix D). These areas included participants understandings of mental 
health and how these related to their service context and colleagues clinical practice, 
the factors perceived to be associated with conceptualisations of mental health and 
the ways in which views about mental health were considered to influence 
participants work with service-users. Due to the exploratory nature of the study, the 
questions were intentionally kept broad and were revised in line with the iterative 
process of the methodology (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Cameron (2001) suggested 
that researchers need to maintain a degree of control during interviews whilst giving 
participants the opportunity to redefine the research topic as this may generate new 
insights. Taking this into account, open-ended questions were used to provide a 
flexible interview space within which the participants could communicate different
representations and introduce new directions to the interviews other than those 
directly addressed by the researcher.
2.4.7 Materials: demographic information sheet
It has been argued that including basic demographic information in studies using 
discursive approaches allows readers to situate the sample and to evaluate the 
relevance of findings (Elliott, Fischer & Rennie, 1999). For this reason, a 
demographic information form was included to collect the following data using self-
completion questionnaires: age, gender, area of work, years since qualification, the 
number of hours spent providing supervision every month and the number of hours of 
the work-week spent in direct contact with service-users (see Appendix C).
2.4.8 Materials: recording and transcription equipment
The interviews were recorded on an Olympus DS-30 digital voice recorder and 
transferred to a personal computer. The interviews were then transcribed using an 
Olympus AS-2300 transcription kit as well as an external transcription service.
2.5 Procedure
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2.5.1 Interview preparation
Prior to conducting the interviews, participants were given the opportunity to go 
through the information sheet again and to raise any questions or concerns. A 
consent form (see Appendix B) stating the potential risks of study participation, 
participants rights to withdraw from the study without penalty, and the anonymous 
nature of their responses was then distributed to be signed prior to participation and 
this was the only item containing personally identifiable information. The consent 
forms were stored in a locked cabinet following the interviews. A demographic 
questionnaire asking participants to indicate their age, gender, area of work, years 
since qualifying and the number of hours spent in direct contact with service-users 
and providing supervision was then completed and these were stored separate from 
the consent forms. The demographic forms were anonymised using individual 
identification codes and these were also employed in the transcription of the digital 
recordings of the interviews. Lastly, participants were reminded of the research aims, 
the interview process and the equipment being used to record the interviews.
2.5.2 Pilot study
In order to examine whether the interview schedule achieved its aim it was piloted 
using two one-to-one interviews. These interviews were then transcribed and 
discussed with the research supervisors and it was agreed that the interview 
schedule was able to capture participants responses in a manner relevant to the 
research aims. However, throughout the pilot interviews I found myself repeatedly 
prompting the participants and thereby potentially closing down the avenues 
available to interviewees in responding to my questions. For this reason, ways to 
minimise the extent to which I was steering the direction of participants accounts 
were discussed with the research supervisors in an effort to generate richer data in 
further interviews.
2.5.3 Semi-structured interviews
In line with the notion that naturalistic settings are to be favoured when using 
discursive psychology (Potter & Hepburn, 2005), the interviews were conducted in 
settings familiar to the participants wherever possible. The interviews were carried 
out over a five-month period in 2012 (February to June). The duration of the 
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interviews ranged from approximately 40 minutes to 110 minutes (with an average 
session duration of about 72 minutes).
2.5.4 Interview schedule
In order to afford a greater degree of comparability and to make the task of coding 
and searching through the transcripts for variations and patterns in responses more 
manageable, all participants were asked a similar set of questions. However, the 
development of the discussion depended on participants replies and so the 
sequence of questioning varied somewhat from interview to interview in order to 
allow participants to expand on their ideas informally. My known and accepted 
position as a trainee CP, and consequent interest in learning from other CPs was 
used to facilitate this process. In line with the epistemological position adopted, the 
interviews were viewed as an opportunity to explore participants discursive practices 
rather than as a means to access veridical accounts. The progress through the 
interview schedule was informed by changes in the interactional nature of the 
interview and questioning techniques included probing for in-depth details, 
clarification and asking follow-up questions in order to generate data rich in variation 
and diversity, considered integral to the epistemology of DP (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987; Silverman, 2001). Again, it needs to be noted that in eliciting diverse 
responses from participants I inevitably influenced the interactive process although 
this impact was kept to a minimum through limiting my responses where appropriate.
2.5.5 Transcription and analysis
Based on Willigs (2008) suggestion that the process of transcription inevitably 
transforms the interview data as the transcripts can never be an exact representation 
of the interviews themselves, I transcribed five of the recordings myself. This allowed 
me to engage with the process of transcribing the data and to reflect on it and as 
such may be viewed as a first stage of analysis (Cameron, 2001). An external 
transcription service was also used to transcribe the interviews and the quality of 
these was then evaluated against the audio recordings and my original transcripts. 
Since the aim of the analysis was to explore rhetorical function and discourse, a 
simplified form of Jeffersonian transcription notation was used (Rapley, 2007; 
Appendix E). This system is commonly employed by discourse analysts as it can be 
adapted in accordance with the amount of detail required (Kitzinger & Frith, 2001). 
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The audio recordings of the interviews were transcribed verbatim using 10-20 hours 
per one hour of interview and the transcripts were headed with participants 
pseudonyms and numbered for reference purposes. 
The focus of the analysis was on the language used by CPs in talking about their 
ideas around mental health and its influence on their work with service-users and the 
constructions used to evaluate this link. As such, the analysis focussed on how 
participants talk was organised, the constructions produced in the talk and the 
discourses and discursive strategies drawn on (Horton-Salway, 2001). In order to 
make the process of analysis more manageable, the discourses generated in the talk
related to the interview questions were first saved in a data file. As part of this 
process, conversational talk before and after the interview concerning issues not 
relevant to the research was eliminated. It is at this point important to keep in mind 
that in discursive examinations of data, consistency is relevant only in the context of 
recognising patterns in language use (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Indeed, consistency 
in responses may indicate that there is a limited set of discursive resources available 
to participants. However, the primary focus of the analysis is on the variation in 
responses. As noted by Potter and Wetherell (1987), analysis of discourse should not 
be carried out mechanically but rather involves reading and re-reading transcripts 
whilst paying particular attention to patterns of language use in the data. In order to 
orient my reading and guide the analysis of the interviews, I developed a template 
listing a number of analytic questions based on past researchers suggestions (see 
Appendix G). The data corpus was read twice, coded and systematically explored 
using this analytic framework paying particular attention to how the text constructed 
its objects and subjects (context) and how such constructs varied across discursive 
contexts (variability). The attention of the analysis to the dimensions of context and 
variability allowed me to trace the effects of participants accounts of mental health 
(action orientation) (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The analysis assumed that mental 
health was not simply talked about by participants but also constituted through their 
discourse., Throughout the analytic process I asked myself; why am I reading the text 
in this way, what is being assumed in the passage and what discursive features 
produce this reading (see Appendix H for a more detailed account of the analytic 
process).
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2.6 Ethical considerations
This study obtained ethical approval from the Institute of Work, Health and 
Organisations at the University of Nottingham, United Kingdom on the 2nd December 
2011 (see Appendix F). 
2.6.1 Confidentiality
Given that studies employing qualitative methodologies frequently contain detailed 
descriptions of participants experiences, confidentiality was given considerable 
consideration throughout the research process. Ethical considerations such as the 
recording of the interviews, the use of direct quotes in the write-up and the storage of 
data were discussed with participants before the interviews and also outlined on the 
information sheet and detailed on the consent form. Participants were also informed 
that any identifiable information (e.g., names of people and places) would be altered 
to maintain anonymity.
2.6.2 Informed consent
Prior to signing the informed consent form, participants were asked if they had any 
questions about the research and whether they had understood the aims of the 
research. The consent form explained the voluntary nature of participation, the right 
to withdraw or stop being a part of the study up to two weeks after the date of the 
interview and that anonymous direct quotes from the interviews may be used in the 
study reports and future publications (see Appendix B).
2.6.3 Risk of harm 
Given the general nature of the questions, it was considered unlikely that the study 
would cause distress to participants. However, as explained on the information sheet, 
there was an option to request additional support from the research supervisors who 
are qualified health professionals for participants experiencing distress as a result of 
participation.
2.7 Quality issues
As outlined, this study adopted a social constructionist epistemology, which favours 
the existence of multiple, equally valid interpretations of knowledge thus rejecting the 
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notion of absolute truth that logical positivist research is measured against. This 
epistemological difference has considerable implications for evaluating the quality of 
the study. For instance, since the researcher and the participants are not viewed as 
independent entities, the absence of bias or the notion of objectivity is not considered 
a meaningful criterion for determining its quality. Researchers have noted that 
applying quantitative measures such as validity and reliability to evaluate qualitative 
studies that approach knowledge from a relativist viewpoint is contradictory to its 
epistemological assumptions and thus meaningless (Reicher, 2000). Given that 
research adopting a relativist epistemology cannot be evaluated using the same, 
established standards of quality employed within realist frameworks, some 
researchers have questioned the validity of discursive psychology examinations 
(Elliott, Fischer & Rennie, 1999). Such methodological controversies has led to the 
development of various frameworks with which to evaluate the quality of qualitative 
research (Willig, 2008), although to date no unitary approach exists, arguably 
reflecting the various epistemologies employed within the qualitative paradigm 
(Taylor, 2001). Madill, Jordan and Shirley (2000) suggested that because there is no 
such thing as a unified qualitative paradigm, the quality of qualitative research should 
be evaluated by the logic of justification associated with the studys epistemology. 
Clearly, in order to evaluate the contribution to knowledge of a piece of qualitative 
research, the objectives of the study and the type of knowledge that it aims to 
produce must be taken into account.
The epistemological position adopted in this study assumes that knowledge is 
necessarily contextual with the implication that, depending on their context and 
background, different people may interpret the same talk differently (Seale, 1998). 
The notion that research methods are able to access entities such as thoughts, 
feelings and experiences10 is thus rejected and quality criteria concerned with the 
reliability, accuracy or authenticity of perspectives are therefore considered 
meaningless. Importantly, this is not the same as proposing that any interpretation is 
as good as another (Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 2000 p. 13). The focus of discourse 
analysis is to explore an interpretation of discourse and the discursive practices that 
                                               
10 It is noteworthy that within DP, the category of experience is commonly viewed as a discursive 
move by which speakers refer to their experiences to validate their claims. 
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constitute knowledge (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). It has been noted that such research 
needs to be evaluated on its own terms (Reicher, 2000) and that discursive 
examinations are best evaluated by assessing the quality of the accounts they 
produce (Willig, 2008). For this purpose, criteria of internal coherence, deviant case 
analysis, openness to reader evaluation and trustworthiness have been introduced 
as meaningful ways of evaluating the quality of discursive research and each of 
these will now be considered in turn (Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 2000).
2.7.1 Internal coherence
Internal coherence refers to the degree to which the analysis of the study hangs 
together and does not contain major contradictions. However, as noted, since mental 
health is assumed to be socially constructed, I would not expect consistency in the 
way that CPs talk about their understanding of mental health and its impact on their 
work with service-users. Rather, the analytical claims made in the study about the 
discourse should in a coherent manner demonstrate how CPs deploy discursive 
strategies to construct mental health and its effect on their clinical practice. It must 
however be acknowledged that I, as a researcher, may alter my understanding of 
what the data is doing through the process of completing this thesis. This, in turn, 
may result in inconsistencies, an issue that has led Madill, Jordan and Shirley (2000) 
to propose an alternative criterion for demonstrating internal coherency through the 
absence of abhorrent contradictions (p. 13).
2.7.2 Deviant case analysis
The quality criterion of deviant case analysis refers to the process of seeking out 
material that seems to challenge the developing theory or pose exceptions to the 
analytical scheme (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). It has been suggested that engaging in 
deviant case analysis allows the researcher to further demonstrate the coherency of 
the study (Potter & Hepburn, 2005; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). It was for this reason 
that CPs working in a diverse range of settings were recruited to the study so that 
potentially contrary cases would be included to aid in testing and qualifying the 
findings of the study. In this study, there were a number of exceptions to the 
prevalent discourses in CPs accounts of mental health and its effect on their clinical 
practice. These deviant cases are given further attention in the results section to 
97
validate the analytical claims being made (see section 3.8).  
2.7.3 Openness to reader evaluation
The validity of discursive research is commonly referred to as the extent to which it 
demonstrates systematic transparency and openness to reader evaluation (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). To address this point, I avoided assuming a neutral stance through 
disclosing my own epistemological underpinnings, assumptions and biases. The 
ways in which the analytic process was affected by my perspective was considered 
throughout the study by adding a reflexivity section and it was also my reason for 
writing in first person as it has been argued that the researcher becomes detached 
from the research process by using the third person11 (Parker, 1998). In line with 
Burrs (1995) suggestions for increasing the transparency of discursive examinations, 
the methodological processes and analytic procedure were described in detail, 
including exceptions and variations and acknowledging novel questions that these 
brought to the research. In order to enable readers to evaluate the arguments 
presented and to facilitate their own interpretations, all findings were based in the 
data and extracts from the text were also offered alongside each discussion point 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987). All of these measures were taken to encourage a 
reflexive exchange about the interpretative procedures and the methods of analysis 
(Flick, 2006). It was hoped that this transparency will enable readers to interpret the 
steps of the analysis, to think of possible alternative interpretations, and to assess 
the fit between the data and the researchers interpretations.
2.7.4 Trustworthiness
In line with Yardleys (2000) recommendations for increasing the credibility of 
qualitative research, my interpretations of the transcripts and the analysis were 
discussed in detail with the research supervisors who were experienced in discourse 
analysis. These regular supervision sessions functioned as a sounding board to see 
whether my supervisors were able to follow my reading of the data, thereby indicating 
the extent to which my analyses were linked to the actual data. As noted by Harper 
(1999b), by assuming that another researcher could come along and provide the 
                                               
11 Indeed, from a discursive point of view, the use of the third person may be viewed as a rhetorical 
device that works to obscure the context of research and to reify the product of the research.
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same analysis there is a danger of creeping positivism as it ignores the impact of my 
own background and my detailed reading of the literature prior to the analysis. This 
criterion was therefore conceptualised as the extent to which my reading of the data 
could be followed, not that it could be repeated. The issue of subjectivity was also 
managed through the use of a reflexive diary. In addition, as suggested by Hayes 
and Oppenheim (1997), an audit trail was employed throughout the research 
process to account for changes to methodology and strategy in order to increase its 
trustworthiness. This study adopted a social constructionist stance assuming 
multiple, equally valid interpretations of knowledge implying that different people 
might produce different readings of the data. For this reason, member-checking, or 
evaluating the accuracy of the results with participants following the analysis, was not 
deemed an appropriate quality criterion.
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Part Three: Extended Analysis and Discussion
3.1 Section introduction
In order to orientate the reader and contextualise the analysis and discussion 
presented in this section12, the findings presented in the journal paper will be 
discussed briefly. In the journal paper two aspects of CPs talk that were pervasive 
across the data were presented. First, the ways in which CPs construct accounts of 
mental health through building up biological factors and psychosocial aspects as 
opposite ends of the spectrum, and positioning themselves as distant from both 
extremes to manage issues of stake and accountability were considered. Second, 
how drawing on a discourse of moral concern for service-users allows CPs to 
negotiate the implications of having different views of mental health, thus 
demonstrating their ability to be helpful to service-users was analysed. In this section, 
these two topics will be expanded on and other findings that were identified in CPs 
talk about mental health will also be discussed. In doing so, I will first analyse and 
discuss the dominant constructions of mental health that arose in the interviews. 
These include multifactorial accounts of mental health, mental health as a physical 
illness and mental health as a social construction. Second, I will examine the issues 
evident in CPs talk about the effects of their views about mental health on their work 
with service-users. In this section the dilemmas of whether to disclose views about 
mental health and whether to challenge service-users assumptions will be 
discussed. It is hoped that this will further elucidate the features of CPs constructions 
of mental health and its influence on their clinical work and the variability that 
occurred within the talk. 
The aim of this section is to outline and describe some of the constructions and 
resources CPs use in their talk about mental health. These have been mapped out 
from the reading and re-reading of the data corpus whilst drawing on wider research 
literature. I am not suggesting that this section includes all of the possible stories and 
positions available to CPs about mental health. To the contrary, the large magnitude 
of data collected for this thesis and the limited word count has meant that I as a 
(novice) researcher have had to be necessarily selective in what is presented. Nor 
                                               
12
As is common practice in discursive research, discussion will be included alongside the analysis in 
this section (e.g., Seymour-Smith, 2008; Stevens & Harper, 2007; Taylor, 2001). 
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am I suggesting that this is the only possible reading of the data. Clearly, a different 
researcher may notice different features of the data and so produce a very different 
analysis. It is also likely that if I were to re-visit the data in the future, I might find very 
different things. Instead, it is hoped that this section offers a way into an analysis of 
CPs talk about mental health thus serving a hermeneutic value as well as providing 
a starting point for troubling talk about mental health (Harper, 1999b).
A recurrent feature of CPs talk was that they appeared surprised and confounded by 
my question about their understanding of mental health as indicated by laughter, 
clarifications and repetitions of the question. This occurred frequently across the 
interviews, which is noteworthy since all participants were told that they would be 
asked about their ideas about mental health before agreeing to take part in the study. 
A possible interpretation of these responses is that mental health, as indicated in the 
literature review, is such a vague and ambiguous term that it poses difficulties for 
people attempting to explain it. It is also possible that participants felt nervous or 
threatened since, in their role as mental health professionals, they might be expected 
to be able to answer this question in an authoritative manner. Indeed, such features 
of accounts have been suggested to be typical of talk about sensitive and difficult 
topics (van Dijk, 1984).
3.2 Multifactorial accounts and the biopsychosocial model
Potter and Wetherell (1987) argued that accounts are constructed to perform certain 
functions or serve particular interests and that these can become more visible 
through delineating the different positions that we take up in our use of language. 
However, not only do we position ourselves but we are also positioned by others (for 
instance, by me as an interviewer) and by the wider discourses and institutions 
available at any given time (Davies & Harré, 1990). Therefore, to avoid falling into the 
trap of viewing CPs accounts as merely matters of individual intentions and effects13, 
the dominant narratives within which the speakers are positioned also need to be 
considered. 
                                               
13 Indeed, the analyst remains agnostic with regard to such aspects (Heritage, 1984).
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As reflected in the frequent references to biological and psychosocial factors by 
participants, their accounts could be argued to be positioned within a biopsychosocial 
model (Engel, 1977) of mental health, a dominant narrative within Clinical 
Psychology. From a social constructionist perspective, it may be assumed that CPs 
professional credibility is associated with the extent to which they subscribe to the 
rules that govern their professional bodies, such as the HPC and the BPS. As noted 
in the introduction, the discourse supported by these powerful professional 
institutions is to conceptualise mental health in biological, psychological and social 
terms. By continuously referring to mental health in biopsychosocial terms, this view 
becomes legitimated, taken for granted and epistemologised while linked to 
powerful institutional practices (Foucault, 1972). In the journal paper, we saw how 
speakers re-stated their positioning as distant from both anti-psychiatric and medical 
understandings of mental health and then made reference to this positioning as being 
the dominant narrative within Clinical Psychology. Through voicing and 
acknowledging this dominant discourse, speakers thus introduced their own personal 
agency and subjectivity into the narrative. This script formulation functions to 
construct accounts as ones that are to be expected from any CP whilst emphasising 
personal agency, thus positioning speakers as thoughtful, balanced and reasonable. 
In the following extract CP1 draws on a similar account in explaining the factors that 
have impacted on his views of mental health. 
Extract 6 
152    I: what (.) ehmm::: would you say has influenced your understanding
153 of mental health?
154    CP1: erm you know I suppose I am somebody who tends to think that 
155 most things are partly true just as almost everything is partly wrong 
156 as well
157    I: yes
158    CP1: its the kind of models and ideas that we think of that (.) you know I 
159 find it difficult to entirely reject any erm but difficult to entirely 
160 embrace any:
161    I: sure (.) yes
162    CP1: at the expense of others if you see what=I=mean so I am kind of a 
163 (.) a natural erm (.) fence-sitter or fudger or so ha::ha:: erm
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164    I: ha::ha
165    CP1: but I suppose I defend that on the basis that I think thats how=I 
166 think thats how it really works
167    I: yes::
168    CP1: you know I think we are a (.) and the experiences that we have 
169 including the difficult ones=the dramatic ones that we seek help for
170    I: mmmm
171    CP1: are a combination of you know (..) what we are (.) you know 
172 biologically evolutionary speaking erm (.) as well as our more 
173 immediate erm (.) circumstances you know (.) our psychological 
174 and emotional history our attachment histories
The speaker asserts that he subscribes to a variety of frameworks of mental health. 
Whilst this response implies that such a multi-factorial account simply represents the 
way things really work it can also be viewed as a rhetorical strategy and thus be 
examined for the effect that it achieves in talk. On line 172, a range of theoretical 
frameworks of mental health is presented in a five-part list, a discursive strategy 
argued to be effective in constructing factual accounts (Edwards & Potter, 1992). 
Through eclectically combining ideas from various theoretical viewpoints the account 
is given a degree of flexibility, which can be used to manage potential challenges, a 
feature described by Harper (1999a) in his analysis of psychiatrists accounts of the 
efficacy of medication. In this way, if the influence of biological factors on mental 
health were questioned on the basis that medical interventions have not had an 
effect on a persons mental health, then other frameworks can be drawn on as an 
explanation. An example of how such a fence-sitting account can be used to 
manage challenges is given in the following extract in which CP9 refers to biological 
factors to explain a persons mental health when psychosocial aspects do not seem 
sufficient. 
Extract 7 
175    CP9: so I dont you know (.) I dont usually kind of buy into it as a 
176 biological illness, I dont buy into an illness model particularly erm I 
177 think its more about peoples adaptive responses to their 
103
178 experiences and thats why you may get mental health problems or 
179 be mentally healthy and well
180    I: yes::
181    CP9: erm but having=said that I suppose. I meet a few people where I 
182 just think there is no obvious other explanation? other than it being 
183 an illness.
184    I: yes
185    CP9: so there have been a few people that have kind of challenged my 
186 thinking that its all about kind of experience and past events
187    I: yes.
188    CP9: and you never know obviously when someone comes to you (.) you 
189 never know somebodys history
190    I: no
191    CP9: sometimes you get 15 volumes of files that go into it in great detail    
192    I: yes.
193    CP9: you know you think how somebody that comes with little 
194 information about their background erm but they dont make any 
195 connections and I dont always think thats about kind of a lack of 
196 insight or a lack of awareness I mean its sometimes people havent 
197 had necessarily kind of traumatic events or difficult pasts and yet 
198 somehow find themselves facing real difficulties
199    I: yes:: and how do you make sense of that=I mean when you see 
200 those exceptions from the kind of past experiences explaining 
201 current mental health?
202    CP9: I suppose I mean I suppose one erm (.) one way of making sense 
203 of that is by thinking right you know the bio-psycho-social model
204    I: yes
205    CP9: and in a way that=that as a model makes sense to me because I 
206 think you know (.) I dont know much very much about biology and 
207 kind of biological factors that might lead to people having mental 
208 health problems other than their kind of immediate sleep and you 
209 know diet and things like that but in terms of longer-term and you 
210 know obviously there is lots of kind of genetic research that goes on 
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211 that hasnt yet proven much I dont think to my knowledge but erm 
212 (.) certainly lots of people kind of cling onto that idea erm:: and 
213 obviously there is going to be psychological factors that sort of 
214 impact on whether you are well or not and there is going to be 
215 social so I suppose sometimes I see that as a way of explaining it 
216 but actually a more critical approach () saying thats just a real cop 
217 out and there is no () because it covers everything
218    I: right
219    CP9: its completely non-specific so of course you can apply that 
220 approach to anybody
221    I: yes::
222    CP9: erm (.) but it doesnt really give you an answer it just kind of gives 
223 you a catch all saying=and you know I work with lots of people 
224 who=who want to know when they have therapy why has this 
225 happened to me
In the above extract, the challenge to a purely psychosocial explanation posed by its 
inability to explain a persons mental health in terms of his/her history even when you 
get 15 volumes of files that go into it in great detail is met by a move to a 
biopsychosocial account of mental health which allows the speaker to explain the 
persons state in biological terms. If CP9 had constructed mental health in solely 
psychosocial terms, a solution to this might have been difficult. In this way, therefore, 
a biopsychosocial model of mental health allows speakers to manage such 
dilemmas, responding flexibly to challenges to a psychosocial account by referring to 
biological theories. 
3.3 Fence-sitting and resistance
Fence-sitting accounts such as these rest on the liberal assumption that all points of 
view have some utility and therefore appear to be open to criticisms. However, whilst 
utilising a rhetoric of eclecticism and balance, they have also been argued to 
assimilate criticisms and thereby function to maintain the status quo (Billig, 1987). In 
the previous extract CP9 does not simply re-state the dominant biopsychosocial 
narrative of mental health but she also demonstrates through her positioning that she 
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resists aspects of this narrative by referring to it as a non-specific cop out which 
doesnt really give you an answer. Indeed, one of the effects of fence-sitting 
accounts is that they can present a range of theories as equally valid but as fixed 
within a hierarchy. For example, Harper (1999a) outlined how such accounts allowed 
psychiatrists to construct biology at the core of mental health problems, and to 
position psychological and social issues as the mere effects of underlying biological 
mechanisms. 
Extract 8 
226    CP4: erm (.) and I dont know you know maybe thats true and I suppose
227 thats another example of something that challenges my reluctance 
228 to kind of engage in biological models of illness
229    I: mmmmm::
230    CP4: and kind of chemical imbalances and all those kinds of things 
231 because I meet people where medication really works for them
232    I: yes
233    CP4: and makes the difference and therefore I cant say there is nothing 
234 in it erm (.) but I also think that you have to be really cautious 
235 around that so you know (.) of course somebody appears better if 
236 they are sedated
237    I: yes
238    CP4: I erm (.) yes I remember a service-user saying to me once that you 
239 know of course you know (.) of course he was more tranquil 
240 because he was having massive amounts of tranquilliser but it 
241 didnt mean that things had changed for him necessarily
242    I: no
243    CP4: it just meant that they were managed on a very surface level and as 
244 yet, I suppose alongside those people who I see take medication it 
245 seems to be really really helpful for them
246    I: yes
247    CP4: I also see a lot of people on a lot of medication who have been 
248 taking it for a long time and nothing has changed for them
249    I: yes
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250    CP4: and you know=so I always have that (.) I suppose its not really a 
251 dilemma but I always have that kind of mixed view of maybe there 
252 is something in the biology. but maybe there isnt?
In this extract CP4 manages the dilemma of accounting for the efficacy of medication 
and thus the implication of biological factors after having constructed mental health in 
terms of psychosocial factors. This is achieved through presenting medication as 
being able to manage peoples mental health on a very surface level. Such
metaphors of depth are a common feature of empiricist accounts and function to 
position CPs as experts with specific knowledge about the realm below the surface. 
Since this form of knowledge cannot be verified but only assumed through paying 
attention to symptoms or surface signs, it functions as a type of category entitlement. 
Through constructing a multi-factorial account of mental health, then, CP4 is able to 
account for the varying efficacy of medication and thus the implication of biological 
factors whilst the primacy of psychosocial factors remains unthreatened. Clearly, if 
the speaker would have constructed mental health in purely psychosocial terms, she 
might have struggled to offer a solution to such challenges. In this way, such 
multifactorial accounts are able to neutralise challenges to a psychosocial account 
through the use of biological theories. Moreover, because the account is not tied to 
any particular theoretical model, it can be changed depending on the circumstances, 
thus further increasing its flexibility.
In the above extracts, mental health was constructed in biopsychosocial terms, 
allowing CPs to implicate biological factors whilst maintaining the primacy of 
psychosocial factors in mental health. These accounts draw on elements of
eclecticism and balance to appear flexible and to position CPs as open-minded, 
liberal and thoughtful professionals who weigh up arguments for and against in a 
balanced and rational manner. However, as outlined, such accounts may also 
paradoxically work to relativise challenges and criticisms and thereby function to 
maintain current practice. These criticisms of the discursive effects of fence-sitting 
accounts are also echoed in the literature concerned with the implications of adopting 
a biopsychosocial model of mental health (Stainton-Rogers, 1991; Yardley, 1996).
Engel (1977, p.132) suggested that a rational scientific approach to behavioural and 
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psychosocial data should be adopted to create standardised psychosocial measures 
comparable to biological variables. From this point of view, concepts such as 
cognitions and personality are to be seen as objective and value-free entities 
representational of an underlying psychological reality. In this manner, the 
biopsychosocial model is able to incorporate and assimilate psychosocial aspects of 
mental health whilst retaining an essentially biological perspective. Rather than 
analysing psychosocial aspects of mental health in biomedical terms, critics of the 
biopsychosocial model have proposed that the biological realm should be 
reinterpreted from a psychosocial viewpoint. From this perspective, mental health 
and biopsychosocial concepts are viewed as changeable notions that are 
constructed and maintained by social relationships, roles and practices. For example 
through the practices of CPs who advocate selective ideas about what mental health 
really is by outlining the underlying causes of the conditions that service-users 
present with in clinical practice (Yardley, 1996). 
As previously noted, discursive psychology holds that constructing mental health as a 
biopsychosocial phenomena is doing something beyond the words used; it is 
performing an activity and detailed reading of the data allows for various 
interpretations of the possible function of such constructions to be made (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). The reading of the CPs construal of mental health in 
biopsychosocial terms was that it legitimated the implication of biological factors 
whilst emphasising the primacy of psychosocial factors which was helpful in 
managing dilemmas around the efficacy of medication and cases where there was a 
lack of psychosocial evidence to explain a persons mental health.
3.4 Mental health as physical illness 
In this kind of account, which was not particularly well represented in the interviews, 
mental health is portrayed as a physical illness and agency is given to the universal 
and biological features of mental health. 
Extract 9 
253    I: erm:: (.) what is your understanding of mental health?
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254    CP5: Oh my goodness? Ha::ha (.) erm my understanding of mental 
255 health(..) I mean I=I see it as something that=that like anything else 
256 in terms of kind of erm life and situations and things (.) I think its 
257 something that can happen to anybody (.) I dont think=erm I dont 
258 think anybodys excluded from the reaches of having difficulties 
259 with mental health at some point in their life and particularly erm 
260 working in services where people are going through very traumatic 
261 things and I think that just reminds you of how (.) how vulnerable
262 we all are erm to sort of struggling with things at certain points so 
263 (..) erm (..) I am trying to think how can I I dont know erm () I am 
264 just trying to (.) sorry go on 
265    I: no::
266    CP5: I thought you were going to say something (..) I dont really know 
267 what I guess=do you mean sort of like how I understand it as a 
268 concept or is that?
269    I: erm (..) yes=yes?
270    CP5: yes erm (.) I think in a lot of ways I would look at mental health in a 
271 way that youd look at any kind of sort of illness that people can 
272 have at any point so erm on a sort a bit of a spectrum I guess like 
273 cancers and tumours and things like that they are obviously you 
274 know very extreme erm and they are very few thank goodness? in 
275 the world (.) whereas something like a common cold everybody will 
276 have at some stage and it will perhaps impact on you differently 
277 depending on whether you are run down or whether you are you
278 know sort of struggling with other things
The speaker describes mental health as a mental illness that is similar to, if not the 
same as, physical illnesses. Mental health is positioned in the same category as 
cancers, tumours and the common cold and is thereby reified as an illness which 
everyone is vulnerable to and which will impact differently on different people. This 
implies that the concepts of mental health and illness and their boundaries are 
matters of natural fact that can be determined, examined and ultimately treated in the 
same ways as physical illnesses. Such physical illness accounts have been noted to 
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locate the management of the illness within the realm of the psy-complex14 whilst 
disqualifying non-expert understandings (Foucault, 1972; Rose, 1985). Through 
establishing mental health as a physical illness, the account gives agency to expert 
knowledge and thus presents mental health professionals as having the know-how 
and the responsibility of treating service-users who are positioned as passive and 
powerless. Despite these power implications, the language used in the extract does 
not position the speaker as an authoritarian CP. Instead, the account is presented in 
simple everyday language with numerous qualifiers such as I think, I would and I 
guess which work to position the speaker as thoughtful and open-minded as well as 
leaving the account open to challenge. The repetitive use of qualifiers introduces a 
sense of vagueness, ambiguity and tentativeness to the narrative. Similarly, through 
clarifying whether I am asking about her understanding of mental health as a 
concept, the speaker further distances herself from her account thus enabling less 
ownership. These discursive strategies are useful since they allow any challenge to 
the speakers account of mental health to be met with the response that it was only a 
tentative hypothesis. Physical illness accounts are frequently used by psychiatrists to 
present symptoms as if they had agency in and of themselves thus positioning 
mental health problems as somehow disconnected from the individual experiencing 
them. It has been highlighted how this functions to warrant the need for medical 
interventions as reflected in phrases such as a pill for every ill (Harper, 1999a).
However, in this extract, the universality (how vulnerable we all are) and the context 
of mental health (it will perhaps impact on you differently depending on whether you 
are run down or whether you are you know, sort of struggling with other things) are 
emphasised by the speaker. This is unsurprising given CPs concern with the 
psychosocial dimensions of peoples experiences. Through giving agency to these 
two aspects of mental health the speaker could therefore be viewed as managing the 
categorical implications of illness constructions and reaffirming the need for 
psychosocial interventions.
3.5 Mental health as a social construction 
In the previous sections CPs have constructed mental health as reflecting a real 
category, which was treated as a given of the world by focussing on the biological, 
                                               
14 A term used by Foucault (1967) to denote the set of professionals dealing with the psyche.
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psychological and social aspects hypothesised to influence it. However, a number of 
participants also presented mental health as a social construction. A feature of this 
type of account was that biological and psychological factors were either minimised 
or seen as caused by social and political influences. Instead, participants 
constructing mental health in this way tended to focus on the language and 
categories associated with mental health and the effects and implications of using 
these.
Extract 10 
279    CP8: the concept of mental health or diagnosis is clearly socially 
280 constructed
281    I: mmmm::
282    CP8: And you know just how do they help us and the sort of people that 
283 we are dealing with like you know (..) I am not sure that they do
284    I: yes::
285    CP8: but we all (.) well you know lots of people just seem to have 
286 adopted this kind of pseudo-medical view of the world
287    I: yes
288    CP8: which (.) and you know the other thing which is I think a social 
289 which you see in modern practices is because of the way that 
290 services are set up you know these labels are often used as means 
291 of excluding people from services and reducing waiting lists rather 
292 than helping people
293    I: yes::
294    CP8: so I think they are dysfunctional in many ways (.)
295    I: mmmm
296    CP8: so I resist it
The speaker opens this excerpt by presenting mental health as a category, which, 
like psychiatric diagnoses, is socially constructed. To strengthen his argument, CP8 
refers to the moral concern for service-users as guiding his reasoning by providing an 
evaluative assessment on line 283, thus reminding me of CPs primary orientation; to 
be helpful to service-users. Through the inclusive use of us, we and you know, I 
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am assigned moral agency and responsibility by the speaker, a common discursive 
strategy in managing accountability issues (Edwards, 1997). This is also evident on 
line 285, which CP8 starts by saying but we all and then amends to well you know 
lots of people. This re-phrasing is noteworthy as it reduces the speakers investment 
in his construction, positioning him as someone who, just as everyone else, is aware 
of people who adopt this view without necessarily doing so himself. One implication 
of presenting mental health as socially constructed is that it leads speakers to give 
agency to the usefulness or the consequences of adopting a particular language. An 
effect of such accounts is to warrant a political analysis in the construction of mental 
health. This is consistent with a wider social constructionist narrative, which posits 
that the reluctance to challenge or probe the objects and categories that we 
encounter is a political act as it affirms these as givens of the world without 
considering how this status was achieved or whose interests they serve (Sampson, 
1993). In the excerpt, resistance to mental health labels is constructed linguistically 
through drawing on Foucauldian ideas around power. This is presented through 
commenting on the manner in which services rely on such categories to position 
individuals as legitimate or illegitimate service-users and the material interests served 
by these discourses (reducing waiting lists).
3.5.1 Resistance to mental health as labelling
A common feature of the CPs construction of a resistance to the categorical 
understandings of mental health was the use of the evocative metaphor of label, a 
word that was not given as part of the interview questions. This vivid physical image 
was used by participants to highlight how although the label of mental health may be 
useful, it is imposed by someone external to the object and does not comprise an 
intrinsic part of the item and therefore communicates only minimal information. Again, 
the use of the word label functions to emphasise the social construction of mental 
health since people in different contexts, at different times and with different opinions 
may label the same item differently for a variety of purposes. In the following extract 
CP11 uses humour to highlight this variability with the question mark indicating the 
voice rising at the end of the sentence in the manner of an ironic rhetorical question.
Extract 11 
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297  CP11: mmmm:: because I mean=I think you know you think about how 
298 mental health erm (.) I dont know when I think mental health I think 
299 you know this is people talking about DSM or ICD 10 you know I 
300 think thats what they are referring to (.) the labels that have fitted 
301 within those books (..)
302  I: yes:: yes.
303  CP11: you know ha::ha: and I think about how they evolve and you know 
304 these groups of people who sit down and decide
305  I: yes
306  CP11: you know=what language shall we use to describe this group of 
307 people today?? you know ha::ha: thats erm (..) you know its so 
308 temporal you know it changes through time 
309  I: Mmmm::
310  CP11: and erm:: (.) you know that=that in itself I think is quite interesting
Instead of criticising mental health as labelling directly, the speaker ironically uses 
the first person plural to present the process of labelling as unreliable what language 
shall we use to describe this group of people today and to position herself as not 
belonging to these groups of people. The use of the word label was repeatedly 
associated with phrases such as stuck, attached and hard to remove throughout 
the interviews. These linguistic devices may also be understood as constructing 
resistance to the categorical implications of realist constructions of mental health, 
which in turn has a later function: the legitimisation of an alternative construction.
3.5.2 Mental health as a discourse of ambivalence
Rather than constructing the effects of using mental health terminology in purely 
negative terms, the CPs varied in their accounts, drawing on ambivalent and 
sometimes contradictory constructions. This discourse of ambivalence was 
repeatedly indicated by the common discourse marker but (Schiffrin, 1987), allowing 
speakers to include the other side of the coin. This is both seen on line 285 in excerpt 
10 as well as in the following extract on line 333.
Extract 12 
113
311    I: erm (.) how do you view mental health?
312    CP8: I dont
313    I: right (.) okay erm:: (.) do you accept it as a=as a concept?
314    CP8: erm well I accept it as a concept which is banded around
315    I: right
316    CP8: I accept it as a concept yes I mean its a hypothetical construct
317    I: and (.) I mean how would you describe that=that construct what 
318 does it entail?
319    CP8: what does mental health entail as a hypothetical construct (.) erm 
320 (.) broadly it would involve the absence of attracting unfortunate 
321 mental health diagnoses and behaving in a way which enables you 
322 to sustain relationships roles jobs whatever (.) which bring a degree 
323 of (.) hopefully happiness
324    I: right and what is your rationale for not engaging with that?
325    CP8: Erm what it my rationale for not engaging with it (.) erm well 
326 although the term mental health is meant to be positive it is 
327 essentially used in terms of the absence of mental ill health isnt it?
328    I: mmmm
329    CP8: erm I resist you know=we have to speak the language of diagnosis 
330 because you know its like being in France and not being able to 
331 speak French
332    I: yes:
333    CP8: you have to be able to speak the language (.) but I erm I dont like 
334 the language of diagnosis I can see that it makes some people 
335 behave in ways which are broadly similar but if you look at the role 
336 of diagnosis and what its used for generally I am not sure its terribly 
337 helpful you know, the systems which are in place have huge 
338 amounts of variation (.) very low degrees of reliability.
In this extract, mental health is first rejected on the basis that it is a hypothetical 
construct but is then accepted and constructed as signifying both the absence of 
attracting a diagnosis and behaving in a functional way. This construction is 
interesting because although the speaker distances himself from the assumption that 
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mental health problems originate within individuals through referring to it as a 
concept which is banded around, it is then presented as an individuals ability to 
function. Through constructing mental health as a hypothetical construct, CP8 is 
perhaps able to assign conceptual distance from his response and thereby manage 
issues of accountability. The account starts by focussing on the usefulness of the 
language and then shifts to giving agency to mental health at the level of the 
individual, similar to the realist constructions that were discussed in the previous 
section. As such, the speaker shifts between drawing on a social constructionist 
ontology in which mental health is constructed externally and changeably and a 
realist ontology in which mental health is constructed as a concept characterising 
aspects of the person. The ways in which speakers draw on such contradictory 
discourses to achieve certain goals have been highlighted in previous discourse 
analytic work (฀B฀i฀l฀i฀ć฀ ฀&฀ ฀G฀e฀o฀r฀g฀a฀c฀a฀,฀ ฀2฀0฀0฀7). By alternating between social constructionist 
and realist constructions, CP8 obtains a certain amount of discursive space for 
manoeuvring as his construction of mental health can change as a function of the 
effects that he wants to achieve or the context in which he speaks thus allowing him 
to present his account in a flexible manner. 
3.5.3 Constructing an alternative 
As outlined, CPs espousing social constructionist accounts of mental health 
constructed resistance to realist discourses through challenging its scientific 
correctness and questioning its social implications. As well as downgrading realist 
accounts of mental health as a resource, one of the functions of social constructionist 
accounts is to provide and legitimise an alternative construction. Clearly, if realist 
accounts are constructed as unhelpful and problematic for service-users then the 
introduction of novel constructions becomes ethically necessary.
Extract 13 
339  CP10: I think in a sense of (.) broader sense of practice its about trying to 
340 erm::: allow discussion and debate in different forums so not just in 
341 terms of working with individuals but also thinking about in team 
342 meetings:: in wider service discussions:: allowing erm discussion 
343 and debate to occur really I think=I think thats really important erm 
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344 and that people feel they:: can question and critique you know erm 
345 what might appear to be sort of erm dominant narratives (..) I think 
346 thats something that should be erm encouraged really.
347  I: yes:
348  CP10: erm and that mental health the whole field of mental health or 
349 mental ill health is contested thats a very important thing (.) I think 
350 people should have a sense that its an ongoing debate that it is a 
351 contested arena
352  I: yes
353  CP10: and erm (.) I think thats how it will always be=I dont think there will 
354 be a point to which it arrives at a view a sort of a truth (.) I think its 
355 ongoing discussion because I think for me its a reflection again of 
356 this wider issue about what sort of world we want to live in what sort 
357 of society we have mental health is a reflection of that so the fact 
358 that we have large numbers of people experiencing distress at the 
359 moment I think is indicative of that we arent at ease as a society=I 
360 mean thats just one indication you could say why do we lock up so 
361 many people in prison why do we you know erm (.) have such rates 
362 high rates of obesity I mean these arent symptoms of a healthy 
363 society Id say they are indicative of a society thats got problems
364  I: yes
365  CP10: so I think this is part of a bigger debate
366  I: yes
367  CP10: and I think mental health is part of that debate and really it would 
368 be=its much better to sort of allow that debate to happen I think its 
369 interesting that by putting it into the arena of a medical 
370 individualised problem (.) individualising the problem I think kind of 
371 suppresses that debate a bit because it locates the problem inside 
372 individuals rather than outside=as something needing more sort of 
373 social discussion (.) more social change really
In this excerpt the speaker presents an alternative construction of mental health as 
one that is reflective of wider issues and thus necessarily contextual, varying and 
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changeable. This construction highlights the importance of examining the different 
positions that are being made available or denied through various conceptualisations 
of mental health as well as considering what the alternatives might be. Through 
continuously referring to mental health as a concept that is contested and which 
should be open to discussion and debate, this account serves to relativise the 
power of realist constructions of mental health such as the biopsychosocial model by 
positioning it as merely one out of many possible frameworks. Moreover, the speaker 
gives agency to the social constructionist tenet of languages action orientation in 
constructing how the dominant narrative acts to put mental health in the arena of a 
medicalised individualised problem. 
As outlined in this section, CPs adopting a social constructionist stance resisted and 
challenged realist constructions of mental health on the basis of a moral concern for 
service-users and through positioning themselves as outside of the dominant 
discourse. Through resisting the dominant individualising narrative of mental health, 
an alternative construction of mental health sensitive to variability was introduced, 
based on the idea that mental health is constructed in our relationships with others 
and with society. As this view of mental health gives agency to social issues and the 
constructive elements of language, one effect of this kind of account was to warrant a 
form of political analysis.
The effects of CPs constructions of mental health
3.6 Disclosing views: a moral dilemma 
As well as examining how CPs construct mental health, the current study was 
concerned with the ways in which CPs construct the influence of their views of 
mental health on their work with service-users. One of the issues that arose in this 
talk was whether service-users are aware of clinicians conceptualisations and 
whether these ideas should be made explicit.
Extract 14 
374   I: ermm do you think that your (.) the service-users that you see that 
375 they come away with erm (.) an idea about your views about mental 
376 health?
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377   CP6: I would hope so yes yes:: I think I would hope that they would come 
378 away with an understanding of how I view it (.) I would also hope 
379 theyd come away with an understanding that I am equally open 
380 and interested to know about their understanding of it and that the 
381 two even if the two positions are different then that doesnt mean 
382 that thats a problem
383   I: mmmmm::
384   CP6: and that thats okay
385   I: yes
386   CP6: erm (.) so I think its equally I would want them to come away with a 
387 clear understanding of how I view things so that they can disagree 
388 or not and likewise I would want them to go away with a very clear 
389 view that I am keen to know what their understanding is
390   I: yes=yes
391   CP6: of it and whether our views match or whether they dont
392   I: mmmm
393   CP6: and if thats a problem for working together or if its not but I (.) I am 
394 a believer in being very explicit about these things
In this excerpt the speaker presents the issue of service-users coming away with an 
idea of her construction of mental health as something desired, an ideal to be aspired 
to whilst highlighting her interest in the service-users understanding. This view is 
justified through giving agency to the expertise of service-users since if they are 
aware of their clinicians views; they are also able to disagree with them. The speaker 
emphasises that although conversing views of mental health could present problems, 
it wouldnt necessarily do so. 
Extract 15 
395   CP7: errm so that informs that so I guess I try and=and I suppose that 
396 partly informs why I give people information about my views on 
397 mental health (.) I dont I like to think I impose them but I think that 
398 kind of if you can give it to people in an accessible way then they 
399 are able to make choices so actually you know I think they can put
400 them (.) that erm elevates their knowledge and when people have 
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401 knowledge they can make better choices I think for themselves
402    I: yes
403    CP7: so I suppose thats partly thinking back to your earlier question 
404 about why do I how do people I see end up knowing what I think 
405 erm: I do think that does influence my practice that I am trying if you 
406 like lay bare the assumptions behind what people do erm (.) just so 
407 that then clients can make better choices about the kinds of help 
408 they want and have a bit more agency in their care
CP7 draws on a similar discourse of moral concern for service-users in accounting 
for his decision to disclose his position. This is evident in the numerous benefits to 
service-users that the speaker argues that such disclosures lead to and the way in 
which he distances himself from imposing his views. The implication of this account 
is that clinicians who do not disclose their ideas deprive service-users from having 
these choices. These constructions therefore give agency to service-users expertise 
and their right to make their own decisions regarding their care through emphasising 
the importance of being transparent as a clinician. Moreover, as noted in the above 
extract, they also warrant the challenging of clinicians accounts, thereby constructing 
service-users as active agents. In this way, the disclosure of CPs views of mental 
health to service-users is presented as a moral necessity, an action performed out of 
respect for service-users autonomy. By presenting the need to disclose views in a 
manner which position them as responsible clinicians, CPs are thus able to manage 
the dilemma of self-presentation or impression management (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987). Interestingly, through constructing the issue of whether to disclose ones 
views of mental health to service-users in moral terms, the decision is converted from 
a neutral idea into a value-laden judgement call. This, in turn, was evident in the 
many explanations and justifications that CPs offered for their decisions as reflected 
in the following excerpt.
Extract 16 
409    CP7: and I would have to explain myself to a client to some extent and I 
410 think that probably marks me (.) Id be surprised if many clinical 
411 psychologists erm are that clear about it you know (.) I mean=I think 
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412 there is an analogy to me you know when a CBT therapist 
413 socialises someone in to the model (.) I dont really see there is 
414 anything different in what they are doing from what I am doing (.) 
415 its just that we have different beliefs I mean somebody who fully 
416 signs up to CBT that is a satisfactory model of a person and of 
417 course they have a good ethical base in doing it because its 
418 grounded in quite a lot of empirical support so they can easily 
419 defend themselves and say well what I am doing is telling people 
420 whats scientifically true about persons erm:
421    I: yes::
422    CP7: erm (.) so all I am=ermm=so that technically Im giving them 
423 information erm (.) and I guess my views on people are you know 
424 (.) not the same as that but I guess you know=you always give 
425 some information about your views as part of the practice I think its 
426 unavoidable
CP7 first positions himself as different to other CPs and then likens his decision to 
disclose her views about mental health to CBT therapists socialising service-users to 
the model. This analogy could be seen as working to equate the speakers actions 
with those prescribed by the socially sanctioned, evidence-based framework of CBT, 
thus presenting it as more acceptable and as something that anyone would do. This 
account, then, functions to legitimise the speakers initial positioning as different from 
the norm. On line 422, CP7 corrects himself from so all I am to so that technically. 
These starts are noteworthy as they minimise the speakers decision to disclose his 
views and highlights the need for justification. Finally, CP7 introduces the idea that 
views are always shared, whether we like it or not. This construction may be viewed 
as allowing the speaker to manage issues of accountability since, if someone were to 
question his rationale for disclosing his views on the basis of it being similar to 
socialising service-users to a CBT model, he could refer to his response that it is 
unavoidable to transmit some ideas.
3.7 Constructions of mental health as controllable
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Another feature of CPs talk about the influence of their constructions of mental 
health on their work with service-users was to present the effect of their views as a 
factor that could and needed to be controlled and regulated in interactions with 
service-users. 
Extract 17 
427    CP2: so erm (.) so yes I have got my conceptualisation of mental health 
428 but you have to put that to one side and not let it rule your decisions 
429 about what you do with someone.
430    I: mmmm yes:: erm we are just kind of hinting at it but you think its 
431 possible to put our conceptualisations aside in interactions with 
432 other people?
433    CP2: yes=yes I think you hold them yourself
434    I: mmmm
435    CP2: but I think you have=yes you do I think definitely you do have to be 
436 able to put them aside you have to be able to control the amount to 
437 which it goes into your work with a client.
438    I: yes
439    CP2: either it will fully inform it and drive the work in a certain direction 
440 but you have to be able to spin that and sometimes withhold it and 
441 hold it and go okay there is little bits that I can use here
442    I: mmmm::
443    CP2: but actually you know I have to mediate the influence of my 
444 conceptualisation on what I am doing with clients
In this excerpt, views about mental health are presented as something that rules 
clinical decision-making, almost as if it, unless controlled, would take on a life of its 
own. This is provided as a rationale for the importance of controlling the influence of 
these in interactions with service-users. Through the use of the personal pronoun 
you and you have to be able, the speaker introduces a moral force into her 
account since those CPs who arent able to put their conceptualisations of mental 
health aside are constructed as ruled by their views and not by what their service-
users bring to the interaction. On line 435 the speaker says but I think you have, 
and then rephrases using an extreme case formulation (ECF, Pomerantz, 1986) yes 
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you do, I think definitely you do have to be able to put them aside. The deployment 
of this discursive strategy is commonly associated with doing the rhetorical business 
of portraying accounts as compelling and believable (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). This 
account is interesting as it constructs views of mental health as potentially clouding 
clinical decision-making, thus separating such views from the real world and 
implying that decisions are best made in a vacuum free from such biases. 
3.8 Deviant case analysis
Thus far, the need to disclose ones views about mental health and the importance of 
not imposing these on service-users have been constructed by drawing on a 
discourse of moral concern. These were presented within a social constructionist 
ontology which functioned to highlight how, despite having different views about 
mental health, the CPs were nevertheless able to work with service-users to co-
construct narratives. In addition to these accounts, some CPs emphasised the 
importance of challenging service-users views of mental health and other CPs 
constructed the effects of their views of mental health as sometimes being an 
obstacle to their work with service-users, thus providing interesting variability to the 
data corpus. In quantitative research such instances might be regarded as outliers 
and thus be discarded. However, as noted in the methodology section (see section
2.7.2), from a discursive perspective such deviant cases are viewed as forming part 
of a larger collage and are therefore included in the analysis (Potter & Hepburn, 
2005; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
Extract 18 
445    I: you mentioned before as well about sometimes maybe challenging
446 peoples conceptualisations of mental health could be helpful in 
447 some situations.
448    CP2: yes:: I think it is times when you feel like psychological factors or 
449 social factors are so powerful
450    I: mmmm
451    CP2: and yet un-acknowledged that the person is left not understanding 
452 why they are ill=so they view it like that they perhaps view it as an 
453 illness but you look at it and you see a huge influence of other 
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454 factors maybe relationship kind of developmental factors social 
455 stuff disadvantage=things like that.
456    I: yes::
457    CP2: and the person is saying to you I dont understand why I am ill I
458 dont understand why this happened to me.
459    I: mmmm
460    CP2: then I think that might be a case where I would try and introduce 
461 another framework for understanding their experiences
462    I: right
463    CP2: not to knock out their one but just to kind of go alongside it 
464 because fundamentally if someone doesnt understand themselves 
465 I think that impedes recovery
466    I: mmm
467    CP2: so their explanation is not actually helping them to feel kind of 
468 satisfied then I think we have a duty to make and offer other 
469 explanations alongside that
470    I: yes
471    CP2: or perhaps where someones understanding of their own mental 
472 health difficulties is overpowering them I think thats (.) so if 
473 someone is=if someones explanation of their experiences is 
474 fuelling a self-critical drive or a self-destructive drive
475    I: yes::
476    CP2: its actually feeding into it then I think therapeutically you have to
477 challenge that because actually its something thats contributing to 
478 the problem
In this extract I enquire about challenging someones view of mental health as this 
topic was previously introduced by the speaker who goes on to describe several 
factors that might influence the choice to do so. In this account agency is given to 
CPs duty to act in such situations, which, again, appears to draw on a discourse of 
moral concern for the service-users. This is also highlighted in the speakers 
clarification that this new framework would not knock out the service-users 
understanding of mental health but rather go alongside it. Through this discursive 
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construction CP2 is positioned as a responsible yet respectful clinician who, rather 
than pushing her own agenda, accompanies and supports service-users in working 
out their own healing. This is important since CP2s decision to challenge her 
service-users views is a value-laden and subjective judgement call that is likely to be 
based on her own views of mental health. This puts the speaker at risk of being 
positioned as an authoritarian, non-collaborative CP, which she carefully manages 
through her construction. Power and collaboration is common dilemma in 
psychotherapy (Frank, 1973) and, as indicated in this data corpus, previous 
discursive studies have also noted a conflict between therapists wish to persuade 
service-users to modify their beliefs and their beliefs in collaboration (Messari & 
Hallam, 2003).
Extract 19 
479    CP7: one of my clients once asked me for a personality assessment (.)
480 well I felt incredibly uncomfortable about it
481    I: yes
482    CP7: you know=I did what I had to do in the end but I think she was very 
483 disappointed because she was expecting some really big 
484 personality inventory but because I am so sceptical about it and 
485 therefore unfamiliar with the area
486    I: right
487    CP7: and uncomfortable with it=you know I gave her a fairly brief and 
488 erm (.) you know tentative erm interpretation of the findings so you 
489 know definitely if you checked my clinical practice that way I would 
490 never
491    I: no=and did you tell her kind of your views about mental health?
492    CP7: Erm I dont think I told her totally (.) I mean I told her that I had=you 
493 know=I think I probably just said I dont=you know=I think I have 
494 some problems with it (.) to be honest any client who works with me 
495 for any period of time probably knows my views because erm I 
496 mean its clearly not my role to impose them on people but it will 
497 crop up from time to time because often clients are concerned with 
498 judgements or measuring themselves against certain norms
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499    I: mmmmm
500    CP7: erm:: or trying to find their true self and you know where I just dont 
501 believe such things exist.
502    I: right
503    CP7: I have got to be=I do it in a communicable way but I have got to 
504 kind of try and put clients in a kind of in the picture of where I stand 
505 on that because otherwis::e
506    I: yes
507    CP7: wed be working at cross purposes and that wouldnt be really 
508 helpful for them and they could say I dont want to work with you 
509 because you have got stupid ideas=do you know what I mean they 
510 couldnt easily do that I guess but er:: thats: so I dont think there is 
511 any surprise to my clients to know that Im sceptical about that and I 
512 think thats a problem you know if she is a big believer in that and 
513 thats a problem that means we dont work probably as well as 
514 maybe somebody else I think she benefits from working with me in 
515 some ways but clearly in other ways (.) you know she would benefit 
516 seeing somebody who deals in a lot more certainty with erm (.) er 
517 kind of those ideas. 
In this excerpt, the speaker gives an example of how his ideas about mental health 
could present problems when working with service-users who view the construct 
differently. This could be seen to present an interesting dilemma for CP7 since, if he 
chooses to disclose his views and these pose an obstacle to working effectively with 
a service-user, is he then responding to his own needs or to those of the service-
user? To manage this, the speaker draws on a discourse of client-centeredness as 
he constructs the decision to communicate his views as informed by service-user 
need and the desire to be as helpful as possible. Moreover, personal accountability is 
managed by presenting reflections on the situation and some of the associated 
difficulties, thereby anticipating and dissolving potential criticism (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987). Similar to the way in which we saw clinicians drawing on a discourse of moral 
concern for service-users in justifying disclosing their views of mental health, one 
effect of this account is to present service-users as rational and autonomous 
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decision-makers with regard to their care. This concern is again demonstrated when 
the speaker corrects himself in recognising that service-users may not feel able to 
challenge healthcare professionals views of mental health when they do not agree 
with them. Through constructing his decision to be open about his views about 
mental health as informed by concern for service-users, the speaker is able to avoid 
being forced into the position of a non-collaborative clinician whilst acknowledging 
the possibility that conflicting views may pose a problem in clinical practice. This 
extract could also be seen to provide an example of the tension that emerges when 
CPs who chooses a social constructionist view of mental health try to resist the 
dominant scientific discourses informed by positivist epistemologies in their clinical 
work. 
The two exceptions noted in this section are part of a larger picture in which CPs 
negotiate the influence of their views of mental health on their work with service-
users through drawing on a discourse of moral concern. As noted throughout this 
analysis, this discourse was recurrent in the arguments and explanations that CPs 
constructed in responding to my questions and it allowed their talk to be viewed from 
a moral framework where accountability could be managed within interactions.
3.9 Section summary
This section has been concerned with analysing how CPs construct mental health 
and how these views influence their work with service-users. Rather than evaluating 
to what extent these accounts may be considered accurate from a naïve realist 
perspective, this analysis have examined the effects of these accounts and how the 
accounts are constructed to achieve these effects. In the course of this examination, I 
have argued that CPs draw on a number of rhetorical devices. In particular, I have 
focussed on how speakers manage issues of accountability in presenting their 
accounts of mental health and how a discourse of moral concern is drawn on in 
constructing the effects of their views on their work with service-users. 
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Part Four:  General Discussion 
4.1 Section introduction
This discussion section is organised into three subsections: a summary of the 
findings; implications of the results and an evaluation of the study with suggestions 
for future research.
4.2 Summary of the findings
The objective of this study was to explore how CPs construct mental health and its 
effects on their work with service-users and to generate hypotheses about the effects 
of these constructions. The findings of this study show that there is a range of 
constructions of mental health available to CPs and that these are used for a variety 
of purposes. This implies that clinicians views of mental health are considerably 
more complex and flexible than previous quantitative studies have demonstrated. 
Consistent with Potter and Wetherell (1987), CPs constructed various versions of 
mental health through the use of different rhetorical strategies. In particular, CPs who 
constructed mental health in realist terms tended to draw on a biopsychosocial 
framework and employ discursive strategies such as case examples and stake 
inoculation to present their accounts as credible. The CPs who viewed mental health 
as a social construction tended to focus on the language associated with mental 
health and the implications of using this. This functioned to warrant a political 
analysis and to create a rationale for introducing alternative views of mental health. 
From a realist perspective, this diversity of discourses occupied by participants may 
be viewed as evidence of confusion about what mental health is. However, from a 
social constructionist viewpoint, this diversity may be seen as a reverberation of the 
controversy and contradiction that surrounds the concept. Central to this research is 
the notion that rather than simply reflecting reality, language is active and 
constructive, thus allowing CPs accounts to be analysed for the effects that they 
achieve in talk. The discursive strategies deployed by CPs in this study were 
consistent with past discursively informed studies, showing a cross-topic relevance 
by demonstrating how clinicians rely on particular rhetorical devices to get things 
done in verbal interactions. For instance, past research has outlined how clinicians 
use such discursive strategies to construct their accounts as credible (Harper, 1995; 
1999a), to meet challenges to their constructions (Harper, 1994), and to manage 
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professional accountability through their talk in clinical interactions (Robertson, 
Paterson, Lauder, Fenton & Gavin, 2010).
As well as examining how CPs construct mental health, this research examined the 
ways in which CPs construct the influence of their views of mental health on their 
work with service-users. One prevalent feature of these accounts was CPs 
negotiating the implications of having different views of mental health to their service-
users through drawing on a discourse of moral concern, which functioned to manage 
issues of accountability. In line with this, previous discursive studies have 
demonstrated how clinicians manage the implications of challenging service-users 
beliefs through drawing on a discourse of collaboration (Messari & Hallam, 2003).
Another issue that was brought up by a number of participants was the ethical need 
to disclose views about mental health to service-users so as to enable them to make 
informed choices in their interactions with services. This narrative is echoed by both 
the recovery movement (Andresen, Oades & Caputi, 2011) and the Department of 
Health (2010), which have argued such transparency to be key to the empowerment 
of service-users and clinicians professional accountability, respectively.
4.3 Implications of the study
Researchers have noted the epistemological challenges associated with applying 
findings from discursive studies as they emphasise the contextual nature of 
knowledge and do not seek to generate truths (Willig, 2008). However, if it is not 
able to offer anything, research is rendered futile and becomes ethically 
compromised. The positivist notion of applying research has been argued to be 
constrained by a linear and mechanistic opposition between theory and practice by 
critics who have suggested that studies should instead be considered in terms of 
their usefulness (Harper, 1999b). In this section I will suggest some theoretical, 
methodological and practical implications consistent with the analysis whilst 
reminding readers to keep the discursively positioned nature of the research context 
in mind.
Theoretical
This study has demonstrated how clinicians manage professional accountability and 
therefore the personal credibility of their practice through their constructions of 
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mental health. By analysing clinicians accounts of mental health from a discursive 
point of view, this study has offered a valuable theoretical contribution to the topic of 
mental health as an action-orientated discursive practice. The findings demonstrate 
that there are a range of constructions of mental health available to CPs and this 
thesis has outlined some of the assumptions and oppositions implicit in clinicians 
accounts and their effects (e.g., between health and illness). On a theoretical level, 
this is of use to researchers concerned with the implications of subscribing to 
particular models of mental health as it highlights how the concept of mental health is 
highly contested in itself. This suggests that, rather than relying on the a priori
assumption that mental health is a consensual object of thought, future studies 
should be designed so as to allow clinicians to articulate multi-faceted conceptions. 
As outlined, ambiguity, uncertainty and ambivalence were important features of CPs 
accounts in constructing mental health and future research will therefore need to 
capture this complexity. 
Methodological
This research represents the first discursive psychological examination of CPs 
constructions of mental health and its effects on their work with service-users. By 
showing how CPs present their accounts as credible and the effects of these through 
the use of a wide range of discursive strategies, this study has produced novel 
findings of clinical relevance, a criterion argued to be indicative of good quality 
discursive research (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). As such, not only does this thesis fill 
a gap in DA literature, but it also offers a discursive space to examine the interactive 
actions performed in other contested issues.
Practical
As outlined in the literature review (section 1.5) CPs constructions of mental health 
may have important clinical implications. This study has shown a range of 
assumptions implicit in professionals accounts and analysed the consequences of 
these accounts, in particular for how clinicians and service-users are positioned. The 
results of this study suggests that there is a need for clinicians to be honest about the 
contingent and situated nature of their language and knowledge, to make their 
assumptions about mental health explicit and to be mindful of the effects of their use 
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of language on different stakeholders in talking about mental health. Clearly, if 
clinicians are not open about such issues there may be a risk of service-users 
passively complying with a process that they do not understand or feel they benefit 
from, thereby ethically compromising CPs practice. This is particularly important in 
interactions with service-users who, given the inherent power imbalance in the 
therapeutic relationship, may not feel able to express their wishes or needs. Indeed, 
such open and honest conversations might allow service-users and other 
professionals to recognise that CPs accounts of mental health is only one possible 
interpretation of the situation and empower stakeholders to ask more questions about 
CPs views and alternative constructions. Moreover, such transparency is likely to 
strengthen the therapeutic alliance, a factor associated with positive outcomes 
(Martin, Garske & Davis, 2000) and service-user satisfaction (Roberts & Holmes, 
1998) across therapies.
The findings of this study provided novel insights into the issues of accountability at 
stake during CPs verbal interactions. The analysis demonstrated how CPs position 
themselves as liberal and thoughtful clinicians through giving agency to service-users 
and drawing on a discourse of moral concern, thereby helping clinicians to manage 
issues of accountability and to provide a rationale for potentially contentious choices 
in clinical practice. It may be possible to draw on some of the findings from this study 
to develop training packages to help CPs to reflect upon and engage in debate about 
the different positions they can adopt, that they may be forced into or place others in 
as well as the various functions served by such positions and discourses. In line with 
this, past research has outlined how therapists have been trained to help them to 
identify the discourses and positions that they and service-users adopt in therapy 
(McKenzie & Monk, 1997). This might help to increase CPs levels of reflexivity in 
considering the choices that they make and the positions that they assume and give 
others in clinical practice.
This study has shown that CPs draw on a number of unarticulated assumptions 
about mental health and that certain discourses, such as the biopsychosocial model, 
are privileged which leads to certain consequences. There is a need to further 
examine the implications of these implicit assumptions and for clinicians to explore 
how the negative effects of the dominance of some of these assumptions can be 
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challenged. Hare-Mustin (1994) urged clinicians to be reflexively aware of the 
dominant and limited nature of certain discourses so that they can challenge the 
assumptions of dominant discourses rather than merely going along with them 
(p.33). It has been argued that such a process will provide space for subjugated 
discourses, thus giving a voice to alternative conceptions of mental health (White, 
1995). Indeed, this study has revealed a wider diversity of constructions of mental 
health and associated dilemmas than one might expect having read policy 
documents, journal articles and textbooks.
4.4 Evaluation and suggestions for future research
The quality criteria that this thesis sought to meet were outlined in section 2.7, which 
the reader has been able to use in evaluating the study and I will reflect on the main 
considerations here. Research employing discourse analysis has been criticised for 
presuming that the findings or resultant discourses are representative of the 
population studied (Hammersley, 2003). As noted, rather than adopting a 
representational view of language, discourse analysts view language as action 
oriented and as being affected by a range of contextual factors. In this study mental 
health was conceptualised as a contested arena of competing discourses and all of 
the constructions expressed by CPs in my analysis are part of this discourse and 
thus of undeniable significance. I am not suggesting that this study was able to 
capture all of the possible constructions of mental health in circulation but rather 
some of the many discourses of mental health available to CPs. Whilst the 
idiosyncrasy of this research may be viewed as a limiting factor, it also carries many 
benefits as it is sensitive to the multiple voices, contradictions and variability that has 
been largely neglected by previous research. Although it is not possible to claim that 
the constructions outlined in this study are representative of CPs, this does not imply 
that the study of discourse remain only at the individual level. Indeed, this study has 
demonstrated some of the rules of discourse followed by CPs in talking about 
mental health and outlined the sort of things that can and cannot be said from their 
positions. 
Another criticism often levelled at qualitative studies is the supposed lack of clear 
criteria for identifying discourses and that the analysis is entirely dependent on the 
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competence of the researcher, and thus subject to human inconsistencies (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). In line with Burrs (2005, p.152) suggestion that  no human being 
can step outside of their humanity and view the world from no position at all it is 
acknowledged that the work reported here inarguably reflects my own judgements 
and biases as well as contextual factors such as the limited word count. However, I 
have endeavoured to present the research process and the findings of this study with 
sufficient clarity and transparency to assure readers of the consistency employed 
throughout all stages of this process. As noted by Stainton-Rogers (1991, p.10), I am 
not telling it like it is, but instead suggesting look at it this way. Thus, it is hoped 
that my openness in outlining the stages that led to the findings of this study will 
establish sufficient confidence that these were not simply the result of personal 
inclinations. Potter and Wetherell (1987) discuss research validity in terms of 
systematic transparency. Consistent with this idea, data extracts were included to 
demonstrate how the results were grounded in the data (Taylor, 2001), other 
researchers were consulted to discuss the analytical procedures and alternative 
interpretations of the data (Elliott, Fischer & Rennie, 2000), and a neutral stance was 
avoided by stating my own values, biases and situatedness. The question then 
becomes, are my analyses and implications persuasive, taking what you know of my 
assumptions into consideration? (Harper, 1999b). 
Nevertheless, there are limitations associated with my amateur status as a discourse 
analyst. In particular, although I tried to avoid a priori thinking when reading for 
discourses in the data, I wonder about the extent to which my own beliefs about 
mental health influenced what I chose to draw from the texts. Moreover, I am curious 
about what Edwards and Potter (1992) have called the interactional consequences, 
namely how my views of mental health affected what participants felt able to disclose 
in the interviews. Clearly, it is possible that their views and constructions were 
intersubjective, taking into account what they perceived to be my views of mental 
health. This issue is associated with the use of artificial data in this study, which has 
been argued to decrease the ecological validity of findings (Potter & Hepburn, 2005).
Although not epistemologically problematic, the method of data collection is likely to 
have impacted on the variability of the data. Given that mental health is an 
ambiguous and contested term, CPs may have been conscious of how they would be 
132
perceived in constructing their accounts. For instance, my presence as a trainee CP 
is certain to have influenced the ways in which the CPs did professional 
accountability and how they defended their constructions of mental health and the 
choices made in clinical practice. However, such issues of self-presentation also 
reflect participants assumptions and the positions that are taken-for-granted. As 
such, the interviews provided a medium through which these could be explored in
detail and, at times, be challenged, thereby offering a useful framework for examining 
variability in CPs accounts.
Further studies might consider how CPs present and negotiate constructions of 
mental health with service-users and other professionals in clinical settings, thus 
providing the opportunity to compare the data from this study with naturally occurring 
talk. Given the possibility that assumptions about mental health influence clinicians 
judgement of whether to challenge service-users beliefs or not, there is also a need 
for further study of the influences on such decisions. Moreover, there is a need for 
research into service-users constructions of mental health and their experiences of 
how views of mental health are negotiated in their interactions with clinicians so as to 
explore whether they see this process as open and collaborative as the CPs in this 
study presented it. It might also be fruitful for future research to conduct a discourse 
analysis of relevant policy documents and influential psychology texts that CPs use in 
training and clinical practice to examine the culturally available constructions of 
mental health within Clinical Psychology. The results of this study demonstrated how 
CPs frequently draw on the culturally available biopsychosocial discourse in 
constructing their accounts. Whilst the influence of cultural context was highlighted in 
analysing the actions performed by CPs talk, it did not focus on wider contextual 
issues as much as a different form of DA might. For instance, undertaking this study 
using Foucauldian DA would enable a more thorough consideration of the impact of 
historical and cultural context on CPs discourse. Such an approach might help to 
identify and document the disciplinary discourses used by CPs to construct mental 
health and its effects, which would be helpful as it might lead to a rethinking of CPs 
conceptual underpinnings in relation to mental health.
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Part Five: Reflexive Section
5.1 Section introduction
In traditional empirical research, the supposed neutrality of numerical data pre-empts 
the necessity of reflexivity. However, from a social constructionist viewpoint, all 
knowledge is considered to be influenced by the epistemology and ontology of the 
researcher, and is therefore value laden. As such, the relationship between the 
content of the research and the researchers theoretical and methodological 
positioning must be understood reflexively (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The prime 
concern of this reflexive section is the continuous decision-making processes that 
has led to the contents of this thesis. These reflections are informed by the reflective 
journal kept throughout the research process as well as other forms of research 
record keeping such as supervision notes and analytic memos. This section aims to 
make my personal and theoretical biases explicit in order to enable readers to 
evaluate and redefine the multiple established claims and counter-claims made in the 
study. In line with previous studies highlighting the importance of paying attention to 
reflexivity issues, it is hoped that the process of describing, explaining and reflecting 
on the various stages of the research will further add to the rigour and 
trustworthiness of the study (Flick, 2006).
5.2 Reflexivity – epistemology and methodology
The epistemogical assumptions of this research and the use of a DP framework 
highlighted the difficulties of conceptualising talk within context. This study remained 
at the discursive level and only looked at the consequences of CPs talk to the extent 
that these were evident in the discourse. The neglect of wider contexts in DP has led 
critical theorists to point out that DP analyses are only able to demonstrate how 
people talk about subjects but not, crucially, the contextual consequences of doing so 
(e.g., van Dijk, 1997). Throughout the research I found myself drawn towards 
explaining CPs constructions of mental health and its effects as the outcome of 
dominant discourses. This is noteworthy since this study was not concerned with the 
macro level of talk and did not, for instance, analyse policy documents as one might 
have done using a different form of DA such as FDA. As such, I wonder about the 
extent to which my preconceptions about what might constitute the dominant 
discourses for CPs caused me to seek for confirmatory evidence to support these 
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ideas. Moreover, at the start of this process I had considerably less knowledge about 
DA and it therefore has to be acknowledged that there may be more complex ways of 
answering the research question. However, in line with its epistemological 
assumptions, this study allowed me to channel my idiosyncratic constructions of the 
world into the research and its subjective nature could thus be viewed as a strength. 
In addition, through learning more about alternative frameworks for analysing 
discourse such as FDA I have come to appreciate the value of DP and how it allows 
researchers to stay close to the data thereby constructing, in my view, more 
grounded and convincing arguments for possible effects of talk.
5.3 Reflexivity – interviews
The social constructionist epistemology of this research implies that I, as a 
researcher, need to be sensitive to the role that I played in generating the data. The 
interviews represented a particular power dynamic as, through the authority afforded 
to me by my role as the researcher, I controlled the research, the direction of the 
conversations and the analyses that followed. This interview dynamic is likely to have 
positioned the CPs in different ways and influenced what they felt able to say. 
Indeed, Gilbert (1980) described how such dynamics creates roles such as 
confessant and student for participants. The interviews were also characterised by 
my role as a trainee CP which may have given me what Taylor (2001) calls  inside 
status in my interactions with the CPs as I was part of the same system that I sought 
to examine but who, in a work situation, would have more power than me. This 
context may both have worked to complement and undermine the research process 
as, although the language culturally available to the participants and myself may 
have been the same, I was often drawn towards accepting CPs accounts and found 
myself wanting to be less critical. This issue made me reflect on how when we as 
professionals position ourselves as protective of our collegues we may in part be 
protecting ourselves from being undermined by others. Clearly, such acts of 
protection are problematic as they may result in oppressive practices remaining 
unchallenged. Other researchers have commented on how a similar professional 
status can give researchers an increased awareness of what it might be like to be in 
the participants shoes and therefore help to maintain a respectful curiosity in 
interviews (Cecchin, 1987). Throughout the interviews I adopted a conversational 
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interviewing style and tried to strike a balance between what was interesting to the 
participants and what was interesting to me as a researcher with the aim of providing 
a context for linguistic variation (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Although I was at times 
tempted to see myself as neutral in the interviews, it is recognised that even my 
questions, which demonstrated that I was not taking things for granted, were likely to 
have communicated to participants that I was coming from a particular position. 
These factors unavoidably contributed to constructing a particular framework for the 
interviewees' accounts and, as such, it is acknowledged that alternative findings 
might have been produced if the research was undertaken in a different context.
5.4 Reflexivity – analysis and write-up
Throughout the process of reading and analysing the data I often felt at sea, arguably 
in part because explicit guides to conducting discourse analyses are not available as 
it is considered to be a matter of developing a particular analytic mentality and tacit 
expertise gained through careful reflective reading (e.g., Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 
Willig, 2008). This general vagueness about the process of choosing themes added 
to my awareness of how the choices that I made in focussing on particular analytic 
themes were my own constructions. This caused me to question whether these were 
at all grounded in the data, an issue which became especially apparent when I read 
the data to find instances consistent with the devices that I had constructed. In the 
end I made a selection of themes that felt justified in light of the data, the aims of the 
study and wider literature whilst recognising my personal influence on these choices. 
Hollway (1989) commented on the dual danger of representing the analysis as more 
matter-of-fact than it actually was or to construct it as completely open-ended and 
thus arbitrary. Taking this into account, I am hoping to communicate that the process 
of analysing the data and writing up the research was a struggle. I am not doing so in 
order to confess my limitations as a discourse analyst but rather to outline the 
methodological processes through which this analysis was arrived at, a feature 
lacking in much of DA research (Harper, 1999b). Another aspect of this process that 
is worthy of some reflection is the way in which I have, throughout this thesis, used 
specialist language, quotes from other researchers and various other discursive 
strategies to construct my account as credible. As such, this thesis is not so much a 
systematic record of facts as it is a complex social accomplishment (Gergen, 1999; 
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Harper, 1999b). The rationale for highlighting these ideas is not to reject empiricism 
or realism but to emphasise the constructive nature of language and the complex 
contextual factors that have influenced this research.
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APPENDIX A: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION PACK
   
    
INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESEARCH
Clinical Psychologists’ Conceptualisations of Mental Health and
its Perceived Effect on their Work with Service-users
Researchers: Axel Lofgren, Dr. Roshan das Nair and Dr. Vanessa Dale-Hewitt 
Invitation to take part in a research study on conceptualisations of mental 
health
You are being invited to take part in a research study. This study will go towards the 
completion of the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology for the study co-ordinator, Axel 
Lofgren. 
This information sheet will tell you why the research is being done and what 
participation involves. Please take time to read the following information carefully and 
consider whether you would like to participate in this research. 
What is the purpose of the study?
The aim of the current study is to examine Clinical Psychologists conceptualisations 
of mental health and its perceived effect on their work with service-users. Therefore, 
we are interested in speaking to you and other clinicians to explore how you as a 
clinical psychologist think about mental health and the implications (if any) of these 
conceptualisations. 
Participation in the research will involve taking part in a semi-structured interview with 
the study co-ordinator. You will also be requested to complete a brief demographic 
information sheet. Participation in this study is voluntary and hopefully you will find 
participation interesting.
Do I have to take part?
No, participation in this study is entirely voluntary. We will describe the study and go 
through this information sheet with you. If you agree to take part, we will then request 
you to sign a consent form. 
What will taking part involve?
¾ Participation in this study will involve being interviewed about this topic 
by the study co-ordinator, organised at a time convenient for you. The interview is 
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likely to last between 40 and 90 minutes. During the interview, you will be asked a 
a series of questions relating to your conceptualisation of mental health.
¾ You will be asked to complete the attached demographic information 
sheet, which asks you some questions about your current job role. 
¾ At the interview, we will be able to answer any further questions you 
have about the research; we will go through this information sheet and the 
consent form with you.
What are the potential benefits and costs of taking part in the study?
The research itself may not be of direct benefit to you. However, if the findings of this 
study are able to provide more information about the implications of 
conceptualisations of mental health on the therapeutic relationship, these may then 
be used to inform training of clinical psychologists in the future. Although the 
interview will be conducted at a time convenient to you, it will involve the cost of time 
to meet with the researcher. It is expected that the interviews will take place during 
working hours, therefore every effort will be made to conduct this at a time that 
causes least disruption to you and your colleagues; this will be considered when 
arranging the interview.
What will happen with the information I give during the study? 
The interview will be recorded on a digital audio-recorder. This is so that the interview 
can be transcribed. The digital recordings will be stored in a locked filing cabinet until 
they can be transcribed, at which point the recording will be erased. The 
transcriptions will be anonymised using a coding system so that you will not be 
identifiable from the typed notes. 
The personal information will be kept separate from the research data. Quotations 
from the interview may be used in the final version of the current research and may 
be submitted for publication in scientific journals and/or presentation at conferences. 
However, no one will be able to link the data you provide to you, and only the study 
co-ordinator will have access to the audio recordings and transcripts before they are 
anonymised.
Informed consent
Prior to participating in the interview, you will be requested to complete the attached 
consent form. 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you may decide to stop being a part of the 
research study at any time without explanation up to two weeks after the date of the 
interview. You have the right to ask that any data you have supplied to that point be 
withdrawn and destroyed. You have the right to refuse to respond to any question 
that is asked of you without penalty.
What if there is a problem?
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Given the general nature of the questions, the study is unlikely to cause distress to 
participants. However, if you have a concern about any aspect of this study or if you 
experience distress as a result of participation, please contact the research 
supervisors for this project Dr Roshan das Nair or Dr Vanessa Dale-Hewitt on 
0115- 846 8314.
Who is organising and funding the research?
This research is being organised and funded by the University of Nottingham. 
Research ethics approval has been obtained from the Institute of Work, Health and 
Organisations at the University of Nottingham.
How do I get involved?
If you are interested in taking part in this study we would be delighted to hear from 
you. Please contact the study co-ordinator using the details provided below. We will 
be happy to answer any further questions you may have.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT
AXEL LOFGREN
I-WHO, University of Nottingham
International House, 
Jubilee Campus, Wollaton Road
Nottingham. NG8 1BB
E-mail: lwxal3@nottingham.ac.uk
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APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM
                              
CONSENT FORM
(07/03/12 Version 3)
Title of Study: Clinical Psychologists Conceptualisations of Mental Health and its 
Perceived Effect on their Work with Service-users
REC ref: 
Researchers: Axel Lofgren, Dr Roshan das Nair and Dr Vanessa Dale-Hewitt
Name of Participant:
Participant ID:
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet (Version 3, 
07/03/12) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw
from the study two weeks from the date of interview without needing to 
justify my decision and without penalty. 
3. I understand that authorised individuals may look at the data collected in the 
study where it is relevant to my taking part in this study. I give permission for 
these individuals to have access to and to collect, store, analyse and publish 
information obtained from my participation in this study. I understand that 
my personal details will be kept confidential.
4. I understand that the interview will be audio-recorded and that anonymous 
direct quotes may be used in the study reports.
5. I have read and understood the above and I agree to take part in the study.
_________________ ______________    ___________________
Name of Participant Date        Signature
_________________ ______________   ____________________  
Name of Principal Investigator Date Signature
152
APPENDIX C: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION FORM
       
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION FORM
(06/03/12 Version 3)
1. Please indicate your gender.
___________________________________________________
2. Please indicate your age (in years).
     20-29              30-39             40-49           50-59         above 60 years
3. Please indicate the number of years you have been qualified as a Clinical 
Psychologist.
_________________ years.
4. Please indicate the type of service that you work in?
____________________________________________________
5. Please indicate the approximate number of hours of your work-week spent in 
direct contact with service-users.
_________________ hours.
6. Are you providing supervision as part of your current job role?
Yes                 No
7. If you answered yes to the previous question, please indicate how many hours 
a month you provide supervision.
_________________ hours. 
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APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
    
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
(06/03/12 - Version 3)
Introduction
- Cover confidentiality 
- Go through what will happen during the interview.
- Any questions before we start?
Setting
1. What type of service do you work in?
Prompts
x Can you tell me a bit about the service you work in?
x How would you describe the people you work with in your clinical practice?
x What influenced your decision to work in (the service that you work in)?
x Is there anything in particular about the service that attracted you to it
x How do you think your colleagues in this service conceptualise mental health?
Clinical Practice 
2. Can you tell me a bit about the work you do?
Prompts
x How would you describe your clinical practice?
x How would you describe yourself as a Clinical Psychologist?
x How do you identify yourself as a Clinical Psychologist?
x What informs the choices that you make in your clinical practice?
x How do you position yourself as a Clinical Psychologist?
x Do you align yourself with any particular school of thought?
Conceptualisations of Mental Health
3. What is your understanding of mental health?
Prompts
x How do you view the idea of mental health?
x How do you define mental health?
x How do you conceptualise mental health?
x How do you make sense of mental health?
Factors associated with Conceptualisations
4. What factors do you think influence your view of mental health?
Prompts
x Where does your idea of mental health stem from?
x What were your assumptions about mental health before training as a Clinical 
Psychologist?
x Have these assumptions changed?
x What assumptions have changed and how?
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Link between Conceptualisations of Mental Health and Clinical Practice
5. How do you think your views about mental health influence your work with service-
users?
Prompts
x In what way does your conceptualisation of mental health affect your clinical 
work?
x Are there certain aspects of the job that are more affected by your views of 
mental health than others?
x How do you think your conceptualisation of mental health fits with the service 
you work in?
x How do you think your conceptualisation of mental health fits with the rest of 
your colleagues?
x Do you think your service-users come away with an idea about your 
understanding of mental health?
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APPENDIX E: ADAPTED JEFFERSONIAN TRANSCRIPTION NOTATION 
SYSTEM 
Symbol Example Explanation
(0.8) Are you (0.4) sure? Pause is measured in tenths of a 
second.
(.) so (.) what Micro-pause is less than two-tenths 
of a second.
::::: I:::: I am not sure Colons denote sound-stretching of 
preceding sound (in tenths of 
seconds). 
___ I think so Underlining indicates emphasis by 
speaker.
{ I:     {I was just
CP: {Well if you
Left brackets indicate the point at 
which one speaker overlaps anothers 
talk.
= I was=well if Equal sign indicates that there is no 
hearable gap between the words.
WORD Im not SURE Capitals, except at beginnings, denote 
a rise in volume.
° °or maybe not° Words in degree signs denote quieter
talk.
> < >Im not sure< Carets pointing inwards฀฀฀ ฀m฀a฀r฀k฀ 
faster pace.
< > <Im not sure> Carets pointing outwards฀฀฀ ฀m฀a฀r฀k฀ 
slower pace.
? Right? Question mark denotes rising 
intonation.
. Of course. Full stop indicates falling intonation.
Hhh I can see .hhh that A row of hs prefixed by a dot indicates 
an inbreath, without a dot, an 
outbreath (each h denotes duration in 
tenths of seconds).
( ) What is ( ) doing Single bracket with no text for 
unhearable word.
(word) What are you (doing) Word in parentheses denotes the best 
possible hearing.
(( )) I am not ((coughs)) Words in double parentheses contain 
author’s descriptions.
(Adapted from Rapley, 2007).
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APPENDIX F: ETHICAL APPROVAL DOCUMENTS 
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APPENDIX F: FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
What are the patterns present in the text? (Potter & Wetherell, 1987)
What variations are there in the text? (Potter & Wetherell, 1987)
What kind of positions are set up and taken up? (Davies & Harré, 1990)
What kinds of identities are created? (Silverman, 2001)
What concepts are constructed as taken-for-granted, given or obvious? (Potter, 
1996)
What are the dominant narratives in the accounts? (Parker, 1998)
What evidence of resistance to dominant narratives is present in the text? (Parker, 
1998)
How are accounts of mental health designed to accomplish their factual status?
What rhetorical strategies and devices are used? (Edwards & Potter, 1992)
What problems might these rhetorical strategies function to manage? (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987)
What are the metaphors used in the accounts? (Potter & Wetherell, 1987)
How do speakers attribute authority to their accounts?
What is not said that might have been? (Potter & Wetherell, 1987)
What oppositions are implied in the text? (Cameron, 2001)
What type of world is constructed in the text? (Rapley, 2007)
How is reality negotiated by speakers? (Potter, 1996)
What means of describing and defining mental health are present in the accounts?
What ideological effects might these have? (Willig, 2008)
What is achieved through these accounts?
Which of these effects occur frequently? (Willig, 2008)
What are the relationships between the different discourses of mental health? 
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APPENDIX G: STEPS TAKEN IN THE ANALYSIS
Step 1
Following each interview, interesting aspects were written down and considered in 
relation to other findings. Parts of the interviews that were deemed analytically 
interesting (e.g., relevant to the research questions, helpful in interpreting the data, 
good illustrations of themes and rhetorical devices) were also transcribed and 
brought to research supervision sessions for discussion.
Step 2
Following transcription, reading and re-reading of the data corpus facilitated the 
development of broad categories informed by the questions in the interview 
schedule. Features of the data that were considered interesting were also highlighted 
to generate additional headings using the same criteria as outlined in Step 1. 
Working as inclusively as possible, the transcripts were then re-read again and 
additional extracts were placed under the broad headings as were relevant notes and 
parts of extracts noted earlier in the process. Any parts of the transcripts deemed to 
belong to more than one category were copied to both or all. To allow the analysis to 
be visibly grounded in the data and to remain traceable, all extracts were referenced 
with the page number and pseudonym of participants transcripts.
Step 3
At this stage of the analysis, I felt rather overwhelmed by the vast amount of 
categories and data, an experience described by previous discursive researchers 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Research supervision sessions were invaluable in 
facilitating the process of selecting a narrower focus to provide a structure to the 
data. Through discussions with the research supervisors the following features were 
selected for further analysis: constructions of mental health and their effects, the 
negotiation of views with service-users, construction of views of mental health as 
needing to be controlled/regulated in interactions with service-users, construction of 
the issue of whether to disclose views of mental health to service-users. Within each 
of these wider categories there were a number of sub-categories (especially within 
the category of constructions of mental health as reflected in the many aspects 
covered in the results section). As well as these broader categories, recurring 
features in the data and frequently employed discursive strategies were also included 
for further analysis. For instance, the CPs tendency to respond with surprise and 
confusion to my question about their views of mental health was deemed analytically 
interesting and was therefore included. 
Step 4
These extracts were then read keeping in mind the analytic questions outlined in 
Appendix G, picking out relevant trends and features in the data and thinking about 
these in relation to the research aims. This process resulted in the formation of novel 
categories, the merging of other categories and some of the original categories 
becoming redundant to the aims of the research and they were consequently omitted 
in line with the analytic framework (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The links between the 
various categories were also considered and they were grouped accordingly to 
develop a framework for the analysis that would enable a coherent linear story to be 
told about each aspect of the research (e.g., realist and relativist constructions of 
mental health). 
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Step 5
Once an initial draft structure had been developed, extracts were chosen on the 
basis of their relevance to the aims of the study, their ability to illustrate prevalent 
features of the data in a way that did not require readers to refer to the rest of the 
excerpt, and the extent to which they were able to demonstrate richness, diversity 
and variation of an example. On this basis a first draft of the analysis section was 
prepared.
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APPENDIX H: STATEMENT ON PERSONAL REFLEXIVITY
Following Yardleys (1997) recommendations regarding reflexivity, I will briefly 
summarise my position on conceptualisations of mental health. I am sceptical of 
biological conceptualisations of mental health as I think that there is a risk of taking a 
persons experience out of its social and historical context, thus dismissing significant 
aspects of their experience and converting it into an individual problem. Instead, I 
prefer to locate mental health within the wider contexts, such as families, institutions, 
and broader societal issues of inequality. The interviews were treated as 
conversations rather than as elicitations and both parties were considered
responsible in the production of meaning, although from different positions. However, 
in the interviews I did not elaborate on my own views on mental health or any other 
topic. Throughout the process of this study I endeavoured to be attentive to my own 
perspectives and sought to address and discuss any preconceived ideas that were 
brought up and the impact of these on the research.
